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I. High Noon
The Telecommunications Act of 19961 promised the world. It has
1. Pub. L. No. 104-104, 110 Stat. 56 [hereinafter Telecommunications Act] (codified in
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delivered considerably less. The Act's preamble promised that the Act
would "promote competition and reduce regulation," "secure lower
prices and higher quality services... and encourage the rapid
deployment of new telecommunications technologies. ' 2 On its first
occasion to review the Act's provisions on local and long-distance
telephony, the Supreme Court spoke in far less glamorous terms.
"[M]ost unfortunate," lamented the Justices, "for a piece of legislation
that profoundly affects a crucial segment of the economy worth tens of
billions of dollars," the Telecommunications Act "is in many important
respects a model of ambiguity or indeed self-contradiction.
'3
The most vociferous critics of telecommunications deregulation
argue that the Act has produced nothing but a cascade of megamergers.
Consumers Union, for instance, protests that as "telephone monopolies
continu[e] to merge rather than compete," the Act "will not deliver on
its promise of broad-based competition and lower telephone prices."
'4
Implicit in this cry is the assumption that the telecommunications
mergers that have occurred since 1996 have done little or nothing to
reduce prices, spur innovation, or otherwise enhance consumer welfare.
This Article will address questions of law and policy raised by these
megamergers. The very fact that I will be discussing
"telecommunications" as an industry distinct from broadcasting and
other forms of mass communications is a signal that the Act has not
succeeded in "opening all telecommunications markets to
competition."5 Most of the commentary still focuses on "[t]he two most
noteworthy and most controversial changes in the status quo,
authorizing competition in local telephone markets and, reciprocally,
authorizing Bell operating company... entry into long distance."
'6
Part II of this Article will describe the most important changes in
the competitive landscape since 1996. In particular, it will recount the
rise of the seven firms that now dominate American
telecommunications. The Magnificent Seven, as I shall call them, are
SBC Communications, Bell Atlantic, BellSouth, Qwest (heir apparent
to US West), AT&T, MCI WorldCom, and Sprint. The first four are
scattered sections of 47 U.S.C.).
2. Id. at 56 (preamble); cf, e.g., 47 U.S.C.A. § 257(b) (West Supp. 1999) (instructing the
FCC "to promote... policies and purposes... favoring diversity of media voices, vigorous
economic competition, technological advancement, and promotion of the public interest,
convenience, and necessity").
3. AT&T Corp. v. Iowa Utils. Bd., 119 S. Ct. 721,738 (1999).
4. Consolidation in the Telecommunications Industry, Hearing Before the Subcomm. on
Antitrust, Business Rights & Competition of the Senate Judiciary Comm. (Testimony of Gene
Kimmelman), 105th Cong., 1998 WL 767370 (Sept. 15,1998).
5. S. CONF. REP. No. 104-230, at 1 (1996) (emphasis added).
6. Glen 0. Robinson, The "New" Telecommunications Act A Second Opinion, 29
CONN. L. REv. 289,289 (1996).
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Bell Operating Companies (BOCs); the last three are interexchange
carriers (IXCs) with increasingly diversified business portfolios. Minor
players from the parallel worlds of cable television and wireless
telephony have remained just that, minor players. The only change is
that the leading IXCs have incorporated these lines of business into
larger strategies for cracking the BOCs' grip on local telephone
markets.
Part III describes certain provisions of the Telecommunications
Act and key decisions interpreting those provisions. These statutory,
administrative, and judicial mileposts effectively built the Magnificent
Seven by dictating the merger strategies that American telephony's
largest players would pursue. Part IV outlines and analyzes the merger
strategies that have emerged. Three strategies-horizontal mergers
between BOCs, BOC acquisitions of independent local exchange
companies (LECs), and IXC mergers of all stripes-have accounted for
most of the restructuring in this industry since 1996. A fourth strategy,
which accounts for BOC acquisitions of non-LEC assets, has largely
failed.
Part V draws some tentative conclusions from merger mania in
telecommunications. Telephony and video programming simply do not
mix. Convergence between the worlds of entertainment and
broadcasting-between content providers and conduit owners in mass
communications-is proceeding without regard to developments in
telephony. The cable industry has contributed to telecommunications
reform since 1996, but not in the leading role that the Act's framers
anticipated. Neither the Act nor the opening round of mergers,
however, exhausts the competitive possibilities in telephony. Three
avenues of competitive attack remain: the Internet, wireless telephony,
and overseas investment. By Net, by air, or by sea, potential challengers
to the Magnificent Seven may yet emerge. In the meanwhile, the FCC,
responding ad hoc to numerous unanticipated legal and economic twists
since 1996, has made merger policy an important and workable
component of its implementation of the Telecommunications Act.
H. The Gunslingers, Then and Now
Radical changes in market structure or industrial organization can
upset, even undermine, the competitive assumptions on which
deregulation proceeds. The Telecommunications Act is no exception;
the marketplace in which the Act took effect no longer exists. As of
1996, three large IXCs were prepared to square off against eight large
LECs-seven BOCs and one independent-for all the local and long-
distance carriage that the traffic could bear. Competitive access
providers (CAPs), multiple cable system operators (MSOs), and
wireless operators added spice and potentially significant ingredients to
[Vol. 50
the competitive stew.7
Since 1996, however, the American telecommunications industry
has rushed toward combination and concentration. Industry-wide
reshuffling after comprehensive legislative reform has reduced these
eleven major players and their smaller cohorts to the Magnificent
Seven. Four of the seven original BOCs have been absorbed, either by
their more aggressive cohorts or, in one case, by a company that made
its initial public offering nearly a year and a half after the enactment of
the 1996 Act.8 Mergers have catapulted WorldCom and Qwest, two
firms that scarcely attracted attention in 1996, into dominant positions.
The number seven is even more volatile than it is arbitrary: as this
Article churned through the editing process, MCI WorldCom beat
BellSouth in a bidding war for Sprint. Nevertheless, at least for the
moment, the Magnificent Seven rule this market.
A. The Opening Round
On the eve of the 1996 Act, the Bell breakup decree9 still cast a
long shadow. The heirs of the Bell system constituted no fewer than
eight of the leading players in American telecommunications. Seven of
these firms-NYNEX, Bell Atlantic, BellSouth, Ameritech,
Southwestern Bell, US West, and Pacific Telesis-were the original
BOCs created on January 1, 1984, by the Modification of Final
Judgment (MFJ).O The MFJ not only separated the BOCs from AT&T
and from each other but also barred the BOCs from most long-distance
carriage. Presumably "a corporation that enjoyed a monopoly on local
calls would ineluctably leverage that bottleneck control in the
interexchange (long distance) market."" The eighth firm, of course,
was AT&T itself, shorn of its local exchange (LX) affiliates but still
armed with its formidable Western Electric and Bell Labs subsidiaries. 12
Tempting though the analogy might be, Ma Bell and her seven
7. Cf. Microwave Communications, Inc., 18 F.C.C.2d 953, 978 (1969) (statement of
Johnson, Commissioner) (celebrating the introduction of "a little salt and pepper of
competition to" traditional public utility law's "rather tasteless stew of regulatory
protection").
8. See Richard Waters, Strong Demand for Qwest in First-Day Trading, FIN. TIMES,
June 25,1997, at 38.
9. See United States v. Western Elec. Co., 569 F. Supp. 1057 (D.D.C.), affd mem. sub
nom. California v. United States, 464 U.S. 1013 (1983); United States v. American Tel. &
Tel. Co., 552 F. Supp. 131 (D.D.C. 1982), affd mem. sub nom. Maryland v. United States,
460 U.S. 1001 (1983), terminated by Telecommunications Act, supra note 1, § 601(a)(1), 110
Stat. at 143-44, reprinted in 47 U.S.C.A. § 152 note (West Supp. 1999).
10. See also 47 U.S.C.A. § 153(4) (West Supp. 1999) (defining the term "Bell operating
company").
11. United States v. Western Elec. Co., 969 F.2d 1231,1238 (D.C. Cir. 1992).
12. See AT&T, 552 F. Supp. at 166-67 (declining to order the divestiture of Western
Electric and Bell Telephone Laboratories from AT&T).
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daughters bore little resemblance to Snow White and the Seven
Dwarves. These firms dominated the markets left open to them under
the MFJ. Far from confining itself to interexchange (IX) carriage,
AT&T in the 1980s would become a conglomerate with additional
interests in computing, telecommunications equipment manufacturing,
and consumer finance. For their part, the seven BOCs commanded
most of the LX business in the United States. As of 1996, the BOCS still
"control[led] over 80 percent of the [nation's] local telephone
network."'
3
The largest independent LEC in 1996 was GTE. Thanks to an
extremely generous antitrust consent decree,14 GTE was able to unite
"Sprint's long distance and GTE's local telephone operations" under a
single corporate umbrella.' 5 Although the 1984 consent decree barred
GTE from acquiring another IXC for ten years,'6 GTE unloaded Sprint
without serious efforts to replace its "money-losing" IX operations.'
7
MCI, heir to the company that originally cracked the Bell system's
long-distance monopoly in 1969,18 joined AT&T and Sprint in dividing
much of the IX market. Additional victories on the eve of AT&T's
breakup19 enhanced MCI's reputation as the company that beat Bell.20
In fact, however, MCI and Sprint were the beneficiaries of a conscious
federal policy of assessing AT&T's IX competitors a lower share of the
common costs of maintaining Bell's LX networks.21 Throughout the
predivestiture period, the Federal Communication Commission (FCC)
gave MCI, Sprint, and other nondominant carriers a substantial price
advantage over AT&T by manipulating access charges for the
completion of IXCs' calls on the "last mile" of the LECs' networks.22
13. H.R. REP. NO. 104-204, at 50 (1996) [hereinafter HOUSE REPORT], reprinted in 1996
U.S.C.C.A.N. 10,13.
14. See United States v. GTE Corp., 603 F. Supp. 730 (D.D.C. 1984), terminated by
Telecommunications Act, supra note 1, § 601(a)(2), 110 Stat. at 143.
15. Id. at733.
16. See id. at 739-40.
17. MICHAEL K. KELLOGG ET AL., FEDERAL TELECOMMUNICATIONS LAW § 8.6, at
420(1992).
18. See Microwave Communications, Inc., 18 F.C.C.2d 953 (1969).
19. See MCI Telecomms. Corp. v. FCC, 580 F.2d 590 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S.
980 (1978); MCI Telecomms. Corp. v. FCC, 561 F.2d 365 (D.C. Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434
U.S. 1040 (1978).
20. See LARRY KAHANER, ON THE LINE: THE MEN OF MCI-WHO TOOK ON AT&T,
RISKED EVERYTHING, AND WON! (1986).
21. See Exchange Network Facilities for Interstate Access, 71 F.C.C.2d 440, 443 (1969);
Stephen G. Breyer, Antitrust, Deregulation, and the Newly Liberated Marketplace, 75 CAL. L.
REV. 1005, 1022-24 (1987); Paul W. MacAvoy & Kenneth Robinson, Winning by Losing:
The AT&T Settlement and Its Impact on Telecommunications, 1 YALE J. ON REG. 1, 34
(1983); Paul W. MacAvoy & Kenneth Robinson, Losing by Judicial Policymaking: The First
Year of the AT&T Divestiture, 2 YALE J. ON REG. 225,249 (1983).
22. See GERALD W. BROCK, TELECOMMUNICATION POLICY FOR THE INFORMATION
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Beyond the wireline world of LECs and IXCs, there was little
actual competition but plenty of anticipation. "Competitive access" was
little more than a mirage; CAP services provided by such firms as MFS
and Teleport were limited to "a number of fortunately situated business
customers."23  These firms nevertheless established a competitive
beachhead in the local market; in 1994, for instance, MFS secured
permission from the Maryland Public Service Commission to offer LX
services to business and residential customers. 24
Wireless telephony and the cable industry completed the
competitive picture. Optimistic commentators speculated that "[r]adio"
and other wireless technologies, with "the potential to be cheaper than
copper in the local loop," might eventually "put a final end to the local
exchange monopoly."25 The independence of cellular telephony from
the BOCs was hotly contested throughout the history of the MFJ.26
Regulatory hostility to BOC involvement in the cellular industry
spurred Pacific Telesis to divest AirTouch Communications. 27 A similar
concern prompted the government's challenge to AT&T's acquisition of
McCaw Cellular, at that time the largest wireless carrier in the United
States.28 Meanwhile, the digital alternative of personal communications
AGE: FRoM MONOPOLY TO COMPETTON 208 (1994).
23. Lawrence Sullivan, Elusive Goals Under the Telecommunications Act Preserving
Long Distance Competition upon Baby Bell Entry and Attaining Local Exchange
Competition: We'll Not Preserve the One Unless We Attain the Other, 25 Sw. U. L. REV. 487,
501 (1996); see also WILLIAM J. BAUMOL & J. GREGORY SIDAK, TOWARD COMPETMON
IN LOCAL TELEPHONY 17 (1994) (describing the CAPs' business as "concentrated in major
office buildings and main switching locations for interexchange carriers").
24. See MFS Intelenet of Maryland, Inc., 152 P.U.R.4th 102, 110-11 (Md. Pub. Serv.
Comm'n 1994). See generally Alexander C. Larson, Reforming Telecommunications Policy
in Response to Entry into Local Exchange Markets, 18 HAsT. COMM & ENT L. 1, 7-13
(1995) (describing early efforts by the states to promote competitive entry into LX markets).
25. KELLOGG, supra note 17, at 3 (1995 Supp.); see also Mark Landler, An Aerial Assault
on the Wired Nation, N.Y. TIMEs, Feb. 26, 1996, at C1 (describing widespread agreement,
but not unanimity, among telecommunications executives that local competition would
proceed through a wireless rather than a landwire strategy).
26. Compare United States v. Western Elec. Co., 673 F. Supp. 525, 551 (D.D.C. 1987)
(declining to lift IX restrictions on the BOCs' cellular operations based on a finding that
discrimination against customers of the BOCs' competitors was "not only possible but
probable") with United States v. Western Elec. Co., 890 F. Supp. 1, 9-10 (D.D.C. 1995)
(granting, with limiting conditions, the BOCs' motion to allow the provision of IX carriage to
the BOCs' cellular customers), vacated as moot, 84 F.3d 1452 (D.C. Cir. 1996).
27. See Kenneth J. Arrow et aL, The Competitive Effects of Line-of-Business Restrictions
in Telecommunications, 16 MANAGERIAL & DECISION ECON. 301, 306, 310-11 (1995); Sam
Ginn, Restructuring the Wireless Industry and the Information Skyway, 4 J. ECON. & MGMT.
STRATEGY 139,142 (1995).
28. See SBC Communications, Inc. v. FCC, 56 F.3d 1484 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (approving a
consent decree that set conditions on the AT&T/McCaw merger), terminated by
Telecommunications Act, supra note 1, § 601(a)(3), 110 Stat. at 143.
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services (PCS) was emerging as a direct competitor of analog cellular.29
Congress nevertheless downplayed the competitive potential of wireless
telephony. The legislative history of the Telecommunications Act
explicitly rejected the possibility that wireless service could qualify as
"facilities-based" competition against the incumbent LECS. 30
The cable industry, by contrast, harbored many a competitive
dream. Congress identified the availability of cable television "to more
than 95% of United States homes" as strong evidence "that meaningful
facilities-based competition" for LX carriage was "possible." 31  The
leading MSOs were investing in CAPs; most saliently, an alliance
consisting of TCI, Cox Enterprises, Continental Cablevision, and
Comcast had by 1996 acquired a majority stake in Teleport, a leading
CAP.32 Hopeful commentators eagerly anticipated the deployment of
"hybrid coax" technology that would allow cable operators to carry
switched voice messages. 33
The opposite scenario had also become part of the dream of
reform: some observers anticipated that LECs might eventually be able
to transmit video programming through hybrid coax or some other
broadband medium. In its 1992 "Video Dialtone Order,"34 the FCC
presaged telephone company carriage of audiovisual content; a flurry of
judicial decisions in 1994 and 1995 fell just short of facilitating
immediate, full-blown LEC entry into video programming as well as
carriage.35
29. See, e.g., Cincinnati Bell Tel. Co. v. FCC, 69 F.3d 752 (6th Cir. 1995) (invalidating
FCC rules that restricted cross-ownership of existing cellular operations and newly allocated
PCS spectrum); see also Omnipoint Corp. v. FCC, 78 F.3d 620, 626-27 (D.C. Cir. 1996)
(describing a scheme for auctioning broadband PCS spectrum).
30. H.R. CONF. REP. No. 104-458, at 147 (1996) [hereinafter CONFERENCE REPORT],
reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 124,160.
31. Ild. at 148, reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 124, 160; see also HOUSE REPORT, supra
note 13, at 77, reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 10, 43. But cf SBC Communications Inc. v.
FCC, 138 F.3d 410, 420 (D.C. Cir. 1998) ("[W]e see no indication that Congress believed [in
1996] that cable companies, or anyone else, had... near term capability" to "provide
meaningful facilities-based competition.").
32. See Teleport Communications-New York, 7 F.C.C.R. 5986 (1992); BAUMoL &
SIDAK, supra note 23, at 17.
33. See, e.g., Michael Botein, Cable/Telco Mergers and Acquisitions: An Antitrust
Analysis, 25 Sw. U. L. REv. 569,581-82 (1996).
34. See In re Telephone Company-Cable Television Cross-Ownership Rules, 7 F.C.C.R.
5781 (1992), terminated by Telecommunications Act, supra note 1, § 302(b)(3), 110 Stat. at
124. See generally Robert L. Pettit & Christopher J. McGuire, Video Dialtone: Reflections on
Changing Perspectives in Telecommunications Regulation, 6 HARv. J.L. & TECH. 343 (1993).
35. See US West, Inc. v. United States, 48 F.3d 1092, 1106 (9th Cir.) (invalidating 47
U.S.C. § 533(b) (1994), a subsequently repealed provision that banned any common carrier
from providing video programming to subscribers), vacated, 516 U.S. 1155 (1996); Pacific
Telesis Group v. United States, 48 F.3d 1106, 1107 (9th Cir. 1994) (same); Chesapeake &
Potomac Tel. Co. v. United States, 42 F.3d 181, 185 (4th Cir. 1994) (same), vacated, 516 U.S.
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The Act took little or no account of a new telecommunications
medium that was only beginning to take shape in 1996: the Internet.3 6
Beyond passing the Communications Decency Act,37 Congress had little
to say about the Internet, but soon even that legislative effort soon lay
in ruins.3 The early stages of implementing the Telecommunications
Act have exposed Congress's shortsightedness in this regard. Internet
access has emerged as both a secure part of the strategies that could
crack the local exchange bottleneck and as the likeliest avenue by which
cable assets in any form will contribute to the evolution of this industry.
B. The Magnificent Seven
(1) POTS and PANS, Hedgehogs and Foxes
American telephony has become considerably more concentrated
since the passage of the Telecommunications Act. Four of the eight
major LECs that existed in 1996 have either disappeared in mergers or
stand on the verge of being absorbed. One BOC (US West) and one
major IXC (MCI) were overtaken and acquired by more aggressive
upstarts. Two of America's three largest long-distance companies are
preparing to merge, pending FCC review. The survivors of this
deregulatory shootout-Bell Atlantic, SBC, BellSouth, Qwest, AT&T,
Sprint, and MCI WorldCom-deserve the title of "The Magnificent
Seven."
In the immediate aftermath of the 1996 Act, Bell Atlantic's
acquisition of NYNEX and SBC's acquisition of Pacific Telesis reduced
the number of BOCs to five. These leading BOCs, vastly more
aggressive than BellSouth or the formerly independent US West, have
expanded even further. SBC's acquisition of Ameritech has united the
assets and service territories of three formerly independent Baby Bells
within a single BOC. Likewise, FCC approval of Bell Atlantic's
proposed acquisition of GTE would complete GTE's journey from its
post-MFJ status as "[tlhe largest integrated telephone company in the
1155 (1996); Southern New England Tel. Co. v. United States, 886 F. Supp. 211, 219-20 (D.
Conn. 1995) (same); Bell South Corp. v. United States, 868 F. Supp. 1335, 1344 (N.D. Ala.
1994) (same); Ameritech Corp. v. United States, 867 F. Supp. 721, 737 (N.D. Ill. 1994)
(same); see also GTE California, Inc. v. FCC, 39 F.3d 940, 951 (9th Cir. 1994) (Noonan, J.,
dissenting) ("[Section 533] is an irrational obstruction to the exercise of free speech."); cf
Nynex Corp. v. FCC, 153 F.R.D. 1, 3 (D. Me. 1994) (permitting a cable operator to intervene
in an action challenging § 533(b)).
36. See generally John D. Podesta, Unplanned Obsolescence: The Telecommunications
Act of 1996 Meets the Internet, 45 DEPAUL L. REV. 1093 (1996).
37. See Telecommunications Act, supra note 1, §§ 501-509,110 Stat. at 133-39.




United States" to corporate extinction.39 Even without the GTE
merger, Bell Atlantic has become a player in the global wireless market.
The bidding war that yielded MCI WorldCom effected the most
dramatic change among IXCs between 1996 and 1999. The MCI
acquisition was far from the final chapter in this story. A Mississippi-
based firm once called LDDS Communications is threatening to
combine the second and third largest American long-distance
companies under the WorldCom banner. The crucial point is that the
surviving IXCs-AT&T, Sprint, and MCI WorldCom- look radically
different not only from each other but also from the form each assumed
in 1996. These companies' strategies now include Internet access, "one-
stop shopping," and other objectives that scarcely bore names in 1996.
AT&T in particular has made major acquisitions in each of the non-
IXC sectors that had been expected in 1996 to challenge the LX
monopoly: wireless, cable, and competitive access. AT&T's bids for
Tele-Communications, Inc. (TCI), and MediaOne Group, two leading
cable operators, may represent the most significant step by any carrier
toward facilities-based LX entry.
Some things have not changed. The traditional distinction between
the local exchange and long distance still matters. The longstanding
divide between local and interexchange carriage now splits the
Magnificent Seven into two distinct camps. In order better to
distinguish the BOCs from the IXCs, let us mix one pair of metaphors
drawn from telecommunications shop talk with another pair drawn
from the work of the late political philosopher, Isaiah Berlin.
40
Telecommunications mavens speak of POTS and PANS, while Berlin
distinguished between hedgehogs and foxes.
The BOCs as POTS hedgehogs know one great thing: plain old
telephone service. During its twelve-year ascendancy, the Bell breakup
decree confined the BOCs primarily to the business of "providing
telephone service among parties within each local exchange and
granting access to the exchanges to [independent] long-distance
carriers."'41  Old habits die hard; years of progressively intense
deregulation have not changed the essential character of the BOCs as
LX specialists. "The seven independent BOCs [really] are not the old
AT&T";42 Ma Bell had a Long Lines Division, which today's BOCs
most emphatically do not have and cannot develop without regulatory
39. KELLOGG, supra note 17, § 8.1, at 401.
40. Compare HENK BRANDS & EVAN T. LEO, THE LAW AND REGULATION OF
TELECOMMUNICATIONS CARRIERS 703 (1999) (defining POTS and PANS) with ISAIAH
BERLIN, THE HEDGEHOG AND THE Fox: AN ESSAY ON TOLSTOY'S VIEw OF HISTORY
(1954).
41. Illinois Bell Tel. Co. v. FCC, 988 F.2d 1254,1257 (D.C. Cir. 1993).
42. United States v. Western Elec. Co., 993 F.2d 1572, 1580 (D.C. Cir.), cert denied, 510
U.S. 984 (1993).
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cooperation. There never really was more than an "amorphous" and
overstated "risk that the Bell companies, in their zeal to diversify, will
neglect relatively pedestrian... operations" in favor of "more
glamorous, albeit more speculative, business[es]." 43
By contrast, and with apologies to Lillian Hellman,44 the
transformed IXCs as the "big foxes" of PANS know many little things:
not just interexchange carriage but also the full range of pretty amazing
new services. Wireless telephony, video programming, and Internet
access are now essential elements of the major IXCs' competitive
strategy. In short, BOCs as hedgehogs and IXCs as foxes are preparing
for the same battle with radically different perspectives and arsenals.
(2) Lord Low Everything Else
The Seven have become truly Magnificent because the first round
of mergers after 1996 has dwarfed every other source of competition in
the telecommunications industry. The other players on the scene as of
1996 have, at least for now, dropped far into the competitive
background. Formerly independent CAPs are now IXC subsidiaries.
Nor has explosive growth liberated wireless telephony, a field still
dominated by wireline carriers.
In the initial stages of the Telecommunications Act's
implementation, the greatest disappointment may be the dismal
performance of the cable industry in penetrating the LX market. If so,
the LECs' failure to enter the market for video programming delivery
must rank a close second. None of the nation's MSOs have invaded the
LX markets in their service territories. Nor have LECs offered any
meaningful resistance to the cable industry, whether in the form of open
video systems or in the more modest guise of video dialtone. The
FCC's 1998 report on competition in markets for video programming
delivery spoke of LEC entry in the same breath as it spoke of entry by
electric and gas utilities. 45
Instead, the round of mergers that made the Magnificent Seven has
given cable an altogether different role in telecommunications reform.
The cable operators' sunk coaxial network is unlikely to carry a
significant number of voice messages, but it adds high-speed Internet
access to the IXCs' arsenal against the entrenched BOCS. "[T]he one
area where cable operators and telephone companies have started to
43. United States v. Western Elec. Co., 673 F. Supp. 525,599 (D.D.C. 1987), affid in part,
rev'd in part, 900 F.2d 283 (D.C. Cir.), cert denied, 498 U.S. 911 (1990).
44. Cf. LILLIAN HELLMAN, THE LrITLE FOXES: A PLAY IN THREE ACrs (1939).
45. See In re Annual Assessment of the Status of Competition in Markets for the
Delivery of Video Programming, 14 Communications Reg. (P&F) 10,923, 3 (Dec. 23,
1998).
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compete is in the provision of Internet access." 46
It is therefore no longer meaningful to treat CAPs, wireless
carriers, and cable companies as if they represented independent,
credible threats to enter the LX market. Instead, there are only two
economically and legally significant classes of players: competitive local
exchange companies (CLECs) and incumbent local exchange
companies (ILECs). Despite their name, the most important CLECs
are anything but small. AT&T is a CLEC, as are Sprint and MCI
WorldCom. ILECs, at least until the round of horizontal mergers
among LECs reaches its logical conclusion, include both BOCs and
independent LECs such as GTE. It is yet another measure of the
Magnificent Seven's hegemony that the boundary between ILECs and
major CLECs tracks the boundary between BOCs and major IXCs.
I1. The Legal Mothers of Merger Mania
At its theoretical core, the Telecommunications Act of 1996
conducted a three-way experiment in the form of imperfect competition
most commonly associated with Harold Demsetz.47 The Act sought to
unleash three of the most deeply entrenched monopolists in the
American economy-local exchange carriers, interexchange carriers,
and cable system operators-on each other's markets in the hope that
competition among the large would dissolve these industrial giants.
48
"LX service, the last of the great natural monopolies, would succumb to
a technologically sophisticated, intermodal assault. '49 Even if each
combatant eventually achieved only "rather modest" "inroads," the
mere presence of "new entrant[s]" in each of these "tight oligopoly
industr[ies]" could "shake things up a great deal."50 In the battle royale
that Congress anticipated, IXCs and MSOs would lead the charge into
the local exchange, while BOCs would be allowed to breach the MFJ-
era firewalls that had kept them out of long-distance carriage 51 and
46. In re Annual Assessment of the Status of Competition in Markets for the Delivery of
Video Programming, 13 F.C.C.R. 13,044, 13,050 (1998). See generally In re Annual
Assessment of the Status of Competition in Markets for the Delivery of Video Programming,
13 F.C.C.R. 1034,1043,1064-67 (1997) (describing competition between telephone and cable
companies in the provision of Internet access).
47. See generally Harold Demsetz, Why Regulate Utilities?, 11 J.L. & ECON. 55 (1968).
48. See, e.g., Henry Geller, The 1996 Telecom Act: Cutting the Competitive Gordian Knot,
29 CONN. L. REv. 205,207-08 (1996).
49. Jim Chen, TELRIC in Turmoil; Telecommunications in Transition" A Note on the
Iowa Utilities Board Litigation, 33 WAKE FOREST L. RaV. 51,56 (1998).
50. Donald F. Turner, Conglomerate Mergers and Section 7 of the Clayton Act, 78 HARV.
L. REv. 1313,1383 (1964); accord BOC Int'l Ltd. v. FTC, 557 F.2d 24,27 (2d Cir. 1977).
51. See United States v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 552 F. Supp. 131, 188-91 (D.D.C.
1982), affd mem. sub nom. Maryland v. United States, 460 U.S. 1001 (1983), terminated by
Telecommunications Act, supra note 1, § 601(a)(1), 110 Stat. at 143-44, reprinted in 47
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video programming
2
In statutory implementation no less than any other endeavor, the
devil lies in the details. "It would be gross understatement to say that
the Telecommunications Act of 1996 is not a model of clarity. 53 Four
crucial aspects of the 1996 Act have dictated the terms on which the
biggest players in American telecommunications have combated and
combined. First, the Act imposes a battery of obligations on incumbent
LECs. In particular, it requires ILECs to offer interconnection,
collocation, and unbundled access to their competitors. Second, the Act
sets specific-and so far unsatisfied-conditions on BOC access to IX
markets. Third, the Act prescribes the structural separation of cable
programming from local telephony. Finally, the Act channels, tempers,
and arguably limits FCC jurisdiction over telecommunications mergers.
Among these provisions, sections 251 and 271 of the Act have
spurred intense FCC activity and an even more vigorous flurry of
litigation. The BOCs have done most of the suing. In conjunction,
these statutory provisions effectively pose the single legal question that
has driven telecommunications merger activity since 1996: Under what
legal conditions may a local exchange company offer long-distance
carriage? I will therefore follow an examination of the Act's provisions
with a look at the FCC's implementation of sections 251 and 271 and at
the parallel lines of litigation lodged by the BOCs in response to those
regulatory actions.
A. Statutory Starters
The telephonic provisions of the Telecommunications Act address
three broad regulatory objectives: ending the IX franchise, ending line-
of-business quarantines on the BOCs, and comprehensively reinventing
command-and-control regulation of telephony54 Like many other
contemporary transformations of traditional public utility law, the
Telecommunications Act prescribes "complete detariffing, elimination
of all entry restrictions, and [even] outright abolition" of regulatory
supervision.55 In the local exchange, one of the few remaining "market
U.S.C.A. § 152 note (West Supp. 1999).
52. See Cable Communications Policy Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-549, § 613, 98 Stat.
2779, 2785 (codified at 47 U.S.C. § 533 (1994)), repealed by Telecommunications Act, supra
note 1, § 302(b)(1), 110 Stat. at 124.
53. AT&T Corp. v. Iowa Utils. Bd., 119 S. Ct. 721, 738 (1999); accord Puerto Rico Tel.
Co. v. Telecommunications Regulatory Bd., 189 F.3d 1, 19 (1st Cir. 1999); Sprint Spectrum,
L.P. v. Willoth, 176 F.3d 630,641 (2d Cir. 1999).
54. See generally PETER W. HUBER, MICHAEL K. KELLOGG & JOHN THORNE, THE
TELECOMMUNICATIONS Act OF 1996, §§ 1.1-1.3.7, at 5-62 (1996); see also id. § 1.1, at 3-4
(describing "the old paradigm of telecommunications regulation" as resting on these "three
basic pillars").
55. Joseph D. Kearney & Thomas W. Merrill, The Great Transformation of Regulated
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segments that have natural monopoly characteristics," the Act imposes
a "new set of regulatory obligations-including the duty to interconnect,
to lease unbundled network elements, and to sell services for resale"-
in order to prevent incumbents from using their control of "bottleneck
facilities... to discriminate against competitors.
56
Ending the LX franchise is easy enough to declare, if not to
achieve. Section 253(a) of the Act flatly preempts any "State or local
statute or regulation, or other State or local legal requirement" that
"prohibit[s] or ha[s] the effect of prohibiting the ability of any entity to
provide any interstate or intrastate telecommunications service."57
Howard Shelanski argues that this provision alone carries enough legal
weight to force the eventual deregulation of telecommunications.58 The
Act goes well beyond preempting state franchising laws, however, in
prescribing an elaborate set of duties for incumbent carriers during what
now appears to be a long transition from the command-and-control era.
(1) Section 251 and Allied Provisions
Section 251 imposes a cascading set of obligations on increasingly
narrow classes of telecommunications carriers. Section 251(a) broadly
orders every telecommunications carrier "to interconnect directly or
indirectly with the facilities and equipment of other telecommunications
carriers. '59 No carrier may "install network features, functions, or
capabilities" that frustrate interconnection.6°
Section 251(b) then imposes certain unique obligations on local
exchange companies, as distinct from IXCs and other carriers. LECs
must guarantee resale, number portability, dialing parity, telephone
pole access, and reciprocal compensation arrangements for the
transport and termination of telecommunications traffic. 61 Transport
and termination "is the process whereby a call that is initiated by a
customer of one telecommunications carrier is routed to a customer of a
different telecommunications carrier and completed by that carrier.
'62
Typically the carrier "that 'terminates' or completes the call to its
customer.., charges for the cost of terminating the call." 63 Number
Industries Law, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 1323, 1363 (1998).
56. Id. at 1364.
57. 47 U.S.C.A. § 253(a) (West Supp. 1999); see also Suggested Guidelines for Petitions
for Ruling Under Section 253 of the Communications Act, 1998 WL 795231 (Nov. 17,1998).
58. See generally Howard Shelanski, A Comment on Local Competition and Controversy
in Local Telecommunications, 50 HASTINGS L.i. 1617 (1999).
59. 47 U.S.C. § 251(a) (West Supp. 1999).
60. Id.
61. See id. at § 251(b).
62. Iowa Utils. Bd. v. FCC, 120 F3d 753, 792 n.7 (8th Cir. 1997), affd in par4 rev'd in
part sub nom. AT&T Corp. v. Iowa Utils. Bd., 119 S. Ct. 721 (1999).
63. Id; accord Indiana Bell Tel. Co. v. Smithville Tel. Co., 31 F. Supp. 2d 628, 632 n.3
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portability enables customers "to retain, at the same location, existing
telecommunications numbers without impairment of quality, reliability,
or convenience when switching" between carriers. 64 Dialing parity is
the term of art for what most consumers understand as "1+" dialing, or
the ability to make calls "without the use of any access code." 65
Finally, under section 251(c), "incumbent" LECs-that class now
felicitously known as ILECs-owe three additional duties to their
competitors: (1) interconnection to the existing local network,
(2) unbundled, nondiscriminatory access to basic network functions
previously offered by the incumbent LEC on a bundled basis, and
(3) resale at wholesale rates of any telecommunications service offered
by the incumbent LEC to its retail customers.66 If necessary for
interconnection or unbundled access, the incumbent must permit
physical or virtual collocation of facilities.67
Section 254 imposes an additional substantive obligation on
"[e]very telecommunications carrier that provides interstate
telecommunications services": the duty to "contribute, on an equitable
and nondiscriminatory basis," to federally established "mechanisms...
[for] preserv[ing] and advanc[ing] universal service." 68 Section 254 is
striking in its inclusion of "advanced services" within the universal
(S.D. Ind. 1998). See generally TCG Milwaukee, Inc. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 980 F. Supp.
992, 995-97 (W.D. Wis. 1997) (describing the difference between "bill-and-keep" and cost-
based methods of reciprocal compensation for transport and termination of local calls).
64. 47 C.F.R. § 52.21(k) (1999).
65. 47 C.F.R. § 51.5 (1999); see also HOUSE REPORT, supra note 13, at 72, reprinted in
1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 10, 38 ("Dialing parity means the ability to dial the same digits in calling
another number, regardless of who provides the service.... [Flor toll or 'short haul' long
distance service, it is known as ... '1+' dialing."); HUBER ET AL., supra note 54, § 1.1.5, at 16-
17 ("Requiring all consumers to choose, in a single balloting period, between the BOC and
their current interexchange carrier for all 1+ calls, rather than splitting traffic between them,
could shake up the long distance business more thoroughly than any single development
since the breakup of the Bell System in 1984.").
66. See 47 U.S.C.A. §§ 251(c), 251(h), 252(j) (West Supp. 1999); Iowa Utils. Bd., 120 F.3d
at 791; Iowa Utils. Bd. v. FCC, 109 F.3d 418, 421-422 (8th Cir.), motion to vacate stay denied,
519 U.S. 978 (1996); see also 47 U.S.C.A. § 251(h) (West Supp. 1999) (defining "incumbent
local exchange carrier").
67. See 47 U.S.C.A. § 251(c)(6) (West Supp. 1999). Compare Bell Atlantic Tel. Cos. v.
FCC, 24 F.3d 1441, 1446-47 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (striking down the FCC's pre-1996 collocation
rules insofar as the FCC lacked the power to take LEC property and to reassign it to a
competitor) with, e.g., GTE South Inc. v. Morrison, 6 F. Supp. 2d 517 (E.D. Va. 1998)
(rejecting a takings challenge to the Commission's post-1996 rules on physical collocation).
See generally J. GREGORY SIDAK & DANIEL F. SPULBER, DEREGULATORY TAKINGS AND
THE REGULATORY CONTRAct: THE COMPETIrrvE TRANSFORMATiON OF NETWORK
INDUSTRIES IN THE UNITED STATES 232-40 (1997) (describing the physics of network
invasion in electrical transmission, electrical distribution, and telecommunications); Note,
Section 253 of the Telecommunications Act of 1996: A Permanent Physical Appropriation of
Private Property That Must Be Justly Compensated, 50 FED. COMM. LJ. 441 (1998) (same).
68. 47 U.S.C.A. § 254(d) (West Supp. 1999).
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service.69 In stark contrast with the rest of the Act, the universal service
provision consciously subordinates competition to overtly redistributive
objectives.70 To put it bluntly, the Act seeks "to limit state rate and
entry but not universal service regulation."'71
Section 252 prescribes the terms for enforcement of the substantive
obligations that section 251(c) imposes on incumbent LECs. Although
the exact scope of this provision became the subject of the Supreme
Court's decision in AT&T Corp. v. Iowa Utilities Board,72 the basic
structure of section 252 lies beyond serious dispute. Under section 252,
ILECs must pass a stringent procedural gauntlet for negotiating the
terms by which they provide interconnection or unbundled access to
their competitors. ILECs must negotiate comprehensive agreements
with would-be competitors.73 If an ILEC and a CLEC cannot reach an
agreement on their own, either party may petition the appropriate state
public utility commission for compulsory arbitration.74 The state
commission must approve "[a]ny interconnection agreement," whether
"adopted by negotiation or arbitration."75 If the state commission "fails
to carry out its responsibility" in a proceeding of this sort, the Act
orders the FCC to "issue an order preempting the State commission's
jurisdiction" and to "assume... responsibility" for arbitrating and
approving an interconnection agreement.76
After Iowa Utilities Board, the real source of controversy
surrounding section 252 involves federal jurisdiction over the state
commissions charged with implementing that provision. Although the
69. See id § 254(b)(2), (6) (including "access to advanced telecommunications and
information services" within a list of "universal service principles"); id § 254(h)(2) (directing
the FCC to "establish competitively neutral rules" for "enhanc[ing] ... access to advanced
telecommunications and information services"); cf id. § 254(c) (defining universal service as
"an evolving level of telecommunications services" that "tak[es] into account advances in
telecommunications and information technologies and services").
70. See In re Federal-State Joint Bd. on Universal Serv., 12 F.C.C.R. 8776 (1997), affd in
part, rev'd in part sub nom. Texas Office of Public Util. Counsel v. FCC, 183 F.3d 393 (5th
Cir. 1999). See generally, e.g., Deonne L. Bruning, The Telecommunications Act of 1996: The
Challenge of Competition, 30 CREIGHTON L. REv. 1255, 1269-78 (1997); Arturo Gindara,
Equity in an Era of Markets: The Case of Universal Service, 33 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 107
(1998); Eli M. Noam, Will Universal Service and Common Carriage Survive the
Telecommunications Act of 1996?, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 955 (1997); Gregory L. Rosston,
Universal Service and Competition, 50 HASTINGS LJ. 1585 (1999); Mark P. Trinchero &
Holly Rachel Smith, Federal Preemption of State Universal Service Regulations Under the
Telecommunications Act of1996,51 FED. COMM. LJ. 303 (1999).
71. Cellular Telecommunications Indus. Ass'n v. FCC, 168 F.3d 1332, 1337 (D.C. Cir.
1999); see also Bell Atlantic Tel. Cos. v. FCC, 131 F.3d 1044,1047-49 (D.C. Cir. 1997).
72. 119 S. Ct. 721 (1999).
73. See 47 U.S.C.A. §§ 251(c)(1), 252(a) (West Supp. 1999).
74. See id § 252(b).
75. Id. § 252(e)(1).
76. Id § 252(e)(6).
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1996 Act allows "any party aggrieved by" a state commission's section
252 "determination[s]" to file an "action in an appropriate federal
district court,"77 at least one federal district court has held that the
eleventh amendment bars Congress from using this provision to waive
the states' immunity to suit.
78
(2) Section 271: BOC Entry into InterLata Carriage
The Act's BOC provisions must be viewed in light of "the big
prize" that the most formidable of ILECs sought in the 1996 reform:
"access to the lucrative IX market."79 To be sure, the MFJ had allowed
the BOCs to engage in two types of long-distance carriage. First, the
MFJ defined the ban on BOC involvement in IX carriage as a
prohibition on carrying "interLATA" calls--or calls traversing largely
arbitrary local access and transport areas (LATAs).80 Toll calls within a
LATA, however, remained fair game.81 Indeed, intraLATA long-
distance revenues were expected to "augment[]" the newly independent
BOCs' "financial viability," largely because of the generous pricing
policies of the state public utility commissions.82 Even GTE, not
otherwise bound by the MFJ, derived 44 percent of its total revenues for
77. Id. § 252(e)(6); see also Illinois Bell Tel Co. v. WorldCom Techs., Inc., 157 F.3d 500,
501 (7th Cir. 1998) ("Decisions of state agencies implementing the 1996 Act are reviewable
in federal district courts."); Iowa Utils. Bd. v. FCC, 120 F.3d 753, 804 & n.24 (8th Cir. 1997)
("We believe that the enforcement decisions of state commissions would... be subject to
federal district court review under subsection 252(e)(6)."), affd in part and rev'd in part on
other grounds sub nom. AT&T Corp. v. Iowa Utils. Bd., 119 S. Ct. 721 (1999).
78. See AT&T Communications of the South Cent. States, Inc. v. BellSouth Telecomms.,
Inc., 43 F. Supp. 2d 593 (M.D. La. 1999). But see MCI Telecomms. Corp. v. Illinois
Commerce Comm'n, 183 F.3d 558, 564-67 (7th Cir.) (holding that a state commission's
participation in the implementation of the 1996 Act via § 252 operates as a waiver of
sovereign immunity), vacated, 183 F.3d 567 (7th Cir. 1999); cf., e.g., US West
Communications, Inc. v. FMS Intelenet, Inc., 35 F. Supp. 2d 1221, 1229-30 (D. Or. 1998)
(finding that a state commission and its commissioners waived whatever eleventh
amendment immunity they might have held).
79. Jim Chen, Titanic Telecommunications, 25 Sw. U. L. REV. 535, 541 (1996). The Act
also enables BOCs, via structurally separate subsidiaries, to enter three relatively minor but
previously restricted markets: equipment manufacturing, see 47 U.S.C.A. § 273 (West Supp.
1999), electronic publishing, see id § 274, and video programming, see id. §§ 571-573. See
generally Implementation of the Non-Accounting Safeguards of Sections 271 & 272 of the
Communications Act of 1934, 62 Fed. Reg. 2927 (Dec. 24, 1996) (codified at 47 C.F.R. pt.
53).
80. See United States v. Western Elec. Co., 569 F. Supp. 990, 993-95 (D.D.C. 1983)
(Western Elea 1); see also 47 U.S.C.A. § 153(43) (West Supp. 1999) (codifying Judge
Greene's definition of a LATA).
81. See United States v. Western Elec. Co., 569 F. Supp. 1057,1108 (D.D.C. 1983).
82. Western Elea I, 569 F. Supp. at 995 n.23; see also J. Gregory Sidak & Daniel F.
Spulber, Deregulatory Takings and Breach of the Regulatory Contract, 71 N.Y.U. L. REV.
851,859 (1996).
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its California operations in 1994 from intraLATA toll traffic.
83
The BOCs' longstanding ability to carry long-distance calls within a
LATA has invited the BOCs and sympathetic state regulators to
attempt a clever flanking maneuver. The larger a LATA, the more toll
calls a BOC can carry. In 1997, and again in 1999, US West and the
Arizona Corporation Commission attempted to redefine the entire state
of Arizona as a single LATA. On both occasions the FCC repelled the
attempt and reasserted exclusive federal jurisdiction over the definition
and modification of LATAs.84
Even before receiving regulatory relief in the 1996 Act, the BOCS
had the right to carry a second type of long-distance call. In 1986 the
D.C. Circuit recognized that the BOCs could offer interLATA carriage
outside their LX service regions.85 The 1996 Act merely confirmed what
the BOCs had already achieved under the MFJ: as of the date of the
Act's passage, any BOC could immediately offer "interLATA services
originating outside its in-region States.
'86
The Act promises the BOCs their long-awaited opportunity to
enter the lucrative interLATA market, but only upon certain
conditions. Demonstrating persistent concerns over cross-subsidies and
self-preference, Congress conditioned full interLATA relief upon a
showing of significant competition in the relevant BOC's LX market.
Under section 271 of the 1996 Act, the petitioning BOC must show that
some competitor stands ready to provide LX services "either exclusively
over [its] own telephone exchange service facilities or predominantly
over [its] own... facilities in combination with the resale of the
telecommunications services of another carrier." 7 Competition offered
merely through resale of an incumbent BOC's LX services or based
solely on wireless carriage "does not suffice to meet the requirement" of
facilities-based competition.
88
Alternatively, if "no [competing] provider" in any given state "has
requested... access [to] and interconnection" with a BOC's LX
network within "10 months after February 9, 1996," the BOC may
83. See Peter Siembab, Opening the IntraLATA Market in California: Tolls Drop but
Casualties Rise, 28 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1453,1471 n.154 (1995).
84. See In re US West Petitions to Consolidate LATAs in Minnesota & Arizona, FCC
99-222, 1999 WL 674804 (Sept. 1, 1999); In re US West Petitions to Consolidate LATAs in
Minnesota & Arizona, 12 F.C.C.R. 4738 (1997).
85. See United States v. Western Elec. Co., 797 F.2d 1082,1085 (D.C. Cir. 1986).
86. 47 U.S.C.A. § 271(b)(2) (West Supp. 1999).
87. 47 U.S.C.A. § 271(c)(1)(A) (West Supp. 1999); see also CONFERENCE REPORT,
supra note 30, at 147-48 ("The competitor must offer telephone exchange service either
exclusively over its own facilities or predominantly over its own facilities in combination with
the resale of another carrier's service."), reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 124,160.
88. CONFERENCE REPORT, supra note 30, at 147 (emphasis added), reprinted in 1996
U.S.C.C.A.N. 124,160.
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receive interLATA relief in that state by filing "a statement of the terms
and conditions" by which it "generally offers to provide... access and
interconnection" to its LX network.89 That statement of terms and
conditions must be approved by the appropriate state commission. 90 In
all section 271 applications, a BOC must also satisfy a fourteen-step
"competitive checklist," including "[n]ondiscriminatory access to...
poles, ducts, conduits, and fights-of-way"; "local loop transmission from
the central office to the customer's premises, unbundled from local
switching or other services"; nondiscriminatory access to 911, directory
assistance, and operator call completion services; and nondiscriminatory
assignment and transportation of phone numbers.91 New interLATA
service, no matter how it is authorized, must be provided through a
structurally separate affiliate.92
(3) The Cable/Telephone Firewall
Section 652 of the 1996 Act, codified at 47 U.S.C. § 572,
presumptively bans the cross-ownership of cable and telephone
companies. This prohibition arose from Congress's apparent hope that
the forcible separation of LECs and cable operators would keep each
group as a potential competitive check on the other.93
Congress evidently wanted to temper telephone company entry
into cable more than the reverse. This much is clear from the Act's
extensive restrictions on "open video systems" by which telephone
companies may deliver video programming to their customers.94
Among other requirements, an operator seeking open video system
certification must comply with special antidiscrimination rules designed
to curb self-preference and cross-subsidizaion,95 including a rule
limiting the "operator... and its affiliates from selecting the video
programming services for carriage on more than one-third of the
activated channel capacity on [the] system" whenever "demand exceeds
the [system's] channel capacity. '96  In its 1998 review of the video
89. 47 U.S.C.A. § 271(c)(1)(B) (West Supp. 1999).
90. See id
91. Id §271(c)(2)(B).
92. See id § 272(a)(2)(B); cf California v. FCC, 39 F.3d 919, 927-30 (9th Cir. 1994)
(refusing to allow the FCC to lift a requirement that BOCs provide enhanced services
-through a structurally separate affiliate), cert denied, 514 U.S. 1050 (1995).
93. Cf., eg., FTC v. Proctor & Gamble Co., 386 U.S. 568, 580 (1967) (justifying the
invalidation of a merger between the United States' largest soap and detergent manufacturer
and the country's largest bleach manufacturer partly on evidence that the soap and detergent
manufacturer "was the most likely entrant" into bleach manufacturing); United States v. El
Paso Natural Gas Co., 376 U.S. 651, 661 (1964) ("Unsuccessful bidders are no less
competitors than the successful one.").
94. See 47 U.S.C. §§ 571(a)(3), 573 (West Supp. 1999).
95. See id § 573(a), (b).
96. Id. § 573(b)(1)(B). See generally In re Implementation of Section 302 of the
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programming delivery market, however, the FCC acknowledged that
"[m]ost of the firms receiving [open video system] certification are not
LECs."97
Under section 652, a telephone company may not acquire "more
than a 10 percent financial interest, or any management interest, in any
cable operator providing cable service" in the same service area.98 The
reverse is also true; no cable operator may acquire a comparable stake
in a telephone company within its franchise area.99 Moreover, the Act
bans joint ventures between cable and telephone companies. 100 Cable-
telco mergers and joint ventures are legal, inter alia, when they involve
small cable systems in nonurban areas, in rural areas generally, in
putatively "competitive" markets, and whenever the FCC waives
section 652's presumptive prohibition.1 1
Section 652, however, does not "apply to any situation where an
existing cable company initiates telephone service within the cable
company's franchise area."'02 To provide otherwise would undermine
Congress's hope of fostering "a technological convergence that would
permit the use of the same facilities for the provision of telephone and
cable service.'10 3
"[M]ergers, acquisitions, or other... alliances" between cable and
local telephone companies are arguably quite safe,1°4 especially when
one considers in hindsight the cable industry's sorry performance in
penetrating LX markets. The FCC has long recognized that a
"telephone company investment in cable television outside its region is
likely to increase competition for traditional telephone services and to
expand consumer choices."'1 5 Nevertheless, the Telecommunications
Act "effectively directs enforcers of federal antitrust laws to presume
that geographically overlapping cable-telco combinations are
Telecommunications Act of 1996, 11 F.C.C.R. 18,223 (1996); Glen 0. Robinson, The New
Video Competition: Dances with Regulators, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 10, 16 (1997) (examining
the legal requirements governing open video systems).
97. In re Annual Assessment of the Status of Competition in Markets for the Delivery of
Video Programming, 14 Communications Reg. (P&F) 10,923, 1 12 (Dec. 23, 1998); see also
id (noting that Bell Atlantic "is transitioning away" from one of the only three "operating
open video systems" in the United States and "plans to ask customers to switch to its joint
venture with DirecTV").
98. 47 U.S.C.A. § 572(a) (West Supp. 1999); see also 47 C.F.R. § 76.505(a) (1999).
99. See 47 U.S.C.A. § 572(b) (West Supp. 1999).
100. See id. § 572(c).
101. See id. § 572(d).
102. In re Southeast Tel., Ltd., 12 F.C.C.R. 2561, 2, at 2561 (1996).
103. In re Annual Assessment of the Status of Competition in Markets for the Delivery of
Video Programming, 13 F.C.C.R. 13,044,13,050 (1998).
104. Botein, supra note 33, at 604.
105. In re Time Warner & US West, 8 F.C.C.R. 7106,7107 (1993).
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anticompetitive until proven otherwise."' 6
Surprisingly enough for a line of business that is at most a "nice
new cash cowl" for incumbent LECs,1°7 the cable-telephone provisions
imposed one of the strongest forms of structural separation in the entire
1996 Act. 08 .Congress did not presumptively ban even a merger
between a BOC and a major IXC. As a result, section 652 gave the
FCC direct authority to review US West's acquisition of Continental
Cablevision,109 while SBC and AT&T were able to explore merger
possibilities in the absence of explicit statutory barriers.
An arguably more substantial threat to competition lies in the
acquisition of many cable systems in what has become the standard
post-1996 merger strategy for cracking the local exchange. As I discuss
below in Part IV.D.(3), AT&T's acquisition of TCI and pending bid for
MediaOne bring this concern to the forefront. The salient point for
now is that neither section 652 nor any other provision in the 1996 Act
anticipated the problem.
(4) FCC Review of Telecommunications Mergers
At least in theory, the FCC stands roughly in the place of the
Federal Trade Commission in reviewing mergers that involve at least
one telecommunications carrier. The Clayton Act empowers the FCC
to review and to reject telecommunications mergers that "may tend
substantially to lessen competition."" 0 The FCC once had a limited
power to immunize certain telecommunications mergers from antitrust
scrutiny, but the 1996 Act repealed the Commission's authority in this
regard."'
In practice, the FCC usually reviews telecommunications mergers
under the "public interest, convenience, and necessity" standard that
pervades the Communications Act of 1934,112 "so construed as to secure
106. Jim Chen, The Legal Process and Political Economy of Telecommunications Reform,
97 CoLUM. L. REV. 835,863-84 (1997); see also Botein, supra note 33, at 570.
107. Chen, supra note 106, at 860 n.205.
108. See CONFERENCE REPORT, supra note 30, at 389 (noting that the House-Senate
conference committee on the Telecommunications Act accepted "the most restrictive
provisions of both the Senate bill and the House amendment in order to maximize
competition between local exchange carriers and cable operators within local markets").
109. See In re US West, Inc. & Continental Cablevision, Inc., 11 F.C.C.R. 13,260 (1996),
modified, 11 F.C.C.R. 14,391 (1996); In re US West, Inc. & Continental Cablevision, Inc.:
Competitive Impact Statement, 61 Fed. Reg. 58,703 (1996).
110. 15 U.S.C. § 21(a) (1994).
111. See Telecommunications Act, supra note 1, § 601(b)(2), 110 Stat. at 143. See
generally Douglas B. McFadden, Antitrust and Communications: Changes After the
Telecommunications Act of 1996, 49 FED. COMM. L.J. 457, 460-62 (1997) (discussing the
impact of the repeal of the FCC's authority to immunize mergers).
112. Act of June 19, 1934, ch. 652,48 Stat. 1064 (codified as amended at 47 U.S.C. §§ 151-
613).
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for the public the broad aims of" the statute." 3 For instance, in
approving WorldCom's acquisition of MCI,114 the FCC relied on its
power under sections 214(a) and 310(d) of the Communications Act to
authorize new service, to allow the curtailment or abandonment of old
service, and to approve the transfer of previously granted licenses." 5 In
approving US West's acquisition of Continental Cablevision," 6 the FCC
stood on even firmer jurisdictional ground. As described above in Part
I.A.(3), the FCC must approve any petition to waive the 1996 Act's
presumptive ban on the cross-ownership of cable and telephone
companies"
u7
In reviewing the FCC's actual record in regulating mergers, two
observers conceded that they had "not found a case in the last forty
years where the Comnission proceeded under the Clayton Act."" 8 The
FCC frequently invokes its Clayton Act jurisdiction," 9 but it never
squarely rests on that authority.120 In most cases, the Commission
readily "find[s] [its] jurisdiction under the Communications Act to be
sufficient to address all competitive effects" of a proposed merger,
"including the [Clayton Act] issue of whether [a] proposed transfer [of
licenses] may substantially lessen competition or tend to create a
monopoly.'
2'
Instead of invoking its Clayton Act jurisdiction, the FCC
apparently prefers to review telecommunications mergers under a
public interest standard. This should not come as a surprise. The FCC,
after all, is the federal agency "entrusted with the responsibility to
determine when and to what extent the public interest would be served
by competition."' ' 2 It is not, strictly speaking, an antitrust agency,'23 for
113. Western Union Div. v. United States, 87 F. Supp. 324,335 (D.D.C.), affid mem., 338
U.S. 864 (1949).
114. See In re WorldCom, Inc. & MCI Communications Corp., 13 F.C.C.R. 18,025, 1,
8, 9, at 18,026,18,030-31 (1998) (citing 47 U.S.C. §§ 214(a), 310(d) (1994)).
115. See id.
116. See In re US West, Inc. & Continental Cablevision, Inc., 11 F.C.C.R. 13,260 (1996),
modified, 11 F.C.C.R. 14,391 (1996); In re US West, Inc. & Continental Cablevision, Inc.:
Competitive Impact Statement, 61 Fed. Reg. 58,703 (1996).
117. See 47 U.S.C. § 572(d)(6) (West Supp. 1999).
118. James R. Weiss & Martin L. Stem, Serving Two Masters: The Dual Jurisdiction of the
FCC and the Justice Department over Telecommunications Transactions, 6 COMMLAW
CONSPECrus 195,198 (1998).
119. See, e.g., WorldCom & MCI, 13 F.C.C.R. at 18,031-32; In re NYNEX Corp. & Bell
Atlantic Corp., 12 F.C.C.R. 19,985, 20,001 (1997); In re Pacific Telesis Group & SBC
Communications, Inc., 12 F.C.C.R. 2624,2631 (1997).
120. See Weiss & Stem, supra note 118, at 198.
121. E.g., PacTel & SBC, 12 F.C.C.R. at 2631; see also In re McCaw & American Tel. &
Tel. Co., 9 F.C.C.R. 5836, 5843-44 & n.25 (1994), affd sub nom. SBC Communications, Inc.
v. FCC, 56 F.3d 1484 (D.C. Cir. 1995).
122. United States v. FCC, 652 F.2d 77,88 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (en bane).
123. See iL
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the "public interest" standard "necessarily subsumes and extends
beyond the traditional parameters [of]... the antitrust laws."'
1 24
Whatever responsibility the FCC has in enforcing the antitrust laws is
deemed to be discharged when the Commission "seriously considers the
antitrust consequences of a propos[ed] [merger] and weighs those
consequences with other public interest factors."'2 If anything, the
public interest standard often contradicts the procompetitive policy
underlying the antitrust laws: "Merely to assume that competition is
bound to be of advantage, in an industry so regulated and so largely
closed as [telecommunications], is not enough."'1
26
Although the public interest standard is presumably broader than
the antitrust standard underlying section 7 of the Clayton Act, the FCC
has not invalidated a single major telecommunications merger since
1996. The Commission has amassed this surprisingly inactive record
during an era of relatively aggressive antitrust enforcement. Even
Richard Posner, in a comparable span from 1986 to 1990, invalidated
two hospital mergers. 127 As the FCC has weighed successive petitions
proposing horizontal LEC mergers, however, it has continually
tightened the terms and conditions under which it will approve a
merger. As I discuss below in Part IV.A.(1), the Commission's new
practice of extracting concessions from telecommunications carriers
during a merger review may help the Commission jumpstart long-
awaited competition across the boundary separating LECs from IXCs.
The Justice Department augments but does not displace the FCC
in reviewing BOC petitions under section 271. Before authorizing a
BOC to provide in-region interLATA services, the FCC must consult
with the Attorney General and with affected state regulators. In
advising the FCC on the petition's merits, the Attorney General may
"us[e] any [appropriate] standard" of antitrust scrutiny.128  The
legislative history of the Telecommunications Act specifically mentions
the standard used to assess attempted monopolization under section 2
of the Sherman Act 129 and the standard articulated in the Bell breakup
124. In re NYNEX Corp. & Bell Atlantic Corp., 12 F.C.C.R. 19,985, 19,987 (1997); see
also Schurz Communications, Inc. v. FCC, 982 F.2d 1043, 1049 (7th Cir. 1992) (contrasting
the impermissibility of "allow[ing] a trade off [of] a reduction in competition" under the
antitrust laws with the FCC's authority "to make such a tradeoff" under "the nebulous public
interest standard").
125. United States v. FCC, 652 F.2d at 88; accord, e.g., NYNEX & Bell Atlantic, 12
F.C.C.R. at 20,003 n.68; In re OTI Corp., 6 F.C.C.R. 1611,1612 (1991).
126. FCC v. RCA Communications, Inc., 346 U.S. 86, 97 (1953); accord, e.g., Hawaiian
Tel. Co. v. FCC, 498 F.2d 771,776 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
127. See United States v. Rockford Mem'l Corp., 898 F.2d 1278 (7th Cir. 1990); Hospital
Corp. of Am. v. FTC, 807 F.2d 1381 (7th Cir. 1986).
128. 47 U.S.C.A. § 271(d)(2)(A) (West Supp. 1999).
129. Compare CONFERENCE REPORT, supra note 30, at 149 ("whether there is a
dangerous probability that the BOC or its affiliates would successfully use market power to
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litigation. 3 0 Although the FCC "shall give substantial weight" to the
resulting evaluation, the Attorney General has no power to
"preclu[de] ... any Commission decision" to approve or deny a section
271 petition.' 3' This reversal of the FCC's and the Justice Department's
traditional responsibilities in antitrust enforcement effectively
"relegat[es] the DOJ to an influential but supplementary role."' 32
B. Decisions, Decisions
BOC entry into the long-distance market has been deferred so long
that it has become "regulation's rendition of Waiting for Godot.' 33 But
the 1996 Act chose to give conditional rather than immediate
interLATA relief. In exchange for "access to tantalizingly rich markets
for interexchange... carriage," Congress demanded that the BOCs
acquiesce in the "rude disruption of their traditionally protected
markets."' 34 InterLATA relief for the BOCs under section 271 requires
either full-fledged entry based on wireline facilities or successful
implementation of section 251.135 The former possibility is impractical
in the short run; the latter depends on the BOCs' cooperation. Short of
the prohibitively expensive all-or-nothing strategy of building a
competing network from scratch, competitive entry into the BOCs' LX
markets hinges on whether CLECs can secure interconnection with and
unbundled access to the BOCs' LX networks. "[Two interconnection
prices" in particular spark most of the controversy: "the prices for
completion of long-distance messages and the prices for rental of local
telephone facilities.' 36  In other words, absent a technological
substantially impede competition"), reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 124, 161 with Spectrum
Sports, Inc. v. McQuillan, 506 U.S. 447,455 (1993) (requiring a "plaintiff charging attempted
monopolization [to] prove a dangerous probability of actual monopolization") and Swift &
Co. v. United States, 196 U.S. 375, 396 (1905) (Holmes, J.) (noting that the Sherman Act
"directs itself against [a] dangerous probability" of monopolization "as well as against the
completed result").
130. Compare CONFERENCE REPORT, supra note 30, at 149 ("whether there is no
substantial possibility that the BOC or its affiliates could use monopoly power to impede
competition"), reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 124, 161 with United States v. American Tel.
& Tel. Co., 552 F. Supp. 131, 195 (D.D.C. 1982), affd mem. sub non. Maryland v. United
States, 460 U.S. 1001 (1983), terminated by Telecommunications Act, supra note 1,
§ 601(a)(1), 110 Stat. at 143-44, reprinted in 47 U.S.C.A. § 152 note (West Supp. 1999),
131. 47 U.S.C.A. § 271(d)(2)(A) (West Supp. 1999).
132. Weiss & Stem, supra note 118, at 201.
133. PAUL W. MACAVOY, TiE FAILURE OF ANTITRUST AND REGULATION TO
ESTABLISH COMPETITION IN LONG-DISTANCE TELEPHONE SERVICES 176 (1996).
134. Chen, supra note 49, at 56.
135. See CONFERENCE REPORT, supra note 30, at 148-49, reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N.
124,161; Chen, supra note 106, at 861-62.
136. William J. Baumol & Thomas W. Merrill, Does the Constitution Require That We Kill
the Competitive Goose? Pricing Local Phone Services to Rivals, 73 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1122,
1124 (1998).
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breakthrough,137 the FCC will not permit full BOC participation in IX
markets until interconnection and unbundled access become routine.
BOC-initiated litigation has drastically altered the interplay
between sections 251 and 271. The FCC's efforts to implement section
251 remain in legal doubt. Although the Commission complied with a
six-month deadline for promulgating regulations to implement the local
competition provisions of the 1996 Act, the BOCs kept those rules from
taking effect for more than two years by contesting the scope of the
FCC's jurisdiction vis-d-vis that of the states. A challenge on the merits
of those rules still lies ahead. Meanwhile, a few incipient controversies
involving the interplay of section 251 with the universal service
provisions of section 254 mark the emergence of Internet service
providers as significant players in telecommunications reform.
On the other hand, the BOCs have failed to pierce section 271's
theoretically permeable firewall. The FCC rejected the first five BOC
petitions under section 271 to offer interLATA carriage to home-region
LX customers. This frustration has spurred an astounding
counterattack by the BOCs: a string of cases assailing section 271 and
the other BOC provisions of the 1996 Act as unconstitutional bills of
attainder. Nearly four years after putatively comprehensive
telecommunications reform, the tantalizing prospect of IX entry
remains unrealized.
(1) Section 251: August and Everything After 38
The very existence of sections 251 and 271 tells us that Congress
rejected the most aggressive pleas for the complete and immediate
repeal of the Bell decree's line-of-business restrictions.139 Faced with
137. On the viability of wireless networks in competition against existing wireline
networks, see William C. Beckwith, Cutting the Cord: Removing the CMRS Spectrun Cap to
Promote Wireless-Wireline Convergence and Wireless Alternatives in the Local Loop, 7
COMMLAW CONSPECrUs 369 (1999); J. Gregory Sidak et aL, A General Framework for
Competitive Analysis in Wireless Telecommunications, 50 HASTINGS LJ. 1639 (1999); Eric
Thoreson, Comment, Farewell to the Bell Monopoly? The Wireless Alternative to Local
Competition, 77 OR. L. REv. 309 (1998). For a quirky look at pricing plans for wireless
phones have enabled some callers to bypass the landwire carriers on a limited or even
comprehensive basis, see Nick Goldin, Users of Wireless Phones Find Unexpected Benefits,
N.Y. TIMEs, Sept. 21, 1999, at B1. On the use of the Internet as a substitute for conventional
telephone networks, see Seth A. Cohen, Note & Comment, Deregulating, Defragmenting
and Interconnecting: Reconsidering Commercial Telecommunications Regulation in Relation
to Internet Telephony, 18 J.L. & COM. 133 (1998).
138. Cf COUNTING CROWS, Mr. Jones, on AUGUST AND EVERYTHING AFTER
(UNI/Geffen/DGC Records 1993) ("We all want to be big big stars, but we got [sic] different
reasons for that.").
139. See, e.g., MACAVOY, supra note 133, at 182 ("The resulting price cuts from granting
interLATA entry rights to operating companies likely would be substantial. So would the
gains for subscribers ... ."); Arrow et aL, supra note 27, at 302, 310 (touting the economies of
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the challenge of conferring widely distributed benefits at staggering
expense to a concentrated few, Congress gave the FCC a "broad and
ambiguous mandate... to issue regulations."'14 Congress directed the
Commission to "complete all actions necessary to establish regulations
to implement the requirements" of section 251 within an astonishing six
months of the Telecommunication Act's passage.' 4'
"Moving... with" a newfound and "admirable dispatch,"' 42 the
agency quickly seized that mandate. On August 6, 1996, the FCC
launched the first stage of its self-described "competition trilogy" of
proposed rules on interconnection and unbundled access, 43 universal
service,144 and access charge reform.145 Chairman Reed E. Hundt
lauded the Commission's accomplishment as "the most pro-competitive
action of government since the break-up of the Standard Oil Trust.' 46
In one stroke, the battle to deregulate American telecommunications
shifted from the legislative front to the administrative. 147
In implementing the interconnection and unbundled access
requirements of section 251, the FCC adopted the TELRIC
methodology-Total Element Long-Run Incremental Cost-for
determining the prices at which incumbent LECs would sell unbundled
network elements to their competitors. TELRIC posed three profound
threats to incumbent LECs. First, in "calculati[ng] ... the forward-
looking economic cost of al [basic network] element," the FCC
scope and other efficiency gains that could be realized from BOC entry into interLATA
markets).
140. MICHAEL T. HAYES, LOBBYISTS AND LEGISLATORS: A THEORY OF POLITICAL
MARKETS 103 (1981).
141. 47 U.S.C.A. § 251(d)(1) (West Supp. 1999). Rachelle B. Chong, Everyone Can Have
20-20 Vision with Hindsight: Implementing the Telecommunications Act of 1996 Going Full
Tilt Boogie Woogie, Speech at the Hastings Law Journal Symposium (March 6,1999).
142. MCI Telecommunications Corp. v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 512 U.S. 218, 223
(1994).
143. See In re Implementation of the Local Competition Provisions in the
Telecommunications Act of 1996,11 F.CC.R. 15,499 (1996) (codified at 47 C.F.R. §§ 51.503,
51.505), affd in par4 rev'd in part sub norn. AT&T Corp. v. Iowa Utils. Bd., 119 S. Ct. 721
(1999).
144. See In re Federal-State Joint Bd. on Universal Serv., 12 F.C.C.R. 8776 (1997), affd in
par4 rev'd in part sub nom. Texas Office of Pub. Util. Counsel v. FCC, 183 F.3d 393 (5th Cir.
1999); In re Federal-State Joint Bd. on Universal Serv., 13 F.C.C.R. 11,830 (1998).
145. See In re Access Charge Reform, 7 Communications Reg. (P&F) 1209 (FCC May 16,
1997), affd sub nom. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co. v. FCC, 153 F.3d 523 (8th Cir. 1998); In re
Access Charge Reform Price Cap Performance Review for Local Exchange Carriers, 11
F.C.C.R. 21,354 (1996). See generally Gregory L. Rosston, The 1996 Telecommunications
Act Trilogy, MEDIA L. & POL'Y, Winter 1996, at 1.
146. Local Competition Provisions, 11 F.C.C.R. at 16,239 (separate statement of
Chairman Hundt).
147. See generally CHARLES F. PHILLIPS, JR., THE REGULATION OF PUBLIC UTILUTES:
THEORY AND PRACrICE 180-82 (3d ed. 1993) (tracing the paradigmatic shifts between the
"legislative, judicial and administrative" phases of public utility regulation since 1877).
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expressly excluded "[e]mbedded costs ... that the incumbent LEC
incurred in the past" and "[o]pportunity costs includ[ing] the revenues
that the incumbent LEC would have received for the sale of
telecommunications services, in the absence of competition."'1 Second,
the Commission computed costs on the basis of "the most efficient
telecommunications technology currently available" rather than the
technology actually used by an ILEC or proposed by a CLEC.
149
Finally, in prescribing proxy prices for state public utility commission
proceedings, the FCC allegedly depressed the rates that ILECs could
collect from competitors requesting interconnection and unbundled
access.150
The BOCs and other ILECs immediately contested the FCC's
jurisdiction to issue TELRIC. In the early stages of the Iowa Utilities
Board litigation,151 the Eighth Circuit observed that TELRIC might
"require" incumbent LECs "to subsidize their competitors and thereby
threaten the viability of the LECs' own businesses.' 1 52 On this basis the
court stayed the FCC's local competition rules.153 Without reaching
TELRIC's merits, the Eighth Circuit eventually held that jurisdiction
over network element pricing rested with the public utility commissions
of the states rather than the FCC.54 The logic of that decision
compelled the court of appeals to invalidate the FCC's dialing parity
rules. 55
The Supreme Court reversed both decisions in relevant part.
56
Writing for the Court, Justice Scalia held that the general power to
"prescribe... rules and regulations" concerning "interstate or foreign
communication by wire or radio"'157 -a mandate that the Commission
received in 1938158-permitted the FCC to promulgate TELRIC.159 The
148. 47 C.F.R. § 51.505(d)(1), (3) (1999).
149. Id § 51.505(b)(1).
150. See id. §§ 51.503(b)(2), 51.513, 51.705(a)(2), 51.707.
151. See generally Chen, supra note 49, at 56-68 (recounting the early history of this
litigation); Duane McLaughlin, Note, FCC Jurisdiction over Local Telephone Under the 1996
Act: Fenced Off?, 97 COLUM. L. Rv. 2210,2236-42 (1997) (same).
152. Iowa Utils. Bd. v. FCC, 109 F.3d 418,422 (8th Cir.), motion to vacate stay denied, 117
S. Ct. 429 (1996).
153. See id. at 427.
154. See Iowa Utils. Bd. v. FCC, 120 F.3d 753, 800 (8th Cir. 1997), rev'd in relevant part
sub nom. AT&T Corp. v. Iowa Utils. Bd., 119 S. Ct. 721 (1999).
155. See California v. FCC, 124 F.3d 934, 940-41 (8th Cir. 1997) (invalidating 47 C.F.R.
§§ 51.205-.215), rev'd sub nom. AT&T Corp. v. Iowa Utils. Bd., 119 S. Ct. 721 (1999).
156. See AT&T Corp. v. Iowa Utils. Bd., 119 S. Ct. 721 (1999). The Court divided 5-3 on
the question of the FCC's rulemaking jurisdiction. On this point, Justices Stevens, Kennedy,
Souter and Ginsburg joined Justice Scalia's majority opinion. Chief Justice Rehuquist and
Justices Thomas and Breyer dissented. Justice O'Connor took no part in the decision.
157. 47 U.S.C. § 201 (1994).
158. See Act of May 31,1938, ch. 296,52 Stat. 588.
159. See Iowa Utils. Bd., 119S. Ct. at 729-30,733.
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Court explicitly noted that the question of TELRIC's merits remained
open on remand.a6'
The FCC prevailed on almost every other issue before the Court.
The eight participating Justices unanimously upheld three aspects of the
Commission's rules governing unbundled access: (1) the inclusion of
operator services and directory assistance, operational support systems,
and vertical switching functions within its definition of "network
element[s],"1 61 (2) the omission of a facilities-ownership requirement
that would otherwise preclude "competitors [from] provid[ing] local
phone service relying solely on the elements in an incumbent's
network,"'162 and (3) the decision to forbid ILECs from separating
already combined network elements before leasing them to
competitors. 163 The Court also upheld the FCC's "pick and choose"
rule, which effectively renders any "'interconnection, service or network
element arrangement' made.., by an incumbent LEC...
automatically... available to every [other] potential entrant."'164
Meanwhile, as the Supreme Court pondered Iowa Utilities Board,
the Eighth Circuit upheld the FCC's decision to define shared transport
as a "network element" that ILECs must make available to entrants on
an unbundled basis.165 Although the Supreme Court granted certiorari,
vacated, and remanded for further consideration in light of Iowa
Utilities Board,66 it is hard to envision how the shared transport order
conflicts with the high court's construction of the controlling statutory
provision.167
The Court did reverse the FCC's effort to define the extent to
which CLEC "access to such network elements as are proprietary is
necessary" and the extent to which "the failure to provide access...
would impair the ability" of a new carrier "to provide the services it
seeks to offer.' 68 Consistent with the Eighth Circuit's opinion,169 a
battery of similar statutory controversies resolved by the Supreme
Court,170 one of Justice Scalia's opinions on the freedom of speech,
71
160. See id. at 728 n.3.
161. See id. at 733-34 (upholding 47 CF.R. § 51.319(f)-(g) (1997)).
162. Iowa Utils. Bd., 119 S. Ct. at 736.
163. See id. at 736-38 (upholding 47 C.F.R. § 51.315(b) (1997)).
164. Id. at 738 (quoting and upholding 47 C.F.R. § 51.809 (1997)).
165. See Southwestern Bell Tel. Co. v. FCC, 153 F.3d 597, 602-06 (8th Cir. 1998), vacated
sub nom. Ameritech Corp. v. FCC, 119 S. Ct. 2016 (1999).
166. See Ameritech, 119 S. Ct. at 2016.
167. See 47 U.S.C.A. § 153(29) (West Supp. 1999) (defining "network element").
168. 47 U.S.C.A. § 251(d)(2) (West 1998); see Iowa Utils. Bd., 119 S. Ct. at 734-36
(invalidating 47 C.F.R. § 51.319 (1997)).
169. See Iowa Utils. Bd. v. FCC, 120 F.3d 753, 811-12 (8th Cir. 1997), rev'd in relevant part
sub nom. AT&T Corp. v. Iowa Utils. Bd., 119 S. Ct. 721,734-36 (1999).
170. See, e.g., Commissioner v. Tellier, 383 U.S. 687, 689 (1966) ("Our decisions have
consistently construed the term 'necessary' [in I.R.C. § 162(a)] as imposing only the minimal
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and even McCulloch v. Maryland,172 the FCC interpreted the word
"necessary" rather loosely, more in the sense of "helpful" rather than in
the sense of "indispensable." Justice Scalia and six other Justices
disagreed; Justice Souter alone dissented.173 Relying on this aspect of
Iowa Utilities Board, a federal district court has invalidated the
Commission's rule on physical collocation.174
The high court's endorsement of FCC jurisdiction to issue
TELRIC may prove a hidden blessing for ILECs. Thanks to the FCC's
influence, "most state commissions" had already "issued interim pricing
orders.., that mirrored... TELRIC['s] methodology and proxy
rates."' 75 Their "loss" in Iowa Utilities Board will enable ILECs to
challenge TELRIC on the merits in a single federal proceeding. And
that proceeding will be heard by a court that once described the illusory
barrier to FCC jurisdiction as "hog tight, horse high, and bull strong.
176
The conditions are ripe for a constitutional showdown over TELRIC as
a "deregulatory taking," a violation of the government's "regulatory
contract" with the formerly sheltered LECs.
177
requirement that the expense be 'appropriate and helpful' for 'the development of the
[taxpayer's] business."' (quoting Welch v. Helvering, 290 U.S. 111, 113 (1933)).
171. See Board of Trustees of the State Univ. of New York v. Fox, 492 U.S. 469, 476-77
(1989) (Scalia, J.) ("[Tihe word 'necessary' is sometimes used more loosely.").
172. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 413 (1819) (noting that the word "necessary" "frequently
imports no more than that one thing is convenient, or useful, or essential to another");
accord National R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Boston & Maine Corp., 503 U.S. 407, 419 (1992)
(relying on McCulloch to adopt a permissive reading of "required").
173. See Iowa Utils. Bd., 119 S. Ct. at 739-41 (Souter, J., concurring in part and dissenting
in part) (defending the Commission's interpretation of the statutory terms "necessary" and
"impair").
174. See US West Communications, Inc. v. Jennings, 46 F. Supp. 2d 1004,1026 (D. Ariz.
1999) (invalidating 47 C.F.R. § 51.323 insofar as that rule rested on the FCC's definition of
"equipment necessary for interconnection or access to unbundled network elements"
(emphasis added)); cf MCI v. Bell-Atlantic, 36 F. Supp. 2d 419, 428 & n.10 (D.D.C. 1999)
(noting the incongruity between Iowa Utilities Board and the FCC's physical collocation rule
without invalidating the rule); U.S. West Communications, Inc. v. AT&T Communications,
Inc., 31 F. Supp. 2d 839, 854 n.9 (D. Or. 1998) ("The court's dictionary defines 'necessary' as
'essential' .... Apparently, the FCC consulted a different dictionary.").
175. SIDAK & SPULBER, supra note 67, at 558.
176. Iowa Utils. Bd. v. FCC, 120 F.3d 753, 800 (8th Cir. 1997), rev'd in relevant part sub
nom. AT&T v. Iowa Utils. Bd., 119 S. Ct. 721 (1999).
177. Compare SIDAK & SPULBER, supra note 67 (arguing that the failure to cover
stranded costs violates a constitutionally enforceable "regulatory contract" between
franchised incumbents and the government) with Jim Chen, The Second Coming of Smyth v.
Ames, 77 TEX. L. REV. 1535 (1999) (describing how the theory of deregulatory takings
might be used to attack TELRIC and opposing this novel application of constitutional law to
ratemaking decisions). See generally Herbert Hovenkamp, The Takings Clause and
Improvident Regulatory Bargains, 108 YALE L.J. 801 (1999).
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(2) Section 254: Masters of Universal Service
The implementation of sections 251 and 254 has generated three
distinct disputes that are straining incumbent LECs' relationship with
one of the newest segments of the telecommunications industry,
Internet service providers (ISPs). First, ILECs have been rebuffed in an
effort to evade their reciprocal compensation obligations vis-d-vis their
LX competitors. An ILEC owes reciprocal compensation to CLECs for
calls characterized as local carriage, but not for calls that are deemed
long distance.178 Otherwise "local" nontoll calls to an ISP can be
characterized as long distance to the extent that the ISP connects a
customer to a website at a remote location outside the LEC's service
area. Or so ILECS have argued. In February 1999, the FCC issued a
declaratory ruling that endorsed the ILECs' description of such calls.
179
At the same time, however, because the Commission has yet to issue its
own regulations on reciprocal compensation for calls to ISPs, the FCC
has allowed state public utility commissions to reimpose reciprocal
compensation obligations that might otherwise not fall due.18° The
Seventh Circuit has upheld the FCC's decision to defer to its state-law
counterparts on this issue.181
Two other disputes pit ISPs not only against ILECs but also against
all other players in the telecommunications industry. Both of these
disputes involve universal service. On one hand, the Eighth Circuit has
upheld the FCC's decision to grant ISPs an exemption from interstate
access charges.182  This decision stands in contrast with a
contemporaneous district court ruling that the imposition of access
charges on intrastate toll calls completed by an IXC constitutes an
"implicit universal service subsidy" at odds with section 254.183 At the
same time, the FCC has decided to allow ISPs to receive Universal
Service Fund reimbursement for the below-cost component of prices
charged to schools, libraries, and rural health-care providers for Internet
access.184 Subsidies for ISPs come at the expense of LECs, ]XCs, and all
other "providers of telecommunications services" required to make
178. See Illinois Bell Tel. Co. v. WorldCom Techs., Inc., 179 F.3d 566,569 (7th Cir. 1999).
179. See Inter-Carrier Compensation for ISP-Bound Traffic, 14 F.C.C.R. 3689, 3697-99
(1999) (characterizing ISP traffic for "jurisdictional purposes" as "a continuous transmission
from the end user to a distant Internet site").
180. See id at 3703-06.
181. See Illinois Bell, 179 F.3d at 572-73. See generally Philip J. Weiser, Chevron,
Cooperative Federalism, and Telecommunications Reform, 52 VAND. L. REV. 1, 22-53 (1999)
(advocating a general interpretive norm of federal judicial deference to state agency
interpretations of the Telecommunications Act).
182. See Southwestern Bell Tel. Co. v. FCC, 153 F.3d 523,541-44 (8th Cir. 1998).
183. See AT&T Communications of the Pac. Northwest, Inc. v. US West
Communications, Inc., 31 F. Supp. 2d 861,863-64 (D. Or. 1998).
184. See In re Federal-State Joint Bd. on Universal Serv., 12 F.C.C.R. 8776,9002 (1997).
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"equitable and nondiscriminatory contribution[s] to the preservation
and advancement of universal service."'185 The Fifth Circuit has upheld
this FCC ruling.
186
(3) Section 271: The Firewall Still Stands
The Iowa Utilities Board litigation is "just the first salvo in what
promises to be a prolonged battle... over the terms and pace of new
competition."'187 In the tussle over TELRIC, the BOCs have been
playing defense as the country's leading ILECs. Successfully fending off
section 251 will preserve the BOCs' LX networks from CLEC intrusion.
But section 271 gives the BOCs a chance to play offense. As ferociously
as the BOCs have opposed the implementation of section 251, one
would expect these eager would-be entrants into long-distance markets
to show even greater vigor in attacking section 271's barrier to in-region
interLATA carriage.
Yet no BOC has successfully penetrated the section 271 firewall.
The 1996 Act, after all, left the BOCs with the burden of proof on
overcoming the presumptive barrier to interLATA entry.188 So far the
FCC has considered six BOC petitions for authorization to offer in-
region interLATA service. The Commission denied the first five
petitions:189 SBC in Oklahoma,19° Ameritech in Michigan, 191 BellSouth
185. 47 U.S.C.A. § 254(b)(4) (West Supp. 1999); see Sean M. Foley, Comment, The
Brewing Controversy over Internet Service Providers and the Universal Service Fund: A Third
Generation Interpretation of Section 254, 6 COMMLAw CONSPECTus 245, 245-46 (1998)
(noting these carriers' objections to the ISPs eligibility for universal service support and
describing the carriers' counterproposal that ISPs themselves should be required to
contribute to the Universal Service Fund). For an extremely aggressive argument that the
implicit tax scheme embodied by § 254 is unconstitutional, see Nichole L. Millard, Note,
Universal Service, Section 254 of the Telecommunications Act of 1996: A Hidden Tax?, 50
FED. COMM. LJ. 255 (1997).
186. See Texas Office of Public Util. Counsel v. FCC, 183 F.3d 393,445-46 (5th Cir. 1999).
187. Robinson, supra note 6, at 308 n.54.
188. See 47 U.S.C.A. § 271(d)(3) (West Supp. 1999) (providing that the "Commission
shall not approve the authorization requested in a] [§ 271] application... unless it" makes
three specific findings); see also Proceedings for Bell Operating Co. Applications Under New
Section 271 of the Communications Act, 11 F.C.C.R. 19,708 (1996).
189. See generally Eric M. Swedenburg, Note, Promoting Competition in the
Telecommunications Markets: Why the FCC Should Adopt a Less Stringent Approach to Its
Review of Section 271 Applications, 84 CORNELL L. REv. 1418, 1438-55 (1999) (reviewing
the FCC's denials of these § 271 petitions, excluding BellSouth's second Louisiana petition).
190. See In re SBC Communications Inc., 12 F.C.C.R. 8685 (1997), affd sub nom. SBC
Communications, Inc. v. FCC, 138 F.3d 410 (D.C. Cir. 1998).
191. See In re Ameritech Michigan, 12 F.C.C.R. 20,543 (1997). This order became the
subject of an extraordinary mandamus order issued by the Eighth Circuit, which construed
the FCC's denial of Ameritech's § 271 petition as an "plain-faced reassertion of section
252(d) pricing authority over the local competition provisions of the [1996] Act... in clear
violation" of the Eighth Circuit's Iowa Utilities Board decision. Iowa Utils. Bd. v. FCC, 135
F.3d 535,542 (8th Cir. 1998), vacated, 119 S. Ct. 1022 (1999).
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in South Carolina, 192 and two BellSouth petitions covering Louisiana.
193
The sixth, a Bell Atlantic petition covering New York, was pending as
of December 1, 1999.194 The FCC has also used section 271 to
invalidate a "teaming" arrangement under which Ameritech and US
West proposed to package their own vertical switching services (caller
ID, call waiting, last call redial, and the like) with long-distance service
by Qwest.195
The BOCs can find one glimmer of hope in the FCC's section 271
decisions. The earlier denials rested on the BOCs' failure to show that
"no [competing] provider" of LX service "ha[d] requested... access
and interconnection.' 96 The D.C. Circuit upheld the FCC's view that
this path to section 271 authorization "was foreclosed the moment a
provider requested interconnection so long as [the FCC] could predict
that the carrier would... provide competitive service to both residential
and business customers, at least predominantly over its own
facilities."'1 97 A single qualifying request for access and interconnection
from a CLEC within three months would prevent the BOC in question
from filing a section 271 petition under this provision. In BellSouth's
second Louisiana petition, however, the Commission found that the
BOC had satisfied six of the fourteen items on section 271's competitive
checklist and partially fulfilled a seventh.
198
Spurned in their efforts to pierce section 271 on its own terms, the
BOCs pursued a radically different tactic. The BOCs complained that
the Telecommunications Act's BOC provisions, including section 271,
were invalid in their entirety as an unconstitutional bill of attainder. On
the last day of 1997, one week after the FCC denied a section 271
petition for the third and final time that year,199 SBC actually persuaded
a federal district court in Texas to accept this theory.2°° The Fifth
192. See In re BellSouth Corp., 13 F.C.C.R. 539 (1997), affd sub nom. BellSouth Corp. v.
FCC, 162 F.3d 678 (D.C. Cir. 1998).
193. See In re BellSouth Corp., 13 F.C.C.R. 6245 (1998); In re BellSouth Corp., 13
F.C.C.R. 20,599 (1998).
194. See In re Bell Atlantic Corp., CC Docket No. 99-295, 1999 WL 770898 (Sept. 29,
1999) (issuing a protective order for documents submitted in connection with this § 271
petition).
195. See AT&T Corp. v. Ameritech Corp., 13 F.C.C.R. 21,438 (1998), affd sub norn US
West Communications, Inc. v. FCC, 177 F.3d 1057 (D.C. Cir. 1999).
196. 47 U.S.C.A. § 271(c)(1)(B) (West Supp. 1999).
197. SBC Communications, Inc. v. FCC, 138 F.3d 410, 417 (D.C. Cir. 1998); accord
BellSouth Corp. v. FCC, 162 F.3d 678,693 (D.C. Cir. 1998).
198. See In re BellSouth Corp., 13 F.C.C.R. 20,599 (1998).
199. The FCC denied BellSouth's South Carolina petition on December 24, 1997. See In
re BellSouth Corp., 13 F.C.C.R. 539 (1997), affd sub nom. BellSouth Corp. v. FCC, 162 F.3d
678 (D.C. Cir. 1998).
200. See SBC Communications, Inc. v. FCC, 981 F. Supp. 996, 1003-07 (N.D. Tex. 1997),
rev'd, 154 F.3d 226 (5th Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 119 S. Ct. 889 (1999).
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Circuit reversed this rogue decision. 201 Likewise, the D.C. Circuit has
twice declined to invalidate the BOC provisions as bills of attainder.20 2
The BOCs simply cannot argue that section 271 singles them out for
punishment. "Section 271, at worst, provides the BOCs with the
possibility of immediate entrance into the in-region long distance
service market, by following a clearer path than that provided under the
MFJ."20 3  The denial of certiorari in all of these cases ends this
constitutional frolic and detour. In all likelihood, the implementation of
section 271 will return to the relatively quotidian consideration of BOC
petitions for interLATA relief.
The fate of the section 271 process remains clouded. Bell
Atlantic's pending section 271 application, the sixth filed with the FCC
since the passage of the 1996 Act, exposed an intriguing split between
state regulators and the United States Department of Justice. Soon
after Bell Atlantic filed its petition in September 1999,204 the
chairwoman of the New York Public Service Commission informally
announced her support in light of the "tremendous amount of progress
by [Bell Atlantic] in opening its local market to competition. '20 5 Within
a month, the PSC formally supported Bell Atlantic's petition to provide
interLATA service in New York.2°6 In its legally mandated evaluation
of the petition,20 7 however, the Justice Department disagreed,
expressing doubts about Bell Atlantic's ability to "provide access to
unbundled local loops, either for traditional voice services or for digital
subscriber line... technology. 20 8 The Department also observed that
"Bell Atlantic's systems for handling the unbundled network element
'platform'... rely to a disturbing extent on manual processes that are
prone to error and delay."209
201. See SBC Communications, Inc. v. FCC, 154 F.3d 226 (5th Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 119
S. Ct. 889 (1999).
202. See BellSouth Corp. v. FCC, 162 F.3d 678 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (upholding § 271), cert.
denied, 119 S. Ct. 1495 (1999); BellSouth Corp v. FCC, 144 F.3d 58 (D.C. Cir. 1998)
(upholding § 274, which blocks the BOCs from engaging in electronic publishing), cert
denied, 119 S. Ct. 1495 (1999).
203. BellSouth, 162 F.3d at 691.
204. In re Bell Atlantic Corp., CC Docket No. 99-295,1999 WL 770898 (Sept. 29, 1999).
205. Seth Schiesel, Now Found in Bell Atlantic's Corner: New York Regulators, N.Y.
TIMES, Sept. 30,1999, at Cl (quoting Maureen 0. Helmer).
206. See Seth Schiesel, New York Backs Bell Atlantic in Bid to Offer Long-Distance, N.Y.
TIMES, Oct. 20,1999, at Cl1.
207. See 47 U.S.C.A. § 271(d)(2) (West Supp. 1999) (requiring the FCC to consult with
the Department of Justice in considering a BOC's petition to provide in-region interLATA
service).
208. Evaluation of the United States Department of Justice, In re New York Tel. Co., CC
Docket No. 99-295, at 2 (FCC Nov. 1, 1999) (available at <http:ll
www.fcc.govlBureaus/CommonCarrier/in-regionapplications/bany/welcome.html>).
209. Id. (expressing "significant doubt that Bell Atlantic has provided ... stable and
efficient electronic systems" essential to "a competitive market").
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Curiously enough, the BOCs' strategies in litigating sections 251
and 271 contradict each other. The Iowa Utilities Board litigation and
the bill of attainder cases have wrecked the delicate balance between
these two crucial provisions of the Telecommunications Act. Every
BOC, of course, would prefer to receive permission to offer interLATA
carriage within its local service region without waiting for at least one
competitor to undertake the exorbitant project of completing a
redundant wireline LX network. Because competition via resale of an
ILEC's services or via wireless facilities "does not suffice to meet the
[statutory] requirement" of facilities-based competition,210 interLATA
relief under section 271 will depend heavily on the BOCs' ability to
fulfill the competitive checklist. But the BOCs' fierce resistance to
section 251 retards their efforts to satisfy this very checklist, dependent
as section 271 is on evidence that CLECs have "nondiscriminatory
access" to ILEC facilities. By contesting the FCC's interconnection and
unbundled access rules by any means necessary, the BOCs are raising
the costs of their rivals' plans to offer LX carriage.21' Full compensation
for the BOCs' sunk investment in their wireline networks would
substantially increase the cost of any piecemeal LX entry strategy.
This dynamic explains the infuriating pattern of litigation over
sections 251 and 271 since 1996. The BOCs contested the FCC's
authority to implement section 251 and are girding to challenge the
agency's signature policy, the TELRIC rule, on the merits. Just as
steadfastly, the Commission has refused to grant any BOC permission
under section 271 to provide in-region interLATA carriage. The BOCs'
frustration over the failure of their section 271 petitions clarifies the
otherwise baffling decision to assault the 1996 Act's BOC provisions as
bills of attainder. As of December 1, 1999, the Iowa Utilities Board
litigation had returned to the Eighth Circuit for a consideration of
TELRIC on the merits, and the FCC was pondering its sixth section 271
petition. Throughout it all the Commission and the BOCs had
contested the local competition provisions of the 1996 Act to a bitter
standstill.
C. The $90 Billion Question
This elaborate trip through the Telecommunications Act and the
210. CONFERENCE REPORT, supra note 30, at 147 (emphasis in original), reprinted in
1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 124,160; see also HOUSE REPORT, supra note 13, at 77, reprinted in 1996
U.S.C.C.A.N. 10, 43 (noting that neither cellular service nor resale of a BOC's LX services
would satisfy the statutory requirement of "facilities-based competition").
211. See generally Thomas G. Krattemnaker & Steven C. Salop, Anticompetitive
Exclusion: Raising Rivals' Costs to Achieve Power over Price, 96 YALE LJ. 209 (1986). For
an application of post-Chicago antitrust precepts to contemporary telecommunications
policy, see Ashutosh Bhagwat, Unnatural Competition? Applying the New Antitrust
Learning to Foster Competition in the Local Exchange, 50 HASTINGS LJ. 1479 (1999).
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first stages of its implementation concludes with a single, crucial legal
question: When may a local exchange company offer long-distance
carriage? The answer to this question, worth roughly $90 billion in
annual revenues,212 has dictated almost all of the merger strategies on
the BOC side of the Magnificent Seven.
Until the FCC begins granting section 271 petitions, the BOCs can
do no more than carry interLATA calls that originate outside their LX
service regions. Now that the desperate bill of attainder attack on that
provision has expired, the BOCs must engage the FCC in a gritty state-
by-state battle to breach section 271's interLATA firewall. But section
271's very presence also carries great legal significance for LECs not
governed by that provision. Expressio unius est exclusio alterius.213 An
independent-such as GTE or the Southern New England Telephone
Corporation (SNET)-may offer IX carriage anytime, anywhere. This
is precisely the sort of competitive difference that invites regulatory
evasion.214 In the post-1996 world of American telecommunications,
the frustrated BOCs have reacted by acquiring independent LECS.
The $90 Billion Question has a comparably lucrative flip side,
worth roughly $100 billion in annual revenues:215 When will America's
ILECs acquiesce in the opening of their networks to liberal
interconnection, unbundling, and resale? Just as the FCC's reluctance
to grant section 271 relief explained the BOCs' merger strategy in the
first years after the passage of the Telecommunications Act, BOC
intransigence on section 251 has shaped the CLECs' counterstrategy.
After years of watching the BOCs wage massive resistance to TELRIC
and the rest of the FCC's local competition agenda, the Magnificent
Seven's IXCs have pursued a merger and acquisition strategy that
assumes an indefinitely negative answer. Three years after Congress
passed the 1996 Act and the FCC launched the first of its rules
implementing the statute's local competition provisions, the FCC
painted a bleak picture of the local exchange. From the end of 1997 to
the end of 1998, CLECS increased their revenue from $2.2 billion to
212 See FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMM'N, LONG DISTANCE MARKET SHARES:
FOURTH QUARTER 1998, at 11 (March 1999) (reporting that American long-distance
carriers had $88 billion in revenues during 1997).
213. E.g., Freightliner Corp. v. Myrick, 514 U.S. 280, 288 (1995); Leatherman v. Tarrant
County Narcotics Intelligence & Coordination Unit, 507 U.S. 163,168 (1993).
214. Cf., e.g., National Rural Telecom Ass'n v. FCC, 988 F.2d 174,179-80 (D.C. Cir. 1993)
(observing that the transition from conventional rate-of-return regulation to price caps
presents "cost shifting" concerns similar to those that affect the supervision of diversified
utilities with "regulated and unregulated affiliates").
215. See FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMM'N, TELECOMMUNICATIONS INDUSTRY
REVENUE: 1997, at 7 (1998) (stating that American telecommunications carriers reported
$97.4 billion in local service revenues in 1997).
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$3.6 billion 2 16 But ILECs retain 96 percent of all LX revenues. 217
Unbundling and interconnection have made the barest of contributions
to CLECs' modest share of this market. By a ratio of ten to one,
CLECs still rely on resold ILEC lines in favor of unbundled local
loops. 218
Section 251 was meant to spare CLECs the prohibitive expense of
building new LX networks from scratch. Chronic litigation over section
251, however, has taught aspiring CLECs not to wait. And there are no
more than three CLECs in the United States that can hope to amass the
resources for such an extravagant stunt: the major IXCs called AT&T,
MCI WorldCom, and Sprint. Even these companies have not chosen to
enter the fray alone. AT&T has enlisted two of the country's largest
cable companies for the fight, while MCI WorldCom and Sprint are
seeking to merge.
Having completed this selective tour of the 1996 Act and the
leading cases decided under that statute, I now turn to an analysis of the
merger strategies driven by these legal developments.
IV. Merger Mania: A Succinct Strategic Scorecard
On February 27, 1996, exactly three weeks after the passage of the
Telecommunications Act, US West declared that it would purchase
Continental Cablevision for $10.8 billion.219 It was the first major
merger announced under the new statutory regime. On January 16,
1999, roughly three weeks shy of the Act's third anniversary, AirTouch
agreed to be acquired for $56 billion by Vodaphone, a British wireless
concern seeking to expand from its northern European base into North
America. 220
As bookends on the first three years of merger mania under the
Telecommunications Act, the US West/Continental and
Vodaphone/AirTouch deals were oddly unrepresentative. Neither of
these mergers followed the most prominent strategies that have
unfolded since February 6, 1996. US West has followed neither of the
strategies by which some of its fellow BOCs have flourished. As for
AirTouch, the identity of the losing bidders-Bell Atlantic and MCI
WorldCom-sheds substantial light on the legal and economic
dynamics underlying telecommunications mergers.
216. See FEDERAL COMMUNIcATIONs COMM'N, COMMON CARRIER BUREAU, LOCAL
COMPETrlON 1, 12 (Aug. 1999).
217. See hl.
218. See iL at 2,22-23.
219. See Garth Alexander, US Phone Giants Branch Out, SUNDAY TIMEs, March 3, 1996;
Mark Landler, US West's Continental Ambitions, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 28,1996, at C1.
220. See Vodaphone to Acquire AirTouch for $56 Billion, MINNEAPOLIS STAR-TRIB.,
Jan. 16,1999, at Al.
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The balance of Part IV will describe five distinct merger strategies.
The first three involve BOCs. Bell Atlantic and SBC have successfully
pursued two types of mergers: horizontal, "bigger is better"
combinations with fellow BOCs and acquisitions of independent LECs
not bound by the BOC provisions of the 1996 Act. By contrast, the US
West/Continental Cablevision merger stands as a singularly impressive
example of the BOCs' failure to exploit the putative benefits of
deregulation and convergence.
On the other side of the Magnificent Seven, IXC-centered
strategies are as varied as the three leading long-distance carriers. But a
pattern can be discerned in the acquisitions that built AT&T, MCI
WorldCom, and Sprint. These companies consider IX carriage,
wireless, and Internet access as complements of, even prerequisites to,
competitive LX entry. If Qwest's bid for US West clears all regulatory
hurdles, it may suggest that CLECs will invade the BOCs' domain by
merger and acquisition rather than competition. In other words, if you
can't build your own LX network or secure interconnection to someone
else's, perhaps you would be best advised to buy one outright. "If you
can't beat 'em," so it seems, "buy 'em."
The differences in these strategies reflect the stark legal and
economic separation of the BOCs from their rivals.
Telecommunications mergers since 1996 have responded to the legal
peculiarities arising from the interplay between sections 251 and 271.
The BOCs are trying simultaneously to defend their LX turf against
intrusions under section 251 and to gain an IX foothold in spite of the
section 271 firewall. In mergers as in litigation, the mightiest
incumbents in American telecommunications have devoted the greater
part of their efforts to defending their traditional markets.
Conversely, the leading IXCs' simultaneous expansion into
wireless, cable, and Internet access is designed to propel these
companies into LX markets with a minimal amount of ILEC
cooperation. Section 251 is most noteworthy for its relative
insignificance; IXC-centered mergers since 1996 have proceeded apace
even though the Telecommunications Act's local competition
provisions remain incompletely implemented. If anything, AT&T's
efforts to reassert its dominance of this industry have exposed a new,
distinct source of legal controversy over the integration of the
telecommunications and Internet industries. We may be witnessing the
passage of the Telecommunications Act from one generation of
implementation disputes to the next, well before the statute reaches its
fifth anniversary.
A fifth and final strategy bypasses the Magnificent Seven. It has
two dimensions, wireless telephony and transnational investment. Both
may be inferred from the battle over AirTouch. Vodaphone's victory
over Bell Atlantic and MCI WorldCom, a triumph by a foreign wireless
August 1999]
carrier over two American landwire giants, suggest the world of
telecommunications is far from exhausting all of its competitive
possibilities.
A. Strategy No.1: Horizontal BOC Mergers
Despite the original seven BOCs' common parentage and raison
d'tre, the reshuffling of American telecommunications after 1996
exposed a schism in corporate culture and strategy. Two BOCs, SBC
and Bell Atlantic, emerged as aggressive empire-builders. Of the other
five Bell companies, only BellSouth has retained its independence. In
so doing, it arguably has missed its window of opportunity to expand
through merger and thereby to stay viable in an industry ruled by titans.
Three other BOCs have been absorbed into the coastal empires, while
US West stands on the verge of becoming the first major ILEC in the
United States to be acquired by a non-LEC.
(1) The Bicoastal Squeeze
SBC and Bell Atlantic have made themselves America's most
powerful local telephone companies by acquiring sister BOCS. SBC
completed its acquisition of Pacific Telesis in January 1997221 and won
regulatory approval for its acquisition of Ameritech in October 1999.
22
The resulting empire connects San Antonio, San Francisco, and Sault
Ste. Marie. Similarly, purchasing NYNEX made Bell Atlantic the beast
of the East;223 the combined company boasts a continuous LX service
area stretching from Maine to Virginia, excluding an SBC enclave in
Connecticut.
These three horizontal BOC mergers-SBC/PacTel, Bell
Atlantic/NYNEX, and SBC/Ameritech-have dramatically
transformed the FCC's approach in reviewing telecommunications
mergers. As noted above in Part HI.A.(4), the FCC's application of the
public interest standard-more precisely described as the review of
petitions under sections 214(a) and 310(d) of the Communications Act
to transfer licenses--"is informed by antitrust principles, but not limited
by the antitrust laws."224 FCC merger review therefore begins but does
not end with the Clayton Act's prohibition of mergers whose effect
"may be substantially to lessen competition or to tend to create a
221. See In re Pacific Telesis Group & SBC Communications, Inc., 12 F.C.C.R. 2624
(1997).
222. See In re Ameritech Corp. & SBC Communications, Inc., CC Docket No. 98-141,
1999 WL 809551 (Oct. 8, 1999); In re SBC Communications, Inc. & Ameritech Corp., 13
F.C.C.R. 25,297 (1998) (protective order).
223. See In re NYNEX Corp. & Bell Atlantic Corp., 12 F.C.C.R. 19,985 (1997).
224. Id at 20,003 (footnote omitted).
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monopoly." More than any other contemporaneous legal
development, horizontal BOC merger reviews since 1996 have stretched
the public interest standard well beyond core antitrust principles.
In Clayton Act cases, the federal courts have developed an "actual
potential competition doctrine" for mergers "that will leave competition
in the market exactly as it was, neither hurt nor helped, and that [are]
challengeable under § 7 only on grounds that the company could, but
did not, enter de novo or through 'toe-hold' acquisition." 226 Under this
doctrine, a merger eliminating a potential competitor may be criticized
as anticompetitive upon a demonstration of three factors. First, the
market must be concentrated. Second, the acquiring firm must have
been among those firms that were likely and uniquely well situated to
enter. Finally, but for the acquisition, such entry would have
deconcentrated the market or resulted in other procompetitive
effects2 7 The Supreme Court has explicitly declined, however, to
decide whether this doctrine operates "solely on the ground that such a
[market-extension] merger eliminates the prospect for long-term
deconcentration of an oligopolistic market that in theory might result if
the acquiring firm were forbidden to enter except through a de novo
undertaking or through the acquisition of a small existing entrant."
(a) SBC/PacTel
Announced on April 1, 1996, SBC's bid for Pacific Telesis gave the
FCC its first opportunity under the newly amended Communications
Act to review a merger involving two major LECs. Finding an absence
of actual potential competition for PacTel, the Commission approved
the merger229 First, the FCC reasoned that there were "more than a
few other potential entrants into [PacTel's] markets." 230 At that time,
SBC looked no more likely than any other major LEC or IXC to
encroach on PacTel's turfZ 1 Second, the FCC found no evidence "that
SBC would enter or would have entered" those markets "but for the
proposed merger.' '232 Thereupon the Commission concluded its
analysis under the actual potential competition doctrine without
225. 15 U.S.C. §§ 18,21 (1994).
226. United States v. Falstaff Brewing Corp., 410 U.S. 526,537 (1973).
227. See, e.g., United States v. Marine Bancorporation, 418 U.S. 602,633 (1974); Tenneco,
Inc. v. FTC, 689 F.2d 346, 352 (2d Cir. 1982); Yamaha Motor Co. v. FTC, 657 F.2d 971, 977
(8th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 915 (1982); Mercantile Textile Corp. v. Board of
Governors, 638 F.2d 1255,1264 (5th Cir. 1981).
228. Marine Bancorporation, 418 U.S. at 625.
229. See Pacific Telesis Group & SBC Communications, Inc., 12 F.C.C.R. 2624 (1997).
230. Id. at 2637.
231. See id.
232. Id.
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reaching a discussion of the merger's purported benefits. 3
For the moment, it seemed as if FCC merger review would
effectively equate the public interest test with Clayton Act standards. If
ever this position represented FCC policy, it reached its high water
mark in the SBC/PacTel order.
(b) Bell Atlantic/NYNEX
Although the FCC ultimately approved Bell Atlantic's proposed
acquisition of NYNEX, that proceeding represented a significant
turning point in the Commission's approach to telecommunications
mergers.4 This merger, announced exactly three weeks after the
SBC/PacTel merger, commanded an additional six months of the
Commission's attention. The FCC found that each of these companies,
unlike their western counterparts, was a potential entrant in the other's
service territories. The Commission found that Bell Atlantic had
formulated concrete plans to enter NYNEX markets235 and that
NYNEX was at least "a possible entrant into Bell Atlantic
territories. ' '236  By contrast, SBC and PacTel, which lacked
geographically contiguous territories and did not enjoy significant
goodwill or name recognition in each other's markets, could not be
distinguished from "a large number of... [other] significant market
participants."237
The Bell Atlantic/NYNEX proceeding imparted a peculiar twist to
the otherwise familiar Clayton Act maneuver of extolling competition
from nearby geographic markets8 s In this instance, a single geographic
market loomed large. The merging firms cast a menacing shadow
across LATA 132, a market encompassing New York City, Long Island,
and part of Westchester County.3 9 In the battle for what is probably
the most lucrative local telephone market in the western hemisphere, a
combined Bell Atlantic-NYNEX behemoth would prove too powerful
even for what were then the three major IXCs: AT&T, MCI, and
Sprint.24° The ongoing consolidation of LECs would also increase the
233. See id at 2638 ("[W]e do not analyze the proposed merger under the other elements
of the actual potential competition doctrine.").
234. See In re NYNEX Corp. & Bell Atlantic Corp., 12 F.C.C.R. 19,985 (1997).
235. See id at 19,990-91,20,025-28.
236. Id at 19,991.
237. Id at 20,024.
238. See, e.g., United States v. El Paso Natural Gas Co., 376 U.S. 651, 661 (1964); United
States v. Philadelphia Nat'l Bank, 374 U.S. 321,359 (1963); Tampa Elec. Co. v. Nashville Co.,
365 U.S. 320, 327 (1961); cf. United States v. Pabst Brewing Co., 384 U.S. 546, 549-50 (1966)
(holding that § 7 of the Clayton Act governs mergers affecting either a regional market
within the United States or the domestic market as a whole).
239. See NYNEX & Bell Atlantic, 12 F.C.C.R. at 19,990 & n.13.
240. See id at 20,035.
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risk of coordination among the surviving firms.241
The Bell Atlantic/NYNEX merger also raised a regulatory concern
over benchmarking. Rooted in the "comparable earnings" standard
articulated in such classic cases as Bluefield Water Works,242
benchmarking matured as a centerpiece of regulatory policy toward the
end of the MFJ era. Regulators, competitors, and even incumbent
LECs themselves have learned to set baselines according to the
performance of existing regulated monopolists.243 A "reduction in the
number of separately owned firms engaged in similar businesses" would
compromise the "Commission's ability to identify, and therefore to
contain, market power."244 The FCC feared especially that it might lose
the ability to use the uncoordinated conduct of a sufficiently large
number of unrelated LECs as "regulatory 'benchmarks' for evaluating
the conduct of other carriers or the industry as a whole."245
The FCC nevertheless approved the merger. The decisive factor
was a set of commitments that Bell Atlantic and NYNEX accepted as a
condition of approval. Among other things, the merging companies
agreed to cooperate in the monitoring of its operating support systems,
especially "with respect to resold services, unbundled network elements
and combinations of unbundled network elements.2 46 "Bell Atlantic
and NYNEX also agree[d] to offer, in interconnection negotiations and
arbitrations, payment mechanisms... consistent with the Commission's
decision in its Second Physical Collocation Order."247 Most of all, the
firms "commit[ted] to offer interconnection, unbundled network
elements and transport and termination at rates based on forward
looking economic cost."248
It bears remembering that neither TELRIC nor the collocation
241. See id. at 19,991-92,20,046-48.
242. See Bluefield Water Works & Improvement Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 262 U.S.
679, 692-93 (1923). See generally Harold Leventhal, Vitality of the Comparable Earnings
Standard for Regulation of Utilities in a Growth Economy, 74 YALE LU. 989,1011-16 (1965).
243. See California v. FCC, 39 F.3d 919, 927 (9th Cir. 1994), cert denied, 514 U.S. 1050
(1995); United States v. Western Elec. Co., 993 F.2d 1572,1580 (D.C. Cir.) ("[T]he existence
of seven BOCs increases the number of benchmarks that can be used by regulators to detect
discriminatory pricing.... in evaluating compliance with equal access requirements .... "),
cert denied, 510 U.S. 984 (1993); United States v. Western Elec. Co., 900 F.2d 283, 299 (D.C.
Cir.), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 911 (1990).
244. Id at 20,058.
245. Id ; see also id. at 19,994 ("As diversity among carriers declines, both this
Commission and state commissions may lose the ability to compare performance between
similar carriers that have made different management or strategic choices.").
246. NYNEX & Bell Atlantic, 12 F.C.C.R. at 19,992. Operating support systems comprise
"pre-ordering, ordering, provisioning, repair and maintenance, and billing." Id
247. Id. at 19,993 (citing Local Exch. Carriers' Rates, Terms & Conditions for Expanded
Interconnection Through Physical Collocation for Special Access & Switched Transport, 12
F.C.C.R. 18,730 (1997)).
248. Id. at 19,992.
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order has rested on firm legal ground. Iowa Utilities Board clouded
rather than clarified the validity of these orders. Though the Supreme
Court approved FCC jurisdiction over TELRIC, Iowa Utilities Board
did not validate that rule as a reasonable exercise of the Commission's
discretion. 249 Moreover, in light of the nonjurisdictional elements of the
Supreme Court's decision,20 at least two lower courts have taken issue
with the FCC's interpretation of the word "necessary" in its physical
collocation order.25' In other words, in exchange for FCC approval of
their merger, Bell Atlantic and NYNEX acceded in two legally
contested FCC orders at the heart of the Commission's plan for
restructuring local telephone competition.
(c) SBC/Ameritech
The FCC's approval of the SBC/Ameritech merger extended the
practice of extracting commitments from merging firms as a condition
for regulatory approval. On July 24, 1998, SBC and Ameritech
requested FCC approval of their mergerZ 52 On April 1, 1999, the third
anniversary of the announcement of the SBC/PacTel merger, FCC
chairman William Kennard expressed five "serious concerns" that
"potential public interest harms" flowing from the proposed merger
might outweigh its "claimed competitive and consumer benefits" :
53
How can the Commission be assured that the merger will not
interfere with the companies' willingness and ability to fully open
their markets to competition... ?
How can the Commission be assured that the merger would...
encourage competition in all telecommunications markets?
How can the Commission be assured that the public will promptly
receive the claimed benefits from the [merging companies']
proposed "national/local strategy"... ?
How can the Commission be assured that the merger will not
adversely affect the Commission's ability to fulfill its
responsibilities under the Communications Act by reducing its
ability to "benchmark" the performance and capabilities of
telecommunications carriers?
How can the Commission be assured that the proposed
combination will serve the Communications Act's public interest
mandate by improving overall consumer welfare?254
249. See AT&T Corp. v. Iowa Utils. Bd., 119 S. Ct. 721, 728 n.3 (1999) (declining to
address the merits of the TELRIC rule).
250. See Iowa Utils. Bd, 119 S. Ct. at 734-36.
251. See cases cited supra note 174. But see GTE South Inc. v. Morrison, 6 F. Supp. 2d
517 (E.D. Va. 1998) (rejecting a takings challenge to the physical collocation order).
252. See SBC Communications, Inc. & Ameritech Corp., 13 F.C.C.R. 25,297 (1998).
253. See Letter Regarding SBC Ameritech Merger, 1999 WL 179045 (April 1,1999).
254. Id Coincidentally, Chairman Kennard's letter interrupted an otherwise triumphant
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Three months later, on July 1, 1999, SBC and Ameritech
responded to Chairman Kennard's concerns by proposing five sets of
voluntary conditions. First, the companies pledged "to make the in-
region local telephone markets of SBC/Ameritech... the most open
and competitive in the country."255 Among other concessions, the
combined company would guarantee CLECs the same unbundling and
interconnection terms that any SBC/Ameritech affiliate might obtain as
a CLEC in an out-of-region LX market256 Second, the companies
promised "to offer carrier-to-carrier promotions and to pay substantial
penalties to CLECs if SBC/Ameritech do not provide them with
nondiscriminatory service.1257 Third, the post-merger SBC/Ameritech
committed "to roll out facilities-based local service, as a CLEC, in 30
markets selected from the 50 largest out-of-region U.S. markets."25S
The failure to meet its own "specified rollout schedule" would cost the
combined company "$40 million per market, with a total potential
exposure of up to $1.2 billion."2 9 Fourth, in response to Chairman
Kennard's "benchmarking" concerns, the combined company pledged
to continue reporting its performance data on an individualized basis for
each of its local affiliates.26° Finally, the combined company promised
to eschew "any minimum monthly charges for long distance service," to
enhance the "universal service assistance Lifeline plans" already
existing in its service regions, and to implement "a plan for rolling out
advanced services equitably to lower-income urban and rural areas.1
261
While awaiting FCC approval, SBC and Ameritech proceeded with
other formalities, such as the transfer of overlapping cellular licenses to
a third party.
262
On October 8, 1999, the FCC approved the SBC/Ameritech
merger. 263 The Commission identified three threats to the public
ten-day span in which the SBC-Ameritech merger won regulatory approval in two of
Ameritech's in-region states. See In re SBC Communications Inc., 1999 WL 287710 (Ill.
Commerce Comm'n, March 29, 1999); In re SBC Communications Inc., 193 P.U.R.4th 86
(Ohio Pub. Utils. Comm'n, April 8,1999). Ah, "April is the cruelest month." T.S. Eliot, The
Waste Land, 1.1 (1922) (emphasis added).
255. Pleading Cycle Established for Comments on Conditions Proposed by SBC







262. See In re Ameritech Corp. & GTE Consumer Servs. Inc., DA 99-1677, 1999 WL
635724 (Aug. 20, 1999) (seeking FCC approval for the transfer of 20 cellular licenses from
Ameritech to GTE in anticipation of the SBC/Ameritech merger).
263. See In re Ameritech Corp. & SBC Communications, Inc., CC Docket No. 98-141,
1999 WL 809551 (Oct. 8,1999).
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interest. First, the merger would "significantly decrease[] the potential
for competition in local telecommunications markets by large
incumbent LECs" by eliminating SBC and Ameritech as competitors in
each other's LX markets.264 The FCC also expressed concern for
competition "in out-of-region markets," where the BOCs could "offer
wireline local exchange services, potentially bundled with cellular and
other offerings," to customers of their wireless affiliates.
265
Second, by further diluting the effectiveness of "comparative
practice analyses (or 'benchmarking')," a merger of "two of the six
remaining major incumbent LECs" would presumably "frustrate[] the
ability of the Commission (and state regulators) to implement the local
market-opening provisions" of the 1996 Act.266 This merger added a
new wrinkle to the Commission's increasingly familiar concern over
benchmarking: the "elimination of Ameritech as an independently-
owned RBOC," said the FCC, "is likely to reduce significantly the
amount of innovation that regulators and competitors could observe
and analyze."2 67 Just as Bell divestiture sparked "an unprecedented
flowering of innovation, '268 its reversal through horizontal BOC
mergers could smother the inventive spirit in telecommunications.
Third and finally, the SBC/Ameritech merger "would increase the
incentives and ability" of the combined firm "to discriminate against
rivals in retail markets where the new SBC will be the dominant
incumbent LEC.' '269 The sheer size of SBC's enlarged empire would
expand the number of geographic markets where raised costs could
cripple a rival.270 The FCC expressed "particular concern" over this
effect "in the retail market for advanced services." 271
The FCC reasoned that the merger offered little in the way of
competitive benefits. SBC and Ameritech, the Commission wrote, had
overstated the impact of their merger on the combined firm's incentive
to enter out-of-region markets.272 Indeed, the firms' activities before
the announcement of their merger-especially SBC's 1998 purchase of
SNET-showed that the unmerged BOCs already had ample incentive





267. d. [ 59 (emphasis added); cf 47 U.S.C. § 157(a) (1994) ("It shall be the policy of the
United States to encourage the provision of new technologies and services to the public.").
268. United States v. Western Elec Co., 890 F. Supp. 1, 9 (D.D.C. 1995), vacated as moot,
84 F.3d 1452 (D.C. Cir. 1996).
269. Ameritech & SBC, 1999 WL 809551, at 60.
270. See id.
271. Id. 61.
272. See id 296.
273. See id. 299.
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The FCC nevertheless approved the merger. The conditions that
SBC and Ameritech had proposed in response to Chairman Kennard
proved decisive: the Commission concluded that the firms' "package of
voluntary commitments... [had] alter[ed] the public interest balance in
their favor."2 74 The FCC cautioned, however, that the acceptance of
these conditions had no bearing on the merged company's compliance
with other provisions of the Communications Act, especially section
27V.75
Far from providing precedential support for later mergers,
especially the Bell Atlantic/GTE deal, the FCC's approvals of the
horizontal BOC mergers have progressively toughened what had once
been a relatively low regulatory barrier. In the SBC/PacTel proceeding,
the Commission explicitly warned that its approval of that merger
"should not be taken as an indication that [it would] approve all
subsequent proposed combinations of major carriers. ' '276 In the Bell
Atlantic/NYNEX proceeding, the FCC warned that applicants might
not always be able to deflect regulatory attention merely by
"propos[ing] pro-competitive public interest commitments.2 77  The
SBC/Ameritech merger rested squarely on such conditions. The
Commission had concluded that the merger's "significant harms"
outweighed the merger's otherwise "speculative and small" benefits.
278
(2) "Somewhere in Middle America"279
The consolidation of BOCs along the Pacific and Atlantic
seaboards has isolated SBC and Bell Atlantic's surviving inland sisters,
US West and BellSouth. These smaller BOCs have not responded with
significant mergers of their own. Instead, US West became a takeover
target and eventually accepted a hostile bid from Qwest
Communications. For its part, BellSouth lost a fight for Sprint and has
nothing to show after nearly four years of merger mania except a ten
percent stake in Qwest.
(a) QwestfUS West
As the third anniversary of the Act rolled by, US West seemed
especially ripe for an unsolicited offer. (In light of Global Crossing's
274. Id. 349.
275. See id. 357.
276. In re Pacific Telesis Group & SBC Communications, Inc., 12 F.C.C.R. 2624, 2640
(1997).
277. In re NYNEX Corp. & Bell Atlantic Corp., 12 F.C.C.R. 19,985,19,993 (1997).
278. In re Ameritech Corp. & SBC Communications, Inc., CC Docket No. 98-141, 1999
WL 809551, at 5 (Oct. 8,1999).
279. COUNTING CROWS, Omaha, on AUGUST AND EvERYrHING AFrER, supra note 138
("I think you better turn your ticket in / And get your money back at the door.").
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and Qwest's bids for US West, this observation fully benefited from
20/20 hindsight.) Though the union of SBC and Ameritech has
surrounded US West on all sides, that merger never directly jeopardized
the independence of the smallest BOC. Absorption of US West into
the SBC empire would have created a megafirm dominating every LX
market in the western continental United States, excluding only
Louisiana and GTE's patchwork of largely rural service areas. This is
precisely the sort of geographic hegemony that brought the Bell
Atlantic/NYNEX and SBC/Ameritech deals to the brink of FCC
disapproval.280 On the other hand, as the smallest of the BOCs, US
West appeared a good candidate for the sort of combination that former
FCC chairman Reed Hundt once thought "unthinkable": a BOC/IXC
merger.281 With Qwest's bid for US West, the unthinkable has come to
pass. Of course, Qwest is no AT&T, and US West's post-1996 history
showed that this BOC was hardly SBC or Bell Atlantic.
Even the most astute observer would have had great difficulty
predicting that Qwest would join the Magnificent Seven. Qwest stock
was not even publicly traded until 1997.2m Nor did Qwest initiate the
precise chain of events that culminated in its winning bid for US West.
In March 1999, Global Crossing, a Bermuda-based company
specializing in laying undersea cables for broadband carriage, made a
$10.8 billion bid for Frontier Corporation.283 Frontier, formerly known
as Rochester Telephone, had served as the incumbent LEC in
Rochester, New York, throughout this century.2 4 In 1995, Rochester
became the first American city to open up its local phone market2.85
Frontier actively supported the local deregulation effort so "that it
could be freed from the traditional approach to rate regulation.
' '286
Although Frontier retained its LX foothold and had grown into the
country's fourth largest IXC, Global Crossing's primary interest in
Frontier was the target company's one-third stake in Qwest's advanced
280. Cf NYNEX & Bell Atlantic, 12 F.C.C.R at 19,990-91, 20,024; Ameritech & SBC,
1999 WL 809551, at 11 56,69-70.
281. See Mark Landler, In Unusual Move, FCC Chief Criticizes a Possible Deal, N.Y.
TIMES, June 19, 1997, at C1 (reporting Chairman Hundt's reaction to rumors of merger
negotiations between AT&T and SBC); FCC Sees Obstacles to an AT&T Merger, N.Y.
TIMES, June 13,1997, at C2 (same).
282. See Richard Waters, Strong Demand for Qwest in First-Day Trading, FIN. TIMES,
June 25, 1997, at 38; Seth Schiesel, Qwest Set to Acquire LCIfor $4.4 Billion in Stock, N.Y.
TIMES, March 10, 1998, at D2 (observing that Qwest "offered stock to the public for the first
time" in 1997).
283. See Seth Schiesel, Frontier to Be Acquired by Global Crossing for $10.8 Billion, N.Y.
TIMEs, March 18,1999, at C2.
284. See Mark Landler, The Big Boys Come Calling: Rochester Is Courted by AT&T and
Time Warner, N.Y. TIMEs, Oct. 23,1995, at C1, C6.
285. See Rochester Tel. Corp., 160 P.U.R.4th 554 (N.Y. Pub. Serv. Comm'n 1994).
286. Landler, supra note 284, at C6.
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fiber optic communications network.
In May 1999, two months after offering to buy Frontier, Global
Crossing also made a $37 billion bid for US West.m The BOC agreed.
The following month, Qwest made uninvited counteroffers for both
Frontier and US West.289 Although the announcement of these
unexpected takeover bids lowered the price of its stock,29° Qwest won
the battle for US West by July.291 As a consolation prize, Global
Crossing accepted a breakup fee from US West and settled for
Frontier.292 The Qwest/US West merger now awaits FCC approval;
293
the Commission approved Global Crossings' acquisition of Frontier in
September 1999.294
(b) BellSouth
Since 1996 BellSouth has led all BOCs in section 271 petitions-its
three petitions to date match the three filed by all the other BOCs
combined-but lagged behind its counterparts in mergers. Unlike MCI
and US West, relative smallness and inertness have never made
BellSouth a likely takeover target. If anything, BellSouth has taken
affirmative steps to boost its share price, perhaps in a conscious effort to
stave off a hostile acquisition. In 1998 alone, it split its stock, launched
an aggressive buyback of its own shares, and increased its dividend.
2 95
These are hardly the sorts of corporate maneuvers that entice buyers.
Not coincidentally, these very tactics can help sweeten a stock-based
merger offer.
Instead, as the third anniversary of the 1996 Act approached,
BellSouth appeared to be contemplating a purchase of its own, perhaps
287. See iL
288. See Laura M. Holson, US West Seen in Merger That Is Valued at $37 Billion, N.Y.
TIMEs, May 17,1999, at A18.
289. See Two Phone Companies Get $55 Billion Bid, N.Y. TIMES, June 14, 1999, at Al
(announing Qwest's surprise move to bid for both US West and Frontier).
290. See Laura M. Holson, Qwest Shares Plunge 24% in Bid's Wake, N.Y. TIMES, June 15,
1999, at C10.
291. See Laura M. Holson, Complex Telephone Takeover Battle Ends in
Compromise, N.Y. TIMES, July 19,1999, at B6.
292. See icL; see also Frontier Accepts Revised Offer from Global Crossing, N.Y. TIMES,
Sept. 3, 1999, at C3 ("Frontier accepted a revised $10.5 billion acquisition offer from Global
Crossing, thus salvaging a purchase that was threatened by a plunge in Global Crossing's
shares").
293. See In re US West, Inc. & Qwest Communications Int'l Inc., CC Docket No. 99-272,
1999 WL 1041448 (Nov. 17, 1999) (adopting a protective order in connection with the
merging companies' merger approval petition).
294. See In re Global Crossings Ltd. & Frontier Corp., 14 F.C.C.R. 15,911 (1999).
295. See Stephanie N. Mehta, BellSouth Declares a Stock Split, Boosts Dividend and Plans
Buyback, WALL ST. J., Nov. 24, 1998, at B6; BellSouth Takes Steps to Boost Stock Value,
COMMUNICATIONS TODAY, Nov. 25,1998 (n.p.), reprinted at 1998 WL 17661945.
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of a smaller IXC. Such a purchase would give BellSouth access to
interLATA markets outside its LX service region and prepare the BOC
for full-blown IX entry if it ever penetrates the section 271 barrier. It
would also enable the BOC to the pursue the high-speed network
strategies that are more typical of companies not centered around
incumbent LECs. In April 1999, BellSouth finally announced plans to
buy a 10 percent stake in Qwest, its first purchase in five years. 296 When
a new round of merger mania sprung up in September 1999, BellSouth
flirted with a bid for Sprint. Initial reports estimated that MCI
WorldCom had bid $90 billion for Sprint.297 BellSouth countered with
an unsolicited $100 billion offer, which MCI WorldCom ultimately
eclipsed.298 Only time will tell whether BellSouth will suffer the fate
that befell GTE, another smaller incumbent LEC that tried to acquire
an IXC but ultimately lost.
B. Strategy No. 2: Absorbing Independent LECs
Unlike US West and BellSouth, SBC and Bell Atlantic have
acquired independent LECs as well as sister BOCs since 1996. SBC has
acquired SNET.299 Bell Atlantic is awaiting approval of its pending
$52.8 billion purchase of GTE.300
Unlike the horizontal BOC mergers, these acquisitions lack
obvious geographic economies of scale and scope. SNET's Connecticut
base is far removed from SBC's western empire. At the time of their
merger, the two firms did not even share overlapping wireless service
territories.301 Likewise, one is tempted to ask what advantage Bell
296. See Michael E. Kanell, BellSouth Is Buying 10 Percent of Qwest, ATLANTA J., April
19, 1999, at Al (describing the BOC's "conservative fiscal management" as one that had
sought "strong and steady growth" instead of "foolish marriages or profit-diluting
combinations" before agreeing to acquire the Qwest stake); see also Michael E. Kanell,
BellSouth Adds Qwest to Its Puzzle, ATLANTA CONST., April 20,1999, at Fl.
297. See Rebecca Blumenstein & Nicole Harris, Investors Support Sprint Deal, WALL ST.
J., Sept. 27, 1999, at Al; cf. Michael E. Kanell, BellSouth Considers Outbidding MCI to Take
over Sprint, PALM BEACH POST, at 7B (assuming that BellSouth would have to amass
"nearly $90 billion" in order "to outbid-or outbluff-MCI WorldCom").
298. See Laura M. Holson & Seth Schiesel, Dueling Bids Emerge for Sprint, N.Y. TIMES,
Oct. 4, 1999, at Al; Laura M. Holson & Seth Schiesel, MCI to Buy Sprint in Swap of Stock
for $108 Billion, N.Y. TIMEs, Oct. 5,1999, at Al.
299. See In re Southern New England Tel. Corp. & SBC Communications, Inc., 13
F.C.C.R. 21,292 (1998).
300. See In re GTE Corp. & Bell Atlantic Corp., 13 F.C.C.R. 22,751 (1998) (adopting a
protective order covering confidential documents filed in connection with the review of the
Bell Atlantic/GTE merger); Seth Schiesel & Laura M. Holson, Reshaping the Phone
Business: Two Phone Giants Reported Merging in $52 Billion Deal, N.Y. TIMES, July 28,
1998, at Al (reporting Bell Atlantic's $52.8 billion bid for GTE); see also U.S. Regulator
Okays Bell Atlantic Buyout of GTE, NAT'L POST, May 8, 1999, at D02 (reporting that the
Department of Justice had endorsed the Bell Atlantic/GTE merger).
301. See SNET & SBC, 13 F.C.C.R. at 1 3, 21,294.
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Atlantic can have expected from acquiring GTE, a carrier with a more
heavily rural clutch of service areas, many of them far removed from
Bell Atlantic's geographic base along the Eastern seaboard.
Section 271 supplies the impetus for these mergers. Independent
LECs such as SNET and GTE have been free to offer interLATA
carriage to their own customers °2 And with great success: SNET's
long-distance affiliate "captured 35 percent of SNET's local customers
within two years of entry," while GTE in 1997 enrolled 6,000 long-
distance customers per day.303 Ready access to local customers as a
market for interLATA carriage stresses just how sharply sections 271
and 272 distinguish between BOCs and other incumbent LECS.
3°4
Furthermore, because section 271 applies only in "State[s] in which a
Bell operating company or any of its affiliates was authorized to provide
wireline telephone exchange service" under the MFJ "as in effect on the
day before the enactment of the Telecommunications Act,"305 a merger
between a BOC and a previously independent LEC does not affect the
combined company's ability to provide interLATA service in the
independent LEC's former local service region.3°6 To the extent that
the acquired LEC provides interLATA carriage, however, it must do so
as a structurally separate affiliate of the acquiring BOC.7 What the
merger does require is that the combined company retreat from the
interLATA market in the BOC's original local service region.
308
Although this adjustment unavoidably reduces consumers' long-
distance options within the BOCs service region, the FCC sharply
302. See, e.g., In re Southern New England Tel. Corp. & SBC Communications, Inc., 13
F.C.C.R. 21,292, 1 3, 35, at 21,294, 21,309 (1998); In re Public Util. Comm'n of Texas, 13
F.C.C.R. 3460, 57, at 3,489 (1997); In re Implementation of the Local Competition
Provisions in the Telecommunications Act of the Telecommunications Act of 1996, 11
F.C.C.R. 15,499, 47 n.25, at 15,523 (1996), affd in part rev'd in part sub nom. AT&T Corp.
v. Iowa Utils. Bd., 119 S. Ct. 721 (1999).
303. In re Ameritech Michigan, 12 F.C.C.R. 20,543, 20,552 n.27 (1997); accord In re
Teleport Communications Group Inc. & AT&T Corp., 13 F.C.C.R. 15,236, 28 n.99, at
15,252-53 n.28 (1998).
304. Cf. In re Amendment of the Commission's Rules to Establish Competitive Service
Safeguards for Local Exchange Carrier Provision of Commercial Mobile Radio Services, 12
F.C.C.R. 15,668, 1 20, at 15,685 (1997) (acknowledging that the structural separation
requirements of §§ 271 and 272 provide "evidence of Congressional intent to treat
independent LECs and the BOCs differently"). Despite this difference, however, the FCC
ultimately decided to require that all LECs, whether BOCs or independents, may enter
CMRS only by way of a structurally separate affiliate.
305. 47 U.S.C.A. § 271(i) (West Supp. 1999) (emphasis added).
306. See In re Southern New England Tel. Corp. & SBC Communications, Inc., 13
F.C.C.R. 21,292, 36, at 21,309 (1998).
307. See 47 U.S.C.A. § 272(a)(2)(B) (West Supp. 1999); cf. In re SBC Communications
Inc., 1999 WL 430566 (June 28, 1999) (resolving by consent decree an FCC investigation into
alleged violations of this provision by SBC after its acquisition of SNET).
308. See SNET, 13 F.C.C.R. at 37,21,310.
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discounted the significance of this shrinkage when it approved SBC's
acquisition of SNET.3 9
The FCC's progressively greater reluctance to approve horizontal
LEC mergers after the SBC/PacTel merger provides a measure of
suspense for the Bell Atlantic/GTE merger. If anything, the
Commission's approvals of the PacTel, NYNEX, and Ameritech
acquisitions counsel against approving the Bell Atlantic/GTE merger,
for "a trend toward concentration in an industry, whatever its causes, is
highly relevant in deciding how substantial the anti-competitive effect of
a merger may be. '310 Reducing the number of large LECs from eight to
four increases the likelihood of collusion, erodes regulatory
benchmarks, and aggravates the loss of actual potential competitors
against incumbent LECs. "The existence of an aggressive well
equipped and well financed corporation engaged in the same or related
lines of commerce waiting anxiously to enter an oligopolistic market [is]
a substantial incentive to competition which cannot be
underestimated. 311
The relative ease with which the Commission allowed SBC to
absorb SNET provides little or no comfort for Bell Atlantic as that firm
awaits approval of its bid for GTE. SNET is a small LEC, long subject
to a lighter regulatory hand than GTE and the BOCs. For instance,
when the FCC required large LECs to move to price cap regulation, it
gave small LECs such as SNET the option of remaining under
traditional cost-of-service ratemaking if they chose.312 (This decision
was but a variation on the regulatory benchmarking theme developed in
the horizontal BOC merger proceedings.)
GTE, by contrast, once faced the sort of antitrust scrutiny that
eventually cracked the Bell System into pieces of eight.3 13 Bell Atlantic
and GTE have no assurance that they will escape the regulatory arm-
twisting that characterized the FCC's review of the SBC/Ameritech
merger. Even if Bell Atlantic is not an especially likely entrant in
GTE's geographically remote LX markets, the imminent halving in the
number of major American LECs exacerbates regulatory concerns over
collusion and benchmarking. As the FCC noted in its SBC/Ameritech
order, major ILECs are uniquely valuable for benchmarking
309. See id 22, at 21,303.
310. United States v. Pabst Brewing Co., 384 U.S. 546,552-53 (1966).
311. United States v. Penn-Olin Chem. Co., 378 U.S. 158, 174 (1964); accord United
States v. Falstaff Brewing Corp., 410 U.S. 526,559 (1973).
312. See Policy & Rules Concerning Rates for Dominant Carriers, 5 F.C.C.R. 6786, 6787,
6818-20 (1990); see also National Rural Telecom Ass'n v. FCC, 988 F.2d 174, 179 (D.C. Cir.
1993) (reporting that the FCC had made the shift from rate-of-return regulation to price caps
"optional for all but the Bell and GTE LECs").
313. See United States v. GTE Corp., 603 F. Supp. 730 (D.D.C. 1984), tenninated by




Suffice it to say that the fate of the Bell Atlantic/GTE merger is far
more path-dependent than that of any other horizontal LEC merger
proposed since 1996. The FCC's previous merger approvals may be the
crucial factor. The FCC might plausibly disallow the Bell Atlantic/GTE
merger, not because it is more menacing than the horizontal BOC
mergers, but simply because it happened last.
C. Strategy No. 3: Avoiding BOC Missteps
The PacTel, NYNEX, Ameritech, SNET, and GTE acquisitions
have one element in common: they are all purchases of one LEC by a
larger, more aggressive BOC. No other merger initiated by a BOC
since 1996 has succeeded. The pattern suggests that BOCs should stick
with what they know. Their primary asset, perhaps their lone source of
business acumen, is the local exchange.
The paradigmatic example of a misguided BOC foray outside the
comfortable LX world is US West's 1996 acquisition of Continental
Cablevision.315 This $12 billion purchase was meant to catapult US
West into video carriage and programming.316 US West evidently
believed, as Congress did in adopting section 652 of the 1996 Act, that
these industries shared common costs and enjoyed substantial
economies of scope. As a condition of FCC approval, US West had to
shed crucial parts of the Continental empire:317 all cable systems within
US West's LX service region as well as Continental's stake in Teleport
(which in turn would be divested by WorldCom when it bought
MFS).3 18
The section 652 firewall proved fatal. Stripped of Continental's
geographically overlapping cable properties, US West enjoyed none of
the synergy it had sought. In November 1995 the company developed a
"tracking stock" for the US West Media Group, partly to aid
shareholders who had invested in a conventional LEC rather than a
diversified communications and media conglomerate.3 9 Within two
314. See In re Ameritech Corp. & SBC Communications, Inc., CC Docket No. 98-141,
1999 WL 809551, at 58 (Oct. 8,1999).
315. See In re US West, Inc. & Continental Cablevision, Inc., 11 F.C.C.R. 13,260 (1996),
modified, 11 F.C.C.RL 14,391 (1996).
316. See Mark Landler, Rivals Yawn at US West Cable Deal, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 29,1996, at
D4.
317. See US West & Continental Cablevision, 11 F.C.C.R. at 14,392; see also In re US
West, Inc., 13 F.C.C.R. 4402 (1998) (granting US West more time to divest its cable holdings
in Minnesota, which it had acquired through the Continental merger).
318. See In re MFS Communications Co. & WorldCom, Inc., 11 F.C.C.R. 21,164 (1996).
319. See Mark Landler, As Shares Slip, So Do Phone Deals' Worth, N.Y. TIMEs, Oct. 8,
1996, at C1 (describing the use of US West Media Group tracking stock to finance the
Continental Cablevision merger); MediaOne Group, Inc., Who We Are (available at
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years, US West announced plans to divide its Media Group and its
Communications Group into separate companies in anticipation of a
complete divestiture.320 In January 1998 US West sold the American
wireless holdings of its Media Group to AirTouch for $4.3 billion in
stock and assumption of $1.4 billion in debt 21 Later that year, the
renamed MediaOne Group became independent of US West.
3 2
So disastrous was the Continental Cablevision merger that the
BOCs should forever forswear the video programming delivery market.
Video programming delivery has never fulfilled its promise as a
stepping stone into--or out of-the telephone business. Does anyone
remember the interactive television project in Orlando? This heavily
hyped "full-service network" was supposed to give Time Warner and its
partners, including AT&T, a chance at "grabbing local telephone
revenues from... BellSouth.' '323 Perhaps it would be better just to ask
whether anyone remembers what interactive TV was supposed to be.
In 1995, on the eve of comprehensive telecommunications reform,
"three LECs [made] major investments in two wireless [cable]
operators. '324 Who cares today?325 Dim though the memory seems
now, Bell Atlantic desperately sought Tele-Communications, Inc., in
1993.326 In light of US West's fiasco, that failed merger is probably best
regarded as a fortunate close call.
D. Strategy No. 4: From IX Dominance to LX Entry
The strategies that built the three CLEC members of the
Magnificent Seven are as diverse as the three major IXCs of the post-
<http://www.mediaone.com/who weare/history/lhistory.htm>) [hereinafter MediaOne
History]. On the use of tracking stock in telecommunications mergers (particularly the
AT&T/TCI deal), see Gretchen Morgenson, A Hitch in the AT&T-TCI Hitch; For
Shareholders a New Type of Stock to Behold, N.Y. TIMES, June 25, 1998, at Cl; Gretchen
Morgenson, Putting All the Eggs in One Basket, N.Y. TIMES, June 28,1998, § 3, at 1.
320. See Seth Schiesel, Two Regional Bells Take Different Paths to Growth, N.Y. TIMES,
Oct. 28,1997, at C12.
321. See Seth Schiesel, AirTouch Renews Deal for US West Unit, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 30,
1998, at D2. The parties had reached a deal in 1997, but that agreement collapsed because
Congress closed a crucial tax loophole. See id.
322. See MediaOne History, supra note 318.
323. See Mitch Ratcliffe, Time Warner Full-Service Network's One-Act Debut, DIGITAL
MEDIA, Jan. 2,1995, at 24.
324. Annual Assessment of the Status of Competition in the Market for the Delivery of
Video Programming, 11 F.C.C.R. 2060, 79, at 2095 (1995).
325. See Bidding Starts for Wireless Cable Rights, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 14, 1995, at C4
(describing wireless cable as an economic and technological "nonstarter"). See generally Jim
Chen, The Last Picture Show (On the Twilight of Federal Mass Communications Regulation),
80 MINN. L. REV. 1415,1477-79 (1996) (describing BOC involvement in wireless cable).
326. See Sandra Sugawara & Paul Fahri, BellAtlantic, TCI Call OffMerger, WASH. POST,
Feb. 24, 1993, at Al. See generally Erin M. Reilly, Comment, The Telecommunications
Industry in 1993: The Year of the Merger, 2 COMMLAW CONSPECrUs 95 (1994).
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MFJ era-MCI WorldCom, AT&T, and Sprint. What these companies
share is a desire to break into the LX business, regardless of how
quickly or successfully the FCC implements section 251. Their
portfolios have also converged; the combination of a fiber optic IX
network with cable, wireless, and Internet assets appears, at least in the
short run, to be the preferred formula for launching a credible challenge
against the ILECs.
Bigger indeed is better. Whereas AT&T was able to assemble
these disparate pieces on its own, neither MCI nor Sprint could mount
an independent challenge to the Baby Bells or to AT&T. These smaller
IXCs became takeover targets and may eventually unite. WorldCom
acquired MCI after a three-way bidding war in November 1997. In
October 1999, the combined MCI WorldCom outbid BellSouth for
Sprint.
One further facet of IXC-based mergers since 1996 bears special
notice. Tremors from the Bell breakup can still be felt. Whereas
WorldCom's acquisition of MCI raised relatively few legal concerns,
327
AT&T's effort to acquire TCI and MediaOne have raised the specter of
Ma Bell reborn as Ma Cable.32 The regulatory concerns arising from
that prospect may in due course eclipse the local competition disputes
that so far have dominated the implementation of the
Telecommunications Act.
(1) MCI WorldCom
WorldCom was the first company besides GTE, the seven original
BOCs, and the IXCs of the MFJ era (AT&T, MCI, Sprint) to join the
Magnificent Seven. Like Qwest after it, WorldCom made a splashy
acquisition of an older, larger firm. And like Qwest, WorldCom did not
strike the first blow in the merger battle that catapulted it to
prominence.
In the years leading to the passage of the Telecommunications Act,
British Telecommunication plc amassed a 35 percent stake in MCIP 29
In 1997 British Telecom bid for MCI in its entirety, valuing the carrier
327. See Seth Schiesel, In MCI-WorldCom Theory, New Views of Competition, N.Y.
TIMES, Nov. 12, 1997, at Dl (predicting, correctly, that the MCIIWorldCom merger would
be approved with relative ease).
328. See, e.g., Leslie Cauley, Ma Cable? AT&T Appears Close to a Deal to Acquire TCI
for $30 Billion, WALL ST. J., June 24, 1998, at Al; Lee Hall & Diane Mergias, AT&T Ups
Ante to Pay MediaOne: "Ma Cable" Tops Comcast Bid, ELECTRONIC MEDIA, April 26,
1999, at 1.
329. See MCI Communications Corp. & British Telecommunications plc, 9 F.C.C.R. 3960,
3964 (1994) (allowing British Telecom to take a 28% stake in MCI); In re MCI
Communications Corp., 10 F.C.C.R. 8697 (1995) (allowing British Telecom to expand that
stake to 35%).
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at $21 billion.330 The deal went so far as to secure FCC approval.331 A
surprising $800 million loss for fiscal year 1997, attributable to MCI's
lack of success in its earliest efforts at LX entry,332 nearly scuttled the
British Telecom deal.3 33 GTE then tried to thwart British Telecom's
ambitions by tendering a $28 billion all-cash offer 34 But neither of
these suitors would win MCI. WorldCom beat both of its more
established competitors in November 1997 with a $37 billion bid.335
Solid preparation enabled WorldCom to seize the nation's second
largest IXC. The fourth largest long-distance carrier in the United
States as of the Telecommunication Act's passage, WorldCom had
astutely bid $14 billion for MFS, at that time one of the country's two
leading CAPs, in August 1996336 In September 1997, on the eve of its
MCI bid, WorldCom offered to buy CompuServe.337 These purchases,
especially the MFS acquisition, put WorldCom in position to win the
battle royale for MCI, at least as a matter of anticipated synergies, if not
as a matter of cash flow.
In 1998 the FCC approved the WorldComIMCI merger.
338
WorldCom's ownership of UUNet, the leading provider of Internet
backbone services in the United States,339 provided the only element of
suspense. WorldCom acquired this property through its merger with
MFS. In April 1996, MS had bought UUNet Technologies, Inc., for $2
billion; at the time UUNet provided Internet access for the Microsoft
Network, America OnLine, and CompuServe.340 MCI's agreement to
sell its own Internet assets to Cable & Wireless, a British firm, defused
the FCC's concerns over the combined firm's potential acquisition of an
Internet bottleneck.341
330. See MCI Shareholders Approve Deal with British Telecom, N.Y. TIMES, April 3,
1997, at D3.
331. See In re MCI Communications Corp. & British Telecommunication ple, 12 F.C.C.R.
15,351 (1997).
332. See Seth Schiesel, Report of Loss Sends Shares of MCI Lower, N.Y. TIMES, July 12,
1997, § 1, at 33.
333. See Mark Landler, MCI and British Telecom Discuss Renegotiating Terms of Merger,
N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 21,1997, at Cl.
334. See Seth Schiesel, The Battle for MCP GTE Joins Bidding for MCI, Offering $28
Billionn in Cash, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 16,1997, at Al.
335. See Mark Ribbing, Upstart Wins Battle for MCI, BALTIMORE SUN, Nov. 11, 1997.
336. See In re MS Communications Co. & WorldCom, Inc., 11 F.C.C.R. 21,164 (1996).
337. See WorldCom to Buy CompuServe Corp., WALL ST. J., Sept. 8,1997, at A3.
338. See In re WorldCom, Inc. & MCI Communications Corp., 13 F.C.C.R. 18,025 (1998)
(citing 47 U.S.C. §§ 214(a), 310(d) (1994)); In re WorldCom, Inc. & MCI Communications
Corp., 13 F.C.C.R. 4527 (1998).
339. See Matt Richtel, Competitors and Others Woo MCI Customers Hit by Failure, N.Y.
TIMES, Aug. 23,1999, at C3.
340. See Melinda Norris, Time Spurs MFS Dea4 Boss Says $2 Billion Lands Internet
Hookup, OMAHA WORLD-HERALD, May 1,1996, at 22.
341. See WorldCom & MCI, 13 F.C.C.R. at 18,103-04.
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At least one other merger combined an IXC and a CAP in a
marriage of fiber-optic networks; Qwest, at that time a minor CAP,
bought LCI, a minor IXC, for $4.4 billion in early 1998P42 This merger,
a technological and commercial mirror image of the WorldCom/MFS
combination, made Qwest a leader in high-speed access and eventually
enabled that company to acquire US West. Qwest and WorldCom thus
took similar paths toward joining telecommunications' elite ranks.
Among the three IXCs in the Magnificent Seven, MCI WorldCom
has the least diversified portfolio. All of WorldCom's merger activity
failed to secure a substantial foothold in wireless telephony. Having lost
the bidding war for AirTouch to Vodaphone,343 MCI WorldCom
prepared to make an offer for Nextel 44 This overture failed in May
1999.345
(2) Sprint
Until MCI WorldCom outbid BellSouth for Sprint in September
1999, Sprint had been the lone IXC among the Magnificent Seven to
remain untouched by merger mania. True to its roots as the long-
distance unit of a fully integrated telecommunications carrier, Sprint
had been quietly building a smaller version of the pre-divestiture
AT&T. The origins of Sprint's diversified portfolio lay in its 1993
acquisition of Centel Corporation.346 This merger, worth $3 billion
when it was announced in May 1992, added 1.6 million LX customer
lines and a substantial cellular presence to Sprint's holdings.347 By 1997,
Sprint had amassed 7.4 million local phone lines and become America's
seventh largest LEC, trailing only GTE and what were then the five
BOC. 348 The Sprint PCS and SprintNet divisions have enabled Sprint
342. See Streamlined International Section 214 & Section 310(b)(4) Applications
Accepted for Filing, Rep. No. TEL-146-A, 1998 WL 171458 (F.C.C. April 15,1998) (granting
expedited review and presumptive approval of the Qwest-LCI merger under 47 C.F.R.
§ 63.12); Jube Shiver Jr., Qwes4 LCI Plan Merger Valued at $4.4 Billion, L.A. TIMES, March
10, 1998, at D1; Qwest and LCI Consummate Merger (June 5, 1998) (available at
<http://www.qwest.net/press/060598.htmbl>); see also In re WorldCom, Inc. & MCI
Communications Corp., 13 F.C.C.R. 18,025 34 n.92, 45 & n.129, at 18,046 n.92, 18,053
n.129 (1998) (noting that Qwest had acquired LCI).
343. See Laura M. Holson, British Carrier Wins Battle for Airtouch, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 16,
1999, at C1.
344. See Mark Leibovich, MCI Worldcom, Nextel in Talks, WASH. POST, April 7,1999, at
E3.
345. See Nicole Harris, MCI WorldCom Ends Negotiations to Acquire Nextel, WALL ST.
J., May 6,1999, at B4.
346. See In re Centel Corp. & Sprint Corp., 8 F.C.C.R. 1829 (1993), review denied, 8
F.C.C.R. 6162 (1993).
347. See Anthony Ramirez, $3 Billion Acquisition by Sprint, N.Y. TIMES, May 28,1992, at
C1.
348. See Seth Schiesel, Without Frenzy, Sprint Outdoes Its Competitors, N.Y. TIMES, Oct.
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to become a leading player in mobile phone access to the Interet.349
For five years, Sprint was the potential American beachhead for a
European telecommunications invasion that never quite materialized.
In June 1995, Sprint, France T616com, and Deutsche Telekom
announced the formation of the Global One joint venture. France
T616com and Deutsche Telekom would each take a 10 percent stake in
Sprint; the foreign companies' combined share of America's third-
largest IXC was believed to be worth between $3.5 and $4.2 billion.3 50
Statutory restrictions on foreign ownership of FCC licenses did not pose
a serious hurdle;351 the Commission had already allowed British
Telecommunications to acquire a 28 percent stake in MC 3 52 and then to
expand that stake to 35 percent.353 The FCC readily approved the
European partners' proposal to take a 20 percent stake in Sprint354 and
eventually allowed those partners to hold a combined 35 percent stake,
comparable to BT's share of MCI. 355 These transactions, which
preceded the passage of the 1996 Act, formed the backbone of
relatively liberal FCC policies on foreign participation in the American
telecommunications industry.356
Global One evolved into a potential platform for French and
German entry into the American long-distance market. Sprint and its
partners met no regulatory resistance. The FCC lifted the conditions it
had originally placed on Global One. In 1997 the FCC granted Sprint
two additional long-distance circuits connecting Germany to the United
24,1997, at C1.
349. See Katie Hafner, Web Phone: The Next Big Thing?, N.Y. TIMES, April 15, 1999, at
Gi; Sprint to Offer Wireless Access to Internet, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 12, 1999, at C3; cf. Stuart
Elliott, The Marketing Implications of the Bidding War for Sprint Are the Buzz of Madison
Avenue, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 5, 1999, at C14 (noting the "fantastic brand equity"' that Sprint
would bring to any alliance, merger, or acquisition "in the intensely competitive global
telecommunications industry").
350. See In re Sprint Corp., 11 F.C.C.R. 1850, 10, at 1851 (1996).
351. See 47 U.S.C. § 310(b)(4) (1994) (permitting the FCC, in furtherance of "the public
interest," to refuse or revoke a "broadcast or common carrier... license" that would "be
granted to or held by... any corporation directly or indirectly controlled by any other
corporation of which more than one-fourth of the capital stock is owned of record or voted
by aliens, their representatives, or by a foreign government or representative thereof, or by
any corporation organized under the laws of a foreign country"); id § 310(d) (requiring FCC
approval of the transfer of any "construction permit or station license").
352. See MCI Communications Corp. & British Telecommunications plc, 9 F.C.C.R. 3960,
3964 (1994).
353. See In re MCI Communications Corp., 9 F.C.C.R. 8697,8698 (1995).
354. See In re Sprint Corp., 11 F.C.C.R. 1850,1873 (1996).
355. See In re Sprint Corp., 11 F.C.C.R. 11,354,11,359 (1996).
356. See In re Market Entry & Regulation of Foreign Affiliated Entities, 11 F.C.C.R. 3873
(1995); In re Rules & Policies on Foreign Participation in the United States
Telecommunications Market, 1997 WL 735476 (Nov. 26,1997).
[Vol. 50
States; 357 the following year, Sprint won two additional circuits to
France. 58 By June 1998, the FCC declared Sprint a nondominant
carrier on both the French and the German routes and removed all
remaining special reporting requirements stemming from its original
approval of the Global One joint venture.359 But internal disagreements
doomed the alliance. Deutsche Telekom eventually balked at
converting its 10 percent stake into a controlling interest 60 The
European retreat from Global One set the stage for an all-American
battle between WorldCom and BellSouth for control of Sprint.
In October 1999 MCI WorldCom outbid BellSouth with a stock
swap valued at $108 billion.361 Among other benefits, the acquisition
would give MCI WorldCom "a crucial tool in competing with AT&T":
the "nationwide wireless operation" it has long coveted.3 62 FCC
chairman William Kennard, however, issued a curt response:
American consumers are enjoying the lowest long distance rates in
history and the lowest Internet rates in the world for one reason:
competition. Competition has produced a price war in the long
distance market. This merger appears to be a surrender. How can
this be good for consumers? The parties will bear a heavy burden
to show how consumers would be better off.363
The union of the United States' second- and third-largest long-
distance carriers is, to say the least, far from certain. Nevertheless, in
the immediate aftermath of Chairman Kennard's preemptive strike
against the MCI WorldCom/Sprint merger, "an FCC official close to"
the chairman conceded that "it is unlikely that [the FCC] will block the
transaction outright."364  At this distance, it appears that the
Commission may resort again to bluff and bluster, followed by a round
of voluntary commitments and the eventual approval of the merger. In
other words, the FCC may return to the tactics it perfected in the cycle
of horizontal BOC merger proceedings from SBC/PacTel to
SBC/Ameritech.
(3) AT&T
More than perhaps any other member of the Magnificent Seven,
357. See In re Sprint Corp., 12 F.C.C.R. 8430,8441 (1997).
358. See In re Sprint Communications Co., 13 F.C.C.R. 7367,7373 (1998).
359. See In re Sprint Corp., 13 F.C.C.R. 17,223,17,230 (1998).
360. See Seth Schiesel, Sprint's Lessons in Foreign Entanglements, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 23,
1999, at C1.
361. See Laura M. Holson & Seth Schiesel, MCI to Buy Sprint in Swap of Stock for $108
Billion, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 5,1999, at Al.
362. Id. at C13.
363. Statement of FCC Chairman William E. Kennard on Proposed Merger of MCI
WorldCom, Inc. & Sprint Corp., 1999 WL 787485 (Oct. 5,1999).
364. Elizabeth Douglass & Jube Shiver, Jr., Telecom Deal Fans Concerns for Consumers,
LA. TrMEs, Oct. 6,1999, at C1.
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AT&T has reinvented itself several times. Even as Congress debated
the bills that would become the 1996 Act, AT&T was repositioning
itself for competition after comprehensive legislative reform. Not
entirely coincidentally, perhaps, the company in 1994 formally adopted
the name "AT&T" in place of the traditional "American Telephone
and Telegraph Company. 3 65 The FCC declared in 1995 that AT&T
was no longer a "dominant" IX carrier.366 At roughly the same time,
AT&T reorganized itself into three companies: long-distance,
telecommunications equipment manufacturing, and computers 67 The
reorganization enabled AT&T to unload NCR, a big albatross, but it
also launched Bell Laboratories on an independent and highly
profitable trajectory as Lucent Technologies.3 68 In December 1997,
AT&T sold its Universal Card business to Citibank for $4 billion.36
9
Having shed its ancillary businesses, AT&T set about the business
of reasserting dominion over telecommunications. To be sure, AT&T
did abruptly end talk of a merger with SBC in 1997 when then-FCC
chairman Reed Hundt vehemently objected 70  By 1998, AT&T
reoriented and reinvigorated its merger strategy. That year, AT&T
expanded along every line of the IX-cable-wireless-Interet strategy
that now separates the major CLECs from the ILECs. AT&T acquired
Teleport, by then the largest independent CAP.371 It reinforced its
wireless holdings, traceable to its 1994 acquisition of McCaw
Communications, with the purchase of Vanguard Cellular.372 AT&T
365. See William Safire, My Old Flame, N.Y. TIMES, June 19, 1994, § 6, at 14 (lamenting
the elimination of the word telegraph from AT&T's official corporate name).
366. See Reclassification of AT&T Corp. as a Nondominant Interexchange Carrier, 11
F.C.C.R. 3271, 3292, 3356 (1995); see also In re Revisions to Price Cap Rules for AT&T
Corp., 10 F.C.C.R. 3009, 3014 (1995) (finding sufficient competition among IXCs to justify
AT&T's reclassification); cf. MCI Communications Corp. v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 512
U.S. 218, 221 (1994) (describing the distinction "between dominant carriers... and
nondominant carriers ... in the long distance market" as effectively "a distinction between
AT&T and everyone else"); MACAvOY, supra note 133, at 62 (describing how the FCC's
tariffing decisions had "left AT&T in a class ... by itself').
367. See Mark Landler, The Second Breakup of AT&T: The Reorganization, N.Y. TIMES,
Sept. 21, 1995, at Al; Andrew Pollack, AT&T Move Is a Reversal of Course Set in 1980"s,
N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 22, 1995, at C4.
368. See AT&T Names a Unit It Plans to Spin Off, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 6, 1996, at C4
(announcing the name Lucent Technologies as the name for AT&T's equipment
manufacturing spinoff).
369. See Timothy L. O'Brien, Citicorp Is Said to Be Acquiring AT&T Card Unit, N.Y.
TIMES, Dec. 18,1997, at C1.
370. See Mark Landler, AT&T Is Said to Break Off Merger Talks with SBC, N.Y. TIMES,
June 28, 1997, at 35.
371. See In re Teleport Communications Group, Inc. & AT&T Corp., 13 F.C.C.R 15,236,
at 15,265 (1998).
372. See Seth Schiesel, AT&T Buying Vanguard to Extend Reach, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 6,
1998, at C2 (announcing AT&T's agreement to buy Vanguard for roughly $900 million in
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bought IBM's global communications system for $5 billion 73 and
entered a $10 billion joint venture with British Telecom.374
(a) AT&TITCI
But the true turning point in AT&T's evolution after 1996 came in
July 1998, when the carrier announced its $31.6 billion bid for Tele-
Communications, Inc. (TCI). 375 "At last," one journalist concluded, "a
new strategy for AT&T. '376 This deal included TCI's stake in @Home
and, derivatively, in Excite, which @Home had acquired before AT&T
bought TCI.377 The FCC's approval of the TCI deal378 coincided
roughly with AT&T's announcement of an aggressive plan to price all
of its telephone services at a dime a minute.379 Coast-to-coast, flat-rate
pricing for wireless calls, an innovation that originated with Sprint and
Nextel, places extreme pressure on the BOCs. Unlike AT&T and the
other national wireless carriers, the BOCs' wireless affiliates do not
have a nationwide PCS network; their customers must use
technologically clumsier dual-mode phones in order to take advantage
of a flat-rate plan.38
0
In February 1999 the FCC approved the AT&T/TCI merger. 381
The most serious objection to this merger was arguably the prospect
that an enlarged AT&T "could bundle its bottleneck broadband
transmission service with any or all of the numerous residential services
under its wide corporate umbrella--cable television, long distance
voice, local voice, and wireless, as well as Internet services. '382 Though
acknowledging that AT&T might enjoy monopoly or market power
over cable in certain locations, the Commission declined "to impose a
stock and cash).
373. See Mark Leibovich & Mike Mills, AT&T to Purchase IBM Data Network, WASH.
POST, Dec. 9,1998, at CIl.
374. See In re AT&T Corp., British Telecommunications, plc, et al., FCC 99-313,1999 WL
979615 (Oct. 22, 1999) (approving the AT&T/British Telecom joint venture); Stephanie
Stoughton, A Telecom Maestro: Reston's Concert Communications Is Model for AT&T-BT
Deal, WASH. POST, July 29,1998, at El.
375. See Paul Farhi, AT&T Buys TCI, Looks to One-Stop Future, WASH. POST, June 25,
1998, at Al.
376. Seth Schiesel, At Las a New Strategy for AT&T, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 17,1999, § 3, at 1.
377. See Amy Harmon, Excite and @Home Confirm $6.7 Billion Merger, N.Y. TIMES, Jan.
20, 1999, at Cl (announcing @Home's merger with Excite and describing TCI as @Home's
primary shareholder).
378. See In re Tele-Communications, Inc. & AT&T Corp., 14 F.C.C.R. 3160,3234 (1999).
379. See AT&T Completes the Acquisition of TC1, N.Y. TIMES, March 10, 1999, at C6
(announcing the completion of AT&T's $55 billion acquisition of TCI and "creating a one-
stop shop for phone service, Internet access and cable television").
380. See Michael E. Kanell, BellSouth Tries Flat-Rate Plan, ATLANTA CONST., April 17,
1999, at Dl.
381. See In re Tele-Communications, Inc. & AT&T Corp., 14 F.C.C.R. 3160 (1999).
382. Id. 124, at 3218.
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blanket rule prohibiting the bundling of cable services with other
services in which a cable operator might have a financial interest.
'383
Nor did section 652 of the 1996 Act impede AT&T's acquisition of
TCI. AT&T's 1998 acquisition of Teleport had raised the possibility
that section 652 would "prohibitf] AT&T from acquiring any TCI
systems in areas served by Teleport. ''384 The timing of Teleport's entry
into LX markets proved decisive: because Teleport had not begun
providing "telephone exchange service" as of January 1, 1993,385 section
652 did not require AT&T to divest any cable systems it acquired from
TCI or to seek a waiver from the FCC.3
86
Meanwhile, the AT&T-TCI merger has sparked a potential
blockbuster of a dispute over concurrent state-law regulation of cable
television and Internet access. As a condition of approving the transfer
of TCI's franchise agreements to AT&T, city and county officials in
Portland, Oregon, adopted "open access" measures requiring AT&T to
permit unaffiliated ISPs to interconnect directly with AT&T's cable
modem platform. This requirement would allow independent ISPs to
bypass Excite@Home, the proprietary cable-based ISP that AT&T
acquired in the TCI merger. A federal district court has held that these
open access measures do not conflict with the Communications Act, the
first amendment, the commerce clause, or the contract clause.387 In an
amicus brief filed in the Portland appeal, the FCC has asked the Ninth
Circuit to uphold the Commission's claim of exclusive jurisdiction over
this matter.388 Internet access via cable, the Commission suggested,
should not be treated as "cable service," but rather simply as Internet
access.389 The former is susceptible to state regulation; the latter,
according to the FCC, has benefited from a longstanding policy of
"unregulation." 390
(b) AT&T/MediaOne
In March 1999, Comcast and MediaOne, the successor to US West
Media Group, began merger talks.391 Comcast announced a $53 billion
383. Id. 126, at 3219.
384. See id. 130, at 3221.
385. See 47 U.S.C.A. § 652(e) (West Supp. 1999) (defining "the term 'telephone service
area"' for purposes of § 652's presumptive ban on cable-telco combinations as "the area
within which [a] carrier provided telephone exchange service as of January 1,1993").
386. See TCI & AT&T, 14 F.C.C.R. at 1 134,136, at 3223-24.
387. See AT&T Corp. v. City of Portland, 43 F. Supp. 2d 1146 (D. Or. 1999).
388. See FCC Court Brief Underscores Consumer Benefits from National Internet Policy
of Unregulation, 1999 WL 618088 (Aug. 16,1999).
389. See id.
390. See id
391. See Geraldine Fabrikant, Comcast-MediaOne Merger Talks Reported, N.Y. TIMES,
March 22,1999, at A14.
HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 50
offer for MediaOne in an effort to "create the third-largest cable
television company in the nation.' '39 - The deal evidently had little to do
with television and much to do with Internet access.3 93 AT&T made an
unsolicited offer for MediaOne, outbidding Comcast by $5 billion 94
Despite early speculation that Microsoft would help Comcast fight
AT&T,395 Microsoft eventually entered an alliance with AT&T to
supply television set-top boxes.3 96 In anticipation of FCC review of its
MediaOne purchase, AT&T has filed a protective order with the
Commission 97
AT&T's acquisitions of the second and fourth largest cable
companies in the United States have resurrected a dormant FCC rule
designed to foster diversity in video programming. The MediaOne
merger, if consummated, would make AT&T the owner of cable
systems serving more than 40 percent of all homes in the United States.
Section 11(c) of the 1992 Cable Act398 directed the FCC to "establish[]
reasonable limits on the number of cable subscribers a person is
authorized to reach through cable systems owned by such person."399
The FCC in 1993 promulgated rules prohibiting any entity from owning
an attributable interest in cable systems "reach[ing] more than 30
percent of all homes... nationwide," plus an additional margin of five
percent "provided [that] the additional cable systems... are minority-
controlled." 4°  A federal district court struck down section 11(c) as an
392. Geraldine Fabrikant, Huge Cable TV Companies to Unite in $53 Billion Deal, N.Y.
TIMES, March 23, 1999, at Al; see also Harry Berkowitz, Comcast Corp. Buys MediaOne
Group in a $48.5 Billion Stock Swap, NEWSDAY, March 23,1999, at A42; Rebecca Cantwell,
Comcast to Buy MediaOne, ROCKY MTN. NEWS, March 23, 1999, at 1B (valuing the
proposed merger between $48 billion and $60 billion).
393. See Fabrikant, supra note 391, at A14 ("What is driving this deal is the cable
industry's race with telephone companies to offer superfast access to the Internet.").
394. See Geraldine Fabrikant & Seth Schiesel, AT&T Makes Competing Bid for
MediaOne, N.Y. TIMES, April 23, 1999, at Cl (announcing AT&T's offer to acquire
MediaOne for $58 billion in cash and stock).
395. See Geraldine Fabrikant, Comcast Is Seen as Unlikely to Raise Bid for MediaOne,
N.Y. TIMES, April 24, 1999, at Cl (speculating that Microsoft, having already invested $1
billion in Comcast, might help Comcast fight AT&T's bid). MCI WorldCom briefly
considered joining Comcast's battle against AT&T for MediaOne. See Seth Schiesel &
Geraldine Fabrikant, MCI Is Said to Weigh Bid for MediaOne, N.Y. TIMES, May 4, 1999, at
Cl.
396. See Seth Schiesel, Concerns Raised as AT&T Pursues a New Foothold, N.Y. TIMES,
May 6,1999, at Al.
397. See In re MediaOne Group, Inc., 14 F.C.C.R. 12,286 (Aug. 6,1999).
398. Cable Television Consumer Protection and Competition Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 10-
385, § 11(c), 106 Stat. 1460,1486.
399. 47 U.S.C. § 533(f)(1)(A) (1994).
400. In re Implementation of Sections 11 & 13 of the 1992 Cable Act, 8 F.C.C.R. 8565,
8567 (1993) (codified at 47 C.F.R. 76.503).
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unconstitutional infringement of the freedom of speech.401 Pending
appellate review of that decision,402 the FCC stayed enforcement of its
horizontal ownership rules.
4°3
In October 1999 the FCC revised its horizontal cable ownership
rules. The Commission simplified the rules in two significant
respects. First, the 30 percent ceiling would "be based on cable
subscribers served rather than on cable homes passed." 4 5 Second, the
FCC eliminated the additional five percent allowance for minority-
controlled systems.4°6  Most critically, the FCC changed the
denominator used in computing the horizontal ownership limit. Instead
of basing the limit on merely cable subscribers, the new rules would cap
ownership at 30 percent of the market consisting of all multichannel
video programming distributors in the United States.4°7 This rule
change eases the potential threat to the AT&T/MediaOne merger, for
AT&T's market share drops if one counts direct broadcast satellite
(DBS) subscribers as well as cable subscribers. Quite fortuitously,
AT&T had abandoned its stake in DirecTV in 1998 and thereby ended
its brief flirtation with DBS technology.4°8 AT&T and MediaOne are
nevertheless working with the FCC to determine whether their
proposed merger would transgress the revised horizontal ownership
rules.09
E. OnelfbyAirTwoIfbySea
The fight for AirTouch in early 1999 came at a convenient point for
401. See Daniels Cablevision, Inc. v. United States, 835 F. Supp. 1,10 (D.D.C. 1993), rev'd
on other grounds sub nom. Time Warner Entertainment Co. v. FCC, 93 F.3d 957 (D.C. Cir.
1996), reh'g en banc denied, 105 F.3d 723 (D.C. Cir. 1997).
402. See Implementation of Sections 11 & 13, 8 F.C.C.R. at 8609; see also Time Warner, 93
F.3d at 979-80 (deferring a decision on this issue until the court could hear a consolidated
appeal involving the district court decision that struck down § 11(c)'s "subscriber limitation"
provision as well as a direct attack on the FCC's horizontal ownership rules); In re Annual
Assessment of the Status of Competition in the Market for the Delivery of Video
Programming, 12 F.C.C.R. 4358, 4424 n.372 (1997) (noting that the FCC had suspended its
horizontal ownership rules). As of December 1, 1999, this appeal remained before the D.C.
Circuit.
403. See Implementation of Sections 11 & 13,8 F.C.C.R. at 8567,8609.
404. See In re Implementation of Section 11(c) of the Cable Television Consumer





408. See Mark Landler, AT&T Enters TV Business via Satellite Broadcasting, N.Y. TIMES,
Jan. 23,1996, at D1.
409. See AT&T Corp. & MediaOne Group, Inc. File Submission on Compliance with
New Cable Ownership Rules, No. DA 99-2661,1999 WL 1072448 (Nov. 30,1999).
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a triennial review of the telecommunications market.410 Its outcome
suggests two possible ways in which this industry can move beyond the
Magnificent Seven. To misquote Henry Wadsworth Longfellow: one if
by air, two if by sea.
(1) Air
First, by air. AirTouch commanded an offer of $56 billion, at that
time more than had been bid for any other telecommunications firm
except Ameritech. By comparison, AT&T's subsequent bid for
MediaOne barely eclipsed the price for AirTouch, while Qwest offered
a similar amount for US West and Frontier combined. The biggest bid
of all, MCI WorldCom's $108 billion offer for Sprint, was nearly twice
the size of any previous offer for a telecommunications company.
The sheer size of the Vodaphone/AirTouch merger effectively
signals the emergence of wireless as an economically significant
platform in its own right, independent of its historical ties to landwire
communications. As the year 1998 came to a close, it became clear that
Bell Atlantic was negotiating to buy PacTel's old wireless company.
41'
The East's lone BOC was willing to pay $45 billion for a belated boost
to its relatively thin wireless holdings.412 Despite its deep financial
resources, Bell Atlantic was outbid by Vodaphone, a British company
with extensive wireless holdings in northern Europe.413 And even MCI
WorldCom briefly joined the fray,4 14 for a full complement of major
players in wireless telephony: domestic BOCs/ILECs, domestic
IXCs/CLECs, and foreign carriers.
A sideshow to the SBC/Ameritech and the Bell Atlantic/GTE
mergers may profoundly affect American wireless markets. In
410. Triennial review is a celebrated ritual in telecommunications law. See United States
v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 552 F. Supp. 131, 195 (D.D.C. 1982) (committing the Justice
Department to triennial reports on the ongoing need for the restrictions imposed in the Bell
breakup decree), affd mem. sub nom. Maryland v. United States, 460 U.S. 1001 (1983); cf. 47
U.S.C.A. § 257(a), (c) (West Supp. 1999) (directing the FCC to conduct "a proceeding for
the purpose of identifying and eliminating.., market entry barriers" in the
telecommunications industry and requiring a triennial report to Congress on such barriers).
411. For insight into AirTouch's relationship with Pacific Telesis, a BOC that once owned
it, and with Bell Atlantic, a BOC that bid unsuccessfully for it, see Andrew Pollack, To Chief
of AirTouch, a Deal Seizes a "Bell Opportunity," N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 18,1999, at C6.
412. See Laura M. Holson & David J. Morrow, Bell Atlantic in Talks to Buy Cellular
Giant, N.Y. TIMEs, Jan. 1, 1999, at Al; Seth Schiesel, Bell Atlantic Continues Talks for
Acquisition of AirTouch, N.Y. TIMEs, Jan. 4, 1999, at A13; Seth Schiesel, Bell Atlantic and
AirTouch Stocks Slip on Uncertainty over Merger, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 5,1999, at C1.
413. See Laura M. Holson, Top British Wireless Carrier Joins Battle to Acquire AirTouch,
N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 6, 1999, at Cl; Laura M. Holson, British Carrier Wins Battle for AirTouch,
N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 16,1999, at C1.
414. See Seth Schiesel, MCI WorldCom May Join the Bidding for AirTouch, N.Y. TIMES,
Jan. 8,1999, at C2.
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anticipation of its merger with SBC, Ameritech agreed to sell 20 of its
wireless properties, including the Chicago and St. Louis markets, to a
partnership consisting of GTE and Georgetown Partners for $3.27
billion.415 The licenses sold to GTE presumably will come to rest in Bell
Atlantic's hands, if in fact the BOC can successfully absorb America's
last significant independent LEC. These wireless properties overlap
many of GTE's existing LX service areas and, pending FCC approval of
the Bell Atlantic/GTE merger, will give the combined company a strong
wireless presence in two-thirds of the largest markets in the United
States. 416 Meanwhile, Bell Atlantic eventually reached a compromise
with Vodafone, which agreed to sell AirTouch's former properties in
North America-precisely what the BOC had coveted all along in its
failed bid for AirTouch.417 Unless the FCC bars the GTE merger or
forces of partial divestiture of wireless properties, Bell Atlantic will
emerge as a wireless giant, straddling a $70 billion wireless network that
combines North American properties once held separately by
AirTouch, Bell Atlantic, and GTE.
418
(2) Sea
The Vodaphone/AirTouch deal also exposes a competitive lane
that operates by sea.419 Transnational investment, often anticipated but
rarely observed, is a convenient deus ex machina in telecommunications
analysis. It rivals "[n]ew technology" as "the easy answer to
everything. '420 As France T616com and Deutsche Telekom discovered
in retreating from the Global One alliance, international synergy isn't
always what it's cracked up to be. But Vodaphone did win the
415. See In re Ameritech Corp. & GTE Consumer Servs. Inc., DA 99-1677, 1999 WL
635724 (Aug. 20, 1999). Coincidentally, this divestiture enabled FCC chairman William
Kennard to achieve his affirmative action goal of raising minority participation in the
telecommunications industry. Georgetown Partners, a minority-owned "private investment
firm... [with] no telecommunications experience," took part in a $33 billion deal that GTE
could have easily managed on its own. Seth Schiesel, Ameritech to Sell Half of Wireless
Business to GTE, N.Y. TIMES, April 6, 1999, at Cl; see also Seth Schiesel, How One Man
Used Corporate Affirmative Action in Ameritech Deal, N.Y. TIMES, April 12, 1999, at C1
(describing SBC's desire to involve Georgetown Partners in order to "curry favor with [FCC
chairman] William E. Kennard" pending approval of the Ameritech acquisition).
416. See GTE Agrees to $3.27 Billion Purchase of Ameritech Wireless Assets, WIRELESS
TODAY, April 5,1999.
417. See Laura M. Holson, Bell Atlantic and Vodafone, Once Enemies, Are Now Allies,
N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 13,1999, at C1.
418. See Laura M. Holson, Deal to Create Biggest U.S. Wireless Network, N.Y. TIMES,
Sept. 22,1999, at Cl.
419. See generally John H. Harwood II, William T. Lake & David M. Sohn, Competition
in International Telecommunications Services, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 874 (1997).
420. Thomas W. Hazlett, Predation in Local Cable TV Markets, 40 ANTrrRUST BULL.
609,643 (1995).
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AirTouch bidding war, after all, and Global Crossing walked away with
Frontier after an unsuccessful effort to capture US West. The resulting
combination of Global Crossing and Frontier commands a worldwide
broadband network. Recall, too, the brief moment in which British
Telecom appeared to have captured MCI. Finally, AT&T and British
Telecom are beginning to convert their joint venture into something
really substantial. These companies are planning to link their global
wireless operations in a strengthened alliance called "Advance," which
would offer both companies' customers the novel experience of
"roaming" across international borders.421 For the moment, it is enough
to ponder how not one but two members of the Magnificent Seven
tasted defeat at foreign hands in American telecommunications' merger
wars.
422
V. After the Gold Rush
Though "[p]rophecies in telecommunications are as treacherous as
they are foolish," 423 I shall draw a few conclusions from this survey.
First, telecommunications law appears to be entering a period of
significant transition. The legal fury over an emerging cluster of
disputes over Internet access, universal service, and cable ownership
restrictions may soon match the fuss that has attended disputes over
unbundling, interconnection, and interLATA relief. Second, the very
resilience of the FCC's merger policy has rescued comprehensive
legislative reform from premature obsolescence. Regulatory "muddling
through" may yet overcome Congress's failure to predict the
technological and economic trajectory of this industry. Finally, insights
from nearly four years of merger mania should help us predict "what
the courts"--and the FCC--"will do in fact" in two crucial contexts:
424
the major mergers that the Commission has yet to approve and the
unfinished business of implementing the local competition provisions of
the 1996 Act.
A. The Bell Scar
The Telecommunications Act never meant "the end of government
intervention." Rather, it marked "a new beginning" for American
public utility law's regulatory tradition, "with new rules, new players,
421. See Seth Schiesel, AT&T and British Telecom Plan Global Wireless Link, N.Y.
TIMES, Sept. 17, 1999, at C2; see also Seth Schiesel, One Nation, Unplugged" The Titans of
Wireless Are Tearing Down Regional Fences, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 11, 1999, at Cl (describing
AT&T's plans to eliminate roaming fees for calls within the United States).
422. See Seth Schiesel, How the Bells Can Feel Like Helpless, Pitiful Giants, N.Y. TIMES,
Jan. 19,1999, at C1.
423. Chen, supra note 106, at 873.
424. Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457,461 (1897).
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and new opportunities to capture decision-making rents."425 Nor did
the Act guarantee that the industry would restructure itself in any way
remotely resembling the perfectly competitive markets found only in
undergraduate microeconomics courses. Not even the United States
Congress would dare to make such an extravagant, unattainable
promise. Even a casual glance at the network effects and "the notorious
economies of scale and scope that define this industry" should lead us to
"expect only one type of [competitor]: big."426 The Magnificent Seven
are the corporate winners who parlayed the sweetest opportunities that
arose from the early implementation of the Telecommunications Act.
Their emergence, standing alone, is neither a basis for celebration nor
cause for alarm. Laissez les gros cons jouer.427
The rise of the Magnificent Seven has exposed some relatively
stable truths about competition and legal reform in telecommunications.
Rapid change, ironically, ranks high among these truths. "Accelerating
technological change has shortened the transitions between ages of
telecommunications law."428 As the BOCs' competitors pursue wireless
and cable-based strategies for bypassing the landwire local exchange,
the litigation that has driven and sometimes overshadowed merger
mania since 1996-Iowa Utilities Board, the BOCs' section 271
petitions, the bill of attainder litigation-will become increasingly
irrelevant. Interconnection and unbundling, to date among the prime
movers in telecommunications merger strategy, are already beginning to
yield in significance to the other legs of the FCC's "competition trilogy":
access charge reform and universal service. These orders underlie
seething disputes over the regulatory treatment of Internet service
providers.429  AT&T's acquisitions of TCI and MediaOne have
triggered another pair of issues involving Internet access and national
425. James A. Montanye, Rent Seeking Never Stops: An Essay on Telecommunications
Policy, 1 INDEP. REv. 249,277 (1996).
426. Chen, supra note 79, at 551.
427. In rough translation, "Party on, fat cats." See supra note * (noting that this article
was initially presented in New Orleans).
428. Chen, supra note 106, at 873.
429. See Texas Office of Public Util. Counsel v. FCC, 183 F.3d 393, 445-46 (5th Cir. 1999)
(upholding the FCC's decision in In re Federal-State Joint Bd. on Universal Serv., 12
F.C.C.R. 8776, 9002 (1997), to grant ISPs reimbursement from the Universal Service Fund);
Illinois Bell Tel. Co. v. WorldCom Technologies, Inc., 179 F.3d 566 (7th Cir. 1999)
(reciprocal compensation for ISP-bound calls), aff'g Inter-Carrier Compensation for ISP-
Bound Traffic, 14 F.C.C.R. 3689 (1999); Southwestern Bell Tel. Co. v. FCC, 153 F.3d 523,
541-44 (8th Cir. 1998) (upholding the FCC's decision to grant ISPs an exemption from
interstate access charges); cf AT&T Communications of the Pac. Northwest, Inc. v. US West
Communications, Inc., 31 F. Supp. 2d 861, 863-64 (D. Or. 1998) (holding that the imposition
of access charges on intrastate toll calls completed by an IXC constitutes an unlawful
"implicit universal service subsidy"). For a fuller discussion of these disputes, see Part
III.B.(2) above.
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cable television policy: the litigation over Portland's ISP access rule and
the FCC's horizontal cable ownership rule. Many of these issues will
involve state regulators. Jurisdictional conflicts will surely arise, and the
FCC's stance in City of Portland suggests that the Commission will soon
encounter the Telecommunications Act's savings clause for state-law
regulations that are "consistent" with the FCC's own rules on local
competition.430
Cable quite obviously dominates this transition in
telecommunications law between the POTS-based disputes of the
preceding generation and the PANS-based disputes of the coming age,
but not in the way that the 1996 Act anticipated. Head-to-head combat
between MSOs and LECs never took place. This phenomenon arose in
part from purely technological considerations. The cable operators'
coaxial networks are not easily converted to a switched system.
Likewise, the telephone companies' embedded copper and fiber optics
networks have far too little bandwidth to accommodate multichannel,
audiovisual programming. Cable does excel in providing high-speed
Internet access, and that technological advantage goes a long way
toward explaining why AT&T stalked TCI and MediaOne.
But we should not overlook economic and institutional
considerations. We now know that one of the 1996 Act's primary
premises was dead wrong: telephony and video programming simply do
not mix. Heralding "convergence" among communications
"technologies and media" has become worse than a "trivial ritual. '431
The misguided belief that cable and telephone carriage have anything to
do with each other besides rights-of-way has inflicted serious regulatory
harm. Sections 652 and 653 of the 1996 Act are a dead letter; neither
cable companies nor ILECs are likely to stray outside their home
markets, at least without a huge boost from IXCs.
Much of the blame also lies with the incumbent LECs' unmatched
aptitude for mismanaging new technology-that dreaded "first gift [of]
making stone out of everything."432 Two examples drawn from the
ILECs' ill-starred efforts to enter the video programming delivery
market illustrate the trouble that these monopolists have encountered
in competing against cable-based Internet access.
Consider first the ILECs' erratic efforts to roll out digital
subscriber line (DSL) technologies. DSL is a legacy of the "video
dialtone" era; this cluster of high-bandwidth technologies grew out of
the ILECs' failed efforts to supply video on demand.4 33 Ironically, DSL
430. See 47 U.S.C.A. § 251(d)(3) (West Supp. 1999).
431. Thomas G. Krattenmaker & L.A. Powe, Jr., Converging First Amendment Principles
for Converging Communications Media, 104 YALE L.. 1719,1719 (1995).
432. SYLVIA PLATH, The Rival, in ARIEL 48,48 (1965).
433. See Jon Van, Getting in the Flow ofDSL, CIE. TRIB., Sept. 20,1999, § 4, at 1, 4.
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underperforms switched copper wire in supplying plain old telephone
service. DSL's packet-switching digital technology promises greater
bandwidth but remains a step behind conventional means of carrying
voice messages.43
4
To make matters worse, the LECs may be losing control of their
own technology. Even though DSL portends new life for the ILECs'
embedded networks, the ILECs have packaged their DSL offerings for
residential customers. 435 They are evidently trying to keep their
business customers on older, more expensive T1 lines, even as CLECs
are aggressively marketing DSL service to business customers.4 36 The
experience of America's most aggressively acquisitive LEC is
illustrative. In October 1999, SBC announced plans to spend $6 billion
in three years in a plan to extend DSL technology to 80 percent of its
customers. 437 But as of that date, the nation's incumbent LECS
combined had "deployed DSL to fewer than 100,000 customers,"
roughly a tenth of the households receiving high-speed Internet
connections through cable companies
4 38
Wireless cable, the other avenue by which LECs have historically
attempted video programming delivery'439 is also shaping up as a
technological embarrassment for the telephone industry. Technologies
such as MMDS (multichannel multipoint distribution service) and
SMATV (satellite master antenna television),440 once on the cutting
edge of the video programming delivery market, now contribute to
Internet access strategies, which themselves are largely the domain of
IXCs.441  Cisco Systems, a manufacturer of Internet networking
equipment, has taken the lead in using vectored orthogonal frequency
division multiplexing to transform MMDS into an all-purpose wireless
broadband medium.442 Once again, a firm wholly unconnected with
local telephony's sheltered world is taking the technological lead.
434. See Jon Van, Promise of Change by the Bundle, CHI. TRIB., Sept. 19, 1999, § 5, at 1,
12.
435. See Jon Van, For Ameritech, the Technology Is a Threat-and an Opportunity, CH.
TRIB., Sept. 20,1999, § 4, at 1, 5.
436. See id. at 5.
437. See Seth Schiesel, SBC Communications to Offer High-Speed Internet Connections,
N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 18,1999, at C10.
438. Iad
439. See supra text accompanying notes 323-324.
440. See generally FCC v. Beach Communications, Inc., 508 U.S. 307, 311 (1993)
(describing the use of SMATV as a wireless substitute for cable television).
441. See In re Annual Assessment of the Status of Competition in Markets for the
Delivery of Video Programming, 13 F.C.C.R. 1034,1083-84,1088 (1997).
442. See Cisco Systems, Inc., Overcoming Multipath in Non-Line-of-Sight High-Speed
Microwave Communications Links (1999) (available at <http:/lwww.cisco.comlwarplpubtc!
cclcisco/mkt/servprod/wt2700/mulpLwp.htm>); John Markoff, Cisco to Offer More Details
on Wireless Technology, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 29,1999, at C1.
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The welcome fading of legislative intransigence on direct broadcast
satellite may finally ameliorate the LECs' failure to enter the cable
industry. Long barred from carrying local broadcast television
signals,443 DBS providers now enjoy roughly equal footing in this regard
with conventional cable systems. 44  The passage of this legislation,
roughly a month after the revision of the FCC's horizontal cable
ownership rules, will probably do more to foster competition in the
video programming delivery market than the entire
Telecommunications Act of 1996. Recovering the satellites, indeed.445
B. All the Commission's Ken
The Telecommunications Act of 1996 ignored the Internet, the
most important technological development in this industry since
wireless telephony. The Act also took little account of mergers, which
would prove to be the industry's most significant economic response
during the first half-decade under the new legislation. Congress
anticipated exactly one type of merger, the LEC/cable combination.
The Act's preemptive strike against this incipient threat, section 652,
proved too effective. US West's botched acquisition of Continental
Cablevision, the only LEC/MSO merger attempted since 1996, stands as
an object lesson on the limits of convergence, synergy, and deregulatory
fervor. Meanwhile, the major mergers that did take place-SBC's
acquisitions of PacTel and Ameritech, Bell Atlantic's acquisitions of
NYNEX and GTE, WorldCom's acquisitions of MCI and Sprint, and
AT&T's acquisitions of TC and MediaOne-have given rise to an FCC
merger policy based on ad hoc applications of the notoriously nebulous
"public interest, convenience and necessity" standard underlying
sections 214 and 310 of the Communications Act.
Perhaps more than any other legal development since 1996, the
FCC's willingness to augment antitrust law's actual potential
competition doctrine has rescued telecommunications law from
regulatory failure. Nothing in administrative law's ubiquitous public
interest standard binds agencies "to analyze proposed mergers under
the same standards that the Department of Justice... must apply"
under section 7 of the Clayton Act.446 Fortunately, the FCC has
invoked its "wide discretion" and dared to engage in "imaginative
interpretation." 447
443. See 47 U.S.C. § 335(a) (1994); 47 C.F.R. § 76.64(b)(2) (1999).
444. See Intellectual Property and CommCommunications Omnibus Reform Act of 1999,
Pub. L. No. 106-113, § 1008,113 Stat. 1501 (to be codified at 47 U.S.C. § 337).
445. Hear generally COUNTING CROWS, RECOVERING THE SATELLITES (UNI/Geffen
1996).
446. Northeast Utils. Serv. Co. v. FERC, 993 F.2d 937,947-48 (1st Cir. 1993).
447. FCC v. RCA Communications, Inc., 346 U.S. 86,90 (1953); see also FCC v. Pottsville
August 1999] TBE MAGNIFICENT SEVEN
After the SBC/Ameritech order, arguably the most comprehensive
of the FCC's merger review decisions since 1996, the Commission's
public interest analysis proceeds in the following four steps:448
1. Will the transaction result in a violation of the
Communications Act or other applicable statute?449
2. Will the transaction result in a violation of applicable FCC
rules?450
3. Will the merger "substantially frustrate or impair the
Commission's implementation or enforcement of the
Communications Act"?451
4. Does the merger confer affirmative "public interest"
benefits,452 including the potential to "enhance competition"? 453
Not surprisingly, much of this analysis arose in response to the three
horizontal BOC mergers that have come before the FCC since 1996.
These mergers have required the FCC to balance three related
regulatory concerns against three goals at the heart of the Commission's
local competition initiatives. Actual potential competition, natural
safeguards against collusion, and benchmarking all become increasingly
tenuous with each merger that is approved. In allowing the horizontal
BOC mergers, the FCC did concede substantial amounts of ground on
these matters. By the same token, however, the Commission persuaded
Bell Atlantic to accede in the legally embattled rules on physical
collocation and the TELRIC pricing methodology as the price for its
acquisition of NYNEX. It also secured competitive entry commitments
from the combined SBC/Ameritech.
This point warrants further elaboration. As demonstrated in the
Bell Atlantic/NYNEX and SBC/Ameritech orders, the public interest
standard in the telecommunications context includes now the FCC's
signature tactic of extracting concessions from and imposing conditions
on merging parties. This aspect of the FCC's merger policy did not exist
in 1996. Quite arguably, it arose out of necessity. Far from serving as a
Broadcasting Co., 309 U.S. 134, 138 (1940) (describing the public interest standard as
"supple" and "as concrete as the complicated factors for judgment in such a field of
delegated authority permit").
448. In re Ameritech Corp. & SBC Communications, Inc., CC Docket No. 98-141, 1999
WL 809551, at 48 (Oct. 8,1999).
449. See In re Tele-Communications, Inc. & AT&T Corp., 14 F.C.C.R. 3160, 3221-24
(1999); In re Southern New England Telecommunications Corp. & SBC Communications,
Inc., 13 F.C.C.R. 21,292,21,309-10 (1998).
450. See TCI & AT&T, 14 F.C.C.R. at 3207-08 & n.287, 3177-81.
451. See TCI & AT&T, 14 F.C.C.R. at 3224-26; In re WorldCom, Inc. & MCI
Communications Corp., 13 F.C.C.R. 18,025,18,130-34 (1998).
452. See TCI & AT&T, 14 F.C.C.R. at 3229-30; In re Puerto Rico Tel. Auth. & GTE
Holdings (Puerto Rico) LLC, 14 F.C.C.R. 3122,3149 (1999).
453. See WorldCom & MCI, 13 F.C.C.R. at 18,032-33; In re NYNEX Corp. & Bell
Atlantic Corp., 12 F.C.C.R. 19,985,19,987 (1997).
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truce after the twelve-year MFJ, the Telecommunications Act became a
legal battleground dominated by defensive litigation initiated by the
BOCs. The BOCs effectively declared war on the FCC;
implementation of the 1996 Act has turned out to be MFJ litigation
continued and carried out on statutory rather than equitable terrain.
Only in the third year after the Act's passage did federal courts finally
resolve a jurisdictional attack on section 251 and a constitutional attack
on section 271. The aftermath of the Iowa Utilities Board litigation
leaves both TELRIC and the Commission's physical collocation rule in
legal doubt. Finally, the very deployment of mergers as a business tactic
changed the structure of the relevant markets and forced concomitant
shifts in regulatory strategy.
The FCC's earliest merger approvals assumed the full and proper
implementation of sections 251 and 251 454 This assumption having
collapsed, the practice of extracting regulatory concessions may now be
defended as sound policy.455  Section 271 petitions and merger
approvals provide the FCC its only defense against the BOCs' attacks
on local competition reform. As soon as the Commission begins
granting section 271 petitions, as it inevitably will, conditions expressed
in merger approval orders will take on even greater importance. The
FCC surely regards BOC accession in TELRIC as an unmitigated good
(except perhaps for BOC shareholders), and implementation of the
embattled physical collocation order is a nice bonus. The only
drawback is that it took a merger approval to accomplish what should
never have become a full-blown Supreme Court decision in Iowa
Utilities Board. In light of the Magnificent Seven's collective inability to
spark competitive LX entry, it may be just as well that SBC and
Ameritech have made a concrete, contractually enforceable
commitment to enter 30 out-of-region markets as CLECs. This single
regulatory decision has sparked a significant amount of interest in
smaller CLECs, which the newly expanded SBC can acquire in order to
fulfill its competitive entry commitments. 456
Most remarkably of all, the Commission has been perfecting this
policy under conditions of rapid technological change and predictive
uncertainty. Throughout the merger mania of the late 1990s, the FCC
"could not read the depth of [its own] thought[s], but stared down into it
as into a deep well where a little light glimmers on the dark water."457 It
454. See In re NYNEX Corp. & Bell Atlantic Corp., 12 F.C.C.R. 19,985, 20,126 (1997)
(separate statement of Chong, Comm'r) ("[W]e [have] made some assumptions that the
most critical provisions of Sections 251 and 252 of the 1996 Act are being implemented").
455. Cf id. ("If it turns out we were wrong, the next Commission may wish to be less
optimistic about such assumptions if another BOC merger comes its way.").
456. See Seth Schiesel, Smal, Local Phone Carriers Go in Search of Big Suitors, N.Y.
TINES, Sept. 15,1999, at C1, C4.
457. ROBERT PENN WARREN, WILDERNESS: A TALE OF THE CIVIL WAR 302 (1961).
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may be just as well that the FCC has developed its merger policy over a
period of years, without conscious forethought, and in response to
rather than in anticipation of market events. Telecommunications
regulation, like so many other exercises in a complex administrative
regime, is a vexatious learning experience.
458
The FCC's experience since 1996 finds an instructive parallel from
the Commission's earliest days. In response to the Congress's first
request for an investigation of the telephone industry,459 the FCC
concluded that the "fundamental problem" of regulating interstate
telephony "consist[ed] largely of developing ways and means ... for
continuous acquisition of basic factual data" on the industry.40 The
Commission thus developed and pursued a policy of "constant or
continuing surveillance" of IX rates through "informal negotiation." 461
Constant surveillance allowed the FCC to patrol long-distance rates
without interminable hearings or the antagonistic atmosphere of
command-and-control regulation, all the while gathering more
knowledge of telephony's underlying market structure.462  The
Commission not only stumbled onto the aptly named regulatory
strategy of "muddling through"463 but also anticipated the "modem"
technique of negotiated rulemaking by a half century.M
In this fashion the Commission crafted a workable approach to
telecommunications deregulation. As a matter of market realities, the
intermodal battle royale that the Telecommunications Act's framers
anticipated never materialized. Incumbent LECs have launched no
meaningful attacks on cable monopolies, and no MSO has yet emerged
as a leading CLEC (at least without massive help from a leading IXC).
The FCC has no firm statutory basis for grappling with the one truly
458. Cf. Daniel A. Farber, Environmental Protection as a Learning Experience, 27 LOY.
L.A. L. REV. 791 (1994).
459. See Pub. Resol. 8,74th Cong., 1st Sess., 49 Stat. 43 (1935) (appropriating $750,000 for
an investigation of the telephone industry).
460. FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMM'N, INVESTIGATION OF THE TELEPHONE
INDUSTRY 596 (1939).
461. FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMM'N, FINAL REPORT OF THE TELEPHONE RATE
AND RESEARCH DEPARTMENT 68 (1938).
462. See Francis X. Welch, Constant Surveillance: A Modem Regulatory Tool, 8
VILLANOVA L. REV. 340 (1963).
463. See Charles Lindblom, The Science of "Muddling Through," 19 PUB. ADMIN. REV.
79, 86 (1959); cf. Kenneth Culp Davis, A New Approach to Delegation, 36 U. Cm. L. REV.
713, 733 (1969) (urging agencies to accumulate information over time about the industries
they regulate and to follow a "common law" body of rules or precedents in formulating
policy). See generally Chen, supra note 106, at 847-48.
464. See Negotiated Rulemaking Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-648, 104 Stat. 4970
(codified at 5 U.S.C. §§ 561-570). See generally Philip J. Harter, Negotiating Regulations: A
Cure for Malaise, 71 GEO. LJ. 1 (1982) (laying the foundation for regulatory negotiation, or
"reg neg").
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important development since 1996: the thirst for Internet access as the
driving force in growing demand for telecommunications services. Nor
did the law develop according to design. Implementation of sections
251, 252, and 253 of the 1996 Act, in any frictionless regulatory
environment an ideal tool for bringing competition to the local
exchange, has stalled. As a result, merger policy, at most an
afterthought in the 1996 Act, has become a major part of
telecommunications reform. The market moved unpredictably, and the
FCC was fortunate enough to respond in a reasonably flexible way.465
The web of interrelated events leading to the Magnificent Seven's
megamergers has also dictated the terms of the FCC's merger policy.
In short, accusations that lax enforcement has made the FCC a tool
of incumbent telecommunications companies are overstated. The FCC
since 1996 has been anything but "a lazy no-good [sheriff], prone to take
[its] ease with a bottle of liquor, and.., let trouble-makers and thieves,
even the most dangerous type of cutthroats, run free and wild.''466
C. Other Voices, Other Rooms
Among the many types of mergers that have altered the
telecommunications landscape since 1996, three warrant significant
regulatory concern: the horizontal union of leading incumbent LEGS,
the rapid hoarding of cable properties by AT&T, and the impending
reduction in the number of major IXCs from three to two. The first
category comprises four mergers, all involving SBC or Bell Atlantic:
SBC/PacTel, Bell Atlantic/NYNEX, SBC/Ameritech, and Bell
Atlantic/GTE. AT&T's successive purchases of TCI and MediaOne
constitute the second category. WorldCom's acquisition of MCI and
pending bid for Sprint account for the third. Only two other mergers
since 1996 have rivaled these deals in size: the QwestIUS West merger
and Vodaphone's purchase of AirTouch.
Four of these mergers remained in legal limbo as of December 1,
1999: Qwest/US West, Bell Atlantic/GTE, AT&T/MediaOne, and MCI
WorldCom/Sprint. Quite fortuitously, each of these pending mergers
will probably turn on legal principles developed by the FCC during
these early years of merger mania. At the risk of making further
mistakes in projecting the future of telecommunications,467 I offer the
following predictions:
1. The QwestfUS West merger is a practical replay of the
465. Cf. Daniel A. Farber, Legal Pragmatism and the Constitution, 72 MINN. L REV.
1331, 1347 (1988) ("Like all other questions, the question of how to promote a flourishing
society [should] be answered as much by experience [as by] theory.")
466. TRUMAN CAPOTE, OTHER VOICES, OTHER RooMs 17 (1948).
467. Cf NANCI GRIFFITH, Can't Help But Wonder Where I'm Bound, on OTHER VOICES,
OTHER ROOMS (WEA/Elektra Entertainment 1993).
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SBC/PacTel merger. Neither partner is an actual potential competitor
in the other's home market, and the synergies achieved through this
union will likely benefit consumers in a rapidly consolidating market.
2. Bell Atlantic/GTE may be the least likely merger among these
four to emerge unscathed from FCC review, not because it would be the
most objectionable ex ante, but simply because it came after the first
three major horizontal LEC mergers. Nevertheless, the FCC will
probably approve this merger as well, but only after extracting the sort
of competitive entry commitments that SBC and Ameritech made as a
condition of their merger.
3. AT&T's pursuit of MediaOne is eerily reminiscent of Bell
Atlantic's merger with NYNEX. Both mergers hinge on FCC rules that
the parties might otherwise challenge. In exchange for its approval of
the Bell Atlantic/NYNEX merger, the FCC convinced these BOCs to
waive their objections to TELRIC and the second physical collocation
order. Likewise, a leading condition in the FCC's eventual approval of
the AT&T/MediaOne merger will be the combined firm's putatively
voluntary compliance with the newly revised 30 percent horizontal
ownership limit on multichannel video programming distributors.
4. WorldCom's sweep of IXCs-MCI and Sprint-faces tough
regulatory review. That is the just and predictable fate of any merger
that proposes to reduce the number of major long-distance carriers
from three to two. What may save the first major horizontal merger of
IXCs, ironically enough, is a loosening of the FCC's grip on section 271.
In an IXC world that consists solely of AT&T and WorldCom, allowing
a BOC to offer interLATA carriage would give local customers a choice
among three major long-distance carriers-as many as they have
enjoyed since the Bell breakup.
Of course, the wireless assault on landwire telephony may suddenly
accelerate, thanks to a technological breakthrough involving MMDS or
an unexpectedly rapid integration of the Internet into PCS technology.
This is exactly the sort of dynamism that prevents "[e]conomic analysis
and market predictions" from being "an exact science."468 I dare not
project the outcome of a battle royale involving AT&T (with or without
British Telecom's helping hand), a united WorldCom, and a north
Atlantic wireless alliance revolving around Bell Atlantic and
Vodaphone.
But let us not get too far of the legal, economic, and technological
curve. One matter of unfinished business remains.
Congress plainly intended the opening of the local exchange to be
the centerpiece of the Telecommunications Act. The FCC's privilege of
468. United States v. Western Elee. Co., 900 F.2d 283, 297 (D.C. Cir.), cert denied, 498
U.S. 911 (1990).
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"regulatory flexibility" under the 1996 Act469-a precious and hard-
fought power to "forbear" from enforcing obsolete or unreasonable
portions of its statutory mandate470-does not extend to the incumbent
LEC provisions of section 251 or to section 271.471 InterLATA relief
for the BOCs is surely imminent. Peaceful resolution of the FCC's
efforts to implement section 251 is not.
There is now substantial competition in every aspect of telephony
except LX carriage. It is a close call whether law or technology will
facilitate the eventual breakthrough. The legal alternative depends
heavily on the litigation strategy adopted by the BOCs. The last and
most deeply entrenched of natural monopolists have been fighting a
two-front war since 1996. The BOCs have played excellent defense on
the section 251 front. In the Iowa Utilities Board litigation, they fought
the FCC to a standstill on the basis of a flimsy jurisdictional argument.
They will fight tenaciously in what I predict (or at least hope) will be a
losing effort to defeat TELRIC on its merits.
But the very success of the BOCs' section 251 strategy has
weakened their offensive posture in securing section 271 authorization
to provide in-region interLATA carriage. With the welcome passing of
the bill of attainder folly, the BOCs must now decide whether they
would rather continue to repel interconnection and unbundled access
under section 251, or whether they like to puncture the long-distance
firewall after a decade and a half of restrictions under the MFJ and
section 271 of the 1996 Act.
At least temporarily, the BOCs hold the key to the further
evolution of the Magnificent Seven. They have mismanaged that
position since 1996. These monopolists have repeatedly upset the
legislative deal that became the Telecommunications Act. The BOCs
lobbied vociferously for the legislation that eventually became the 1996
Act.472 They then had the perfidy to challenge section 271 and the other
BOC provisions of the Act as bills of attainder. With a palpable sense
of bewilderment, two federal courts of appeals noted how readily the
BOCs condemned a statute they had raised and praised, once the
regulatory tables had turned and the constitutional imperative of the
day made betrayal potentially profitable.473  The record supports
469. See 47 U.S.C. § 160 (West Supp. 1999).
470. Cf. MCI Telecommunications Co. v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 512 U.S. 218,224-27
(1994) (refusing to allow the FCC to treat its power to "modify" requirements of the
Communications Act as a general forbearance power).
471. See 47 U.S.C. § 160(d) (West Supp. 1999).
472. See, e.g., Joseph D. Kearney, From the Fall of the Bell System to the
Telecommunications Act: Regulation of Telecommunications Under Judge Greene, 50
HASTINGS L.. 1395 (1999); cf Thomas W. Hazlett, The Telecommunications Act of 1996:
Much Ado About Nothing Much, 50 HASTINGS LJ. 1357 (1999).
473. See BellSouth Corp. v. FCC, 162 F.3d 678, 691 (D.C. Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 119 S.
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Assistant Attorney General Joel Klein's observation that the BOGS
have stalled on opening their networks under section 251 even as they
have attacked section 271 in order to reach the interLATA market.4 74
The whole affair reeks of the "sham" exception to the Noerr-
Pennington doctrine of antitrust immunity.475 In spirit if not in technical
legal detail, the BOGS have pursued the sort of anticompetitive
litigation that deserves condemnation under the Sherman Act.
There is, of course, the theoretical possibility that the IXCs rather
than the BOGS are the parties that have been manipulating the
relationship between sections 251 and 271. To the extent that the IXGS
expect to lose more from BOC entry into interLATA carriage than they
can gain from their own entry into the BOGs' LX markets, the IXGs
"have an incentive to argue that [the BOGs] have forestalled IXC entry
into local exchange markets. '476 Section 271, however, gave the BOGs
expedited access to interLATA relief if "no [competing] provider" in
any given state "requested... access [to] and interconnection" with a
BOC's LX network within "10 months after February 9, 1996."
477 In
other words, the Act anticipated and actively discouraged stalling by
JXGS. Even the critics of IXC conduct in the post-1996 era concede that
"[n]o RBOC [has] failed to receive requests for access and
interconnection from prospective entrants."478 Therefore, the bulk of
the responsibility for the Telecommunications Act's failure to spur
serious LX competition continues to rest on the BOGS' shoulders.
Nor will the BOGS acquit themselves in their attack on TELRIC in
the merits phase of the Iowa Utilities Board litigation.479 In an era when
Ct. 1495 (1999); SBC Communications, Inc. v. FCC, 154 F.3d 226,244 (5th Cir. 1998), cert.
denied, 119 S. Ct. 889 (1999).
474. See Joel Klein, Bells' Strategy at Fault for InterLATA Failings, 64 TELECOM. REP. 37,
47 (Nov. 23,1998).
475. See Eastern R.R. Presidents Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight, 365 U.S. 127, 144
(1961); California Motor Transp. Co. v. Trucking Unlimited, 404 U.S. 508, 512 (1972); Otter
Tail Power Co. v. United States, 410 U.S. 366,380 (1973); see also United Mine Workers v.
Pennington, 381 U.S. 657, 669 (1965) (adopting the antitrust immunity doctrine recognized in
Noerr). See generally Professional Real Estate Investors, Inc. v. Columbia Pictures Indus.,
Inc., 508 U.S. 49, 56-60 (1993) (describing the sham exception to Noerr-Pennington
immunity).
476. Alexander C. Larson & Douglas R. Mudd, The Telecommunications Act of 1996 and
Competition Policy: An Economic View in Hindsight, 4 VA. J.L. & TECH., item 1, 1 30
(Spring 1999) (available at <http:/ijolt.student.virginia.edu/graphics/vol4lhome.-artl.html>).
477. 47 U.S.C.A. § 271(c)(1)(B) (West Supp. 1999) (allowing the BOC to qualify for
interLATA relief merely by filing "a statement of the terms and conditions" by which it
"generally offers to provide.., access and interconnection" to its LX network and by
securing state commission approval of those terms and conditions).
478. Larson & Mudd, supra note 475, 1 29.
479. For a criticism of the BOCs' jurisdictional argument in this litigation, see Chen, supra
note 49. For an assessment of the BOCs' likely challenge to TELRIC's merits, see Chen,
supra note 177.
[Vol. 501578 HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL
a leading rhetoric strain in telecommunications scholarship speaks in
terms of a mythical "regulatory contract" and constitutional protection
for reasonable investment-backed expectations, 480 it is easy to forget
that "[i]t shall be the policy of the United States to encourage the
provision of new technologies and services to the public."481 The BOCs'
backward-looking attempt to hijack contracts clause and takings clause
principles is a jurisprudential mirage;482 their attack on TELRIC, an
unpersuasive effort to indemnify incumbent firms in legally restructured
industries "against the risks of changing technology and new
entrants."483 Wherever the road to innovation leads, it surely does not
begin along the path of unwarranted compensation for American law's
most sheltered monopolists.
In earlier articles on telecommunications reform, I expressed
unequivocal support for the immediate release of the BOCs onto the
interLATA market.4 4 I even confessed my belief that LECs and cable
companies would quickly and effectively invade each other's markets.485
Although the latter misstep undercuts any claim I might make to
clairvoyance in this field, I am on balance relieved that the BOCs were
excluded from the interLATA market long enough for the FCC to
develop a workable merger policy. Despite all regulatory hope,
meaningful local competition has not yet emerged, and I see no point in
coddling the BOCs until it does. Perhaps the rebirth of AT&T as Ma
Cable and the impending union of MCI and Sprint under the
WorldCom banner will alter the calculus. So might the long-awaited
opening of section 271's interLATA floodgates. For the moment,
though, I dismiss any support I might have lent the BOCs as an
insubstantial "fanfare blowing to the sun. '486 I do not rue either my
inaccuracy or my inconsistency. No less than the "regulatory measures"
we criticize, the observations we academics offer "are temporary
480. See, eg., SIDAK & SPULBER, supra note 67, at 106-07; cf US West Communications,
Inc. v. Arizona Corp. Comm'n, 1999 WL 308563 (Ariz. Ct. App. May 18,1999) (rejecting the
argument that an incumbent LEC "provides telephone service within Arizona as the result
of a regulatory contract with the State").
481. 47 U.S.C. § 157(a) (1994).
482. See Hovenkamp, supra note 177, at 805-21.
483. Jim Rossi, The Irony of Deregulatory Takings, 77 TEX. L. REv. 297,316 (1998).
484. See Chen, supra note 106, at 872 ("It is high time to unleash the last of public utility
law's pampered wards").
485. See Chen, supra note 324, at 1510 (predicting BOC preeminence in a mass media
market characterized by "interactive, 'on-demand' information services and audiovisual
programming delivered over phone lines"); Chen, supra note 79, at 563 ("[T]he LX and
cable markets have merged, and thereby competition will likely flourish."). In case the point
is not sufficiently salient in text, I repeat: I was wrong.
486. NEIL YOUNG, After the Gold Rush, on AFrER THE GOLD RUSH (Broken Arrow
Music 1970); hear also NATALIE MERCHANT, After the Gold Rush, on LIVE IN CONCERT
(WEA/Elektra Entertainment 1999).
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expedients, not eternal verities." 487  Write today, regret tomorrow,
renounce mafiana.
487. FPC v. East Ohio Gas Co., 338 U.S. 464, 489 (1950) (Jackson, J., dissenting).
Appendix A: Major U.S. Telecommunications Mergers Since
1996
Acquiring firm Acquired firm Date of merger Date of FCC
announcement; approval (if
estimated value applicable)
as of that date
Sprint Centel May 27, 1992 March 4,1993
$3 billion
AT&T McCaw Cellular Aug. 17, 1993 Sept. 20,1994
$12.6 billion
France T616com/ Sprint (10% take) June 14, 1995 Jan. 11,1996
Deutsche $3.5-4.2 billion
Telekom
US West Continental Feb. 27, 1996 Oct. 18, 1996
Cablevision $10.8 billion
SBC Pacific Telesis April 1, 1996 Jan. 31, 1997
Communications $16.5 billion
Bell Atlantic NYNEX April 22,1996 Aug. 15,1997
$22 billion
MFS UUNet April 30, 1996 N/A
Communications Technologies $2 billion
WorldCom WFS Aug. 26, 1996 Dec. 12,1996
$14.4 billion
WorldCom CompuServe Sept. 7,1997 N/A
WorldCom MCI Nov. 10, 1997 Sept. 14,1998
$37 billion
SBC Southern New Jan. 5, 1998 Oct. 23, 1998
England $4.4 billion
Telephone
AT&T Teleport Jan. 8, 1998 July 23,1998
$11.3 billion
AirTouch US West wireless Jan. 29, 1998 April 6, 1998
properties $5.7 billion
Qwest LCI International March 10, 1998 June 1, 1998
$4.4 billion
Alltel 3600 March 16, 1998 June 23, 1998
Communications $4.1 billion
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SBC Ameritech May 10, 1998 Oct. 8,1999
$61.4 billion
AT&T TCI June 24, 1998 Feb. 18, 1999
$31.6 billion
Bell Atlantic GTE July 28, 1998 Pending
$52.8 billion
AT&T British Telecom July 28, 1998 Oct. 22, 1999
(joint venture) $10 billion
AT&T Vanguard Oct. 5, 1998 Pending
$900 million
AT&T IBM (global Dec. 8,1998 N/A
communications $5 billion
system)
Vodaphone AirTouch Jan. 16,1999 N/A
$56 billion
BellSouth Qwest (10% stake) April 19, 1999 N/A
$3.5 billion
AT&T MediaOne May 5,1999 Pending
$58 billion
Microsoft AT&T (2 to 3% May 5, 1999 N/A
stake) $5 billion
Global Crossing Frontier March 17, 1999 Sept. 21, 1999
$10.8 billion
Qwest US West July 18, 1999 Pending
$41.5-$55
billion
MCI WorldCom Sprint Oct. 4, 1999 Pending
$108 billion
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Appendix B: Major Legal Developments Affecting U.S.
Telecommunications Mergers Since 1996
Statutes" Decisions, rules, and orders
Category 1: "First generation"/POTS issues-LX competition and interLATA
entry
§§ 251,252 Iowa Utilities Board: unbundled access and interconnection
Local
competition
1999 Supreme Court Pending 8th Cir. case on
decision: jurisdiction to remand: merits of the
promulgate TELRIC TELRIC rule
Physical collocation order and pending takings challenges
§ 271-274 § 271 interLATA entry petitions: five down, one pending
BOC
provisions
Bill of attainder litigation
Category 2: "Second generation"/PANS issues-Internet access
§ 253,541 Portland ISP access order (9th Cir. appeal pending)
Cable
franchising








Universal Service Fund eligibility






"All statutes refer to the Communications Act of 1934, as amended by the
Telecommunications Act of 1996, unless specified otherwise.
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AT&T/MediaOne order (pending)
Category 3. FCC merger policy as such
Ad hoc merger policy, combining Clayton Act § 7 and
"public interest" factors, as expressed through four broad
























§310(b)(4) BT/MCI orders; Global One orders
Foreign
ownership
Foreign participation, market entry, affiliate guidelines
I
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